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^,*.r:.*A 0 V 5 / . °o,% 











ASSESSMENT OF 
INFLUENCE EXERTED ON 
MILITARY OPERATIONS 
BY OTHER THAN 
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS 


I 



GENERAL W.B. ROSSON 
Commander in Chief 
United States Army, Pacific 













?//- J7S9b S 




REPLY TO 
ATTENTION OF 


THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 
WASHINGTON, DC 20005-3402 


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 





. 7 


DAMH-ZC 


, Z<o7 
/?f 3 


22 April 1993 


MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION 
SUBJECT: Manuscript 


1. The enclosed manuscript, "Assessment of Influence Exerted 
on Military Operations by Other than Military Considerations," 
is provided for inclusion in your collection. This 1970 study 
was completed under the direction of the Commander, U.S. Army 
Pacific, General W.B. Rosson, for then Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General William C. Westmoreland. 

2. This study contains a wealth of information about the 
prosecution of the Vietnam War. Of particular use are the 
citations to primary sources in the notes. The manuscript 
is, however, a reflection of the era in which it was prepared. 
Used within this context it should be a valuable tool for 
researchers. 



Enel 


Brigadier General, USA 
Chief of Military History 


DISTRIBUTION: 

AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND LIBRARY 

ALBERT F. SIMPSON HISTORICAL RESEARCH CENTER 

ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE LIBRARY 

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY, U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL 
COLLEGE 

DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER 

JAMES CARSON BRECKINRIDGE LIBRARY AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE 
RESEARCH FACILITY 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES 

U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE 

U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY 

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE LIBRARY 




Cc 




c 




UNCLASSIFIED 


PREFACE 


(U) In a letter to the author dated 9 November 1970, the Chief of Staff, 
United States Army stated: 

M . . . .1 have been concerned about a serious 
deficiency in the authoritative accounts of certain 
events or series of events concerning the United 
States Army in Vietnam -- accounts that will assist 
the Army in its development of future operational 
concepts and provide reference material for a 
comprehensive historical record. 

"An assessment of the influence exerted on 
military operations by other than military considera¬ 
tions has not been fully documented. . . . " 

To "correct the deficiency" the author was tasked to prepare the 

assessment cited above. This monograph responds to that tasking. 

(U) In terms of scope, the assessment reflects the following guidance 

furnished by the Chief of Staff: 

This monograph should provide an assessment of the effect 
of nonmilitary considerations on military operations with particular 
attention to those which tend to have a negative effect and to methods 
employed in minimizing their effect. Of prime consideration will be 
a discussion of the Rules of Engagement that have governed the actions 
of United States, Free World Military Assistance Forces, and Govern¬ 
ment of Vietnam forces within the Republic of Vietnam and along its 
borders. The account should include the problems of unit commanders 
in securing clearances to fire, conditions affecting actions on the 
borders and within Cambodia and Laos, and the ranging scale of actions 
and counteractions that can be conducted within and north of the Demili¬ 
tarized Zone. A focal point will be the limited incursion into Cambodia 

ii 


DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

and the effect of the conditions imposed upon the participants, to 
include prior proposals for similar operations. The account should 
also describe the effects on United States and allied forces of the 
observance of ceasefires. Treatment should be given to the changing 
policies governing the use of air power, including restrictions on the 
use of B-52's in South Vietnam until June 1965, the 37-day halt in air 
attacks north of the Demilitarized Zone beginning in December 1965, 
the partial limitation of air strikes in March of 1966 [1968], and the 
complete bombing halt in North Vietnam in October of 1968. Other 
factors that should be taken into account are the Buddhist uprising in 
1966, the prisoner of war issue, limitations in command and control 
of third country forces, the effect of anti-war sentiment in the United 
States, and the effect of coverage of the war by the news media. The 
monograph should close with a discussion of troop reductions. 

(U) Organizationally, requirements established by the Chief of Staff's 

guidance are fulfilled by nine chapters: 

I. Rules of Engagement 

II. Free World Military Assistance Forces 

III. The Buddhist Uprising in 1966 

IV. Effect of Truces on US and Allied Operations 

V. Policies Governing the Use of Air Power 

VI. Prior Proposals for and the Limited Incursion into 
Cambodia 

VII. Prisoner of War Issue 

VIII. Reduction of US Forces 

IX. Summary of Conclusions 

(U) In relation to time frame, the monograph encompasses the decade 
1961-71. Prime focus, however, is on the period mid-1964 through 


iii 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


1970. 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

(U) As a final point, it is to be stressed that the assessment contained 
herein is selective in scope, relies extensively on the author's 
experience and judgment, and is limited in some cases by non¬ 
availability of highly sensitive reference data. 


iv 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 


Page 

Title Page.i 

Preface.ii 

Table of Contents.. 

List of Illustrations.xi 

CHAPTER I. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.1-1 

F^urpose.1-1 

Approach.1-1 

Background.1-2 

ROE, 1961-1965 . 1-4 

Summary.1-17 

ROE, 1965-1971. .. 1-19 

Summary.1-42 

Border Areas and DMZ . . . „ ..1-43 

Assessment.1-52 

Conclusions.1-54 

Footnotes.1-5 7 


v 

IftflFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


















UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

Pag< 

CHAPTER II. FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

FORCES ......... . II-l 

Purpose. 

Approach. 

Political Considerations-More Flags . . . H -2 

Command-Control Constraints.II -5 

US Economic Support to Free World 
Contributing Countries.11-14 

Conclusions. U-17 

Footnotes.. H -19 

CHAPTER HI. THE BUDDHIST UPRISING IN 1966. . . . IH -1 

Purpose. III-l 

Approach. III-l 

Developments. III-l 

Crisis. in _ 5 

Assessment. III-ll 

Conclusions. III-14 

Footnotes. III-16 

CHAPTER IV. EFFECTS OF TRUCES ON UNITED 

STATES AND ALLIED OPERATIONS. . . IV -1 

Purpose. IV-1 

Approach. IV-1 

vi 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


















CHAPTER 


UNCLASSIFIED 



Background. -c. 

Political Military Considerations. IV-3 


Pre-Tet 1968 . IV-6 

Tet 1968 . IV " 7 

The Significance of Tet.. * • IV-10 

Post Tet 1968 . IV-14 

Propaganda Efforts. IV-14 

Conclusions.IV-16 

Footnotes.IV-19 

Appendix.IV-22 

Source List of Appendix.IV-25 

POLICIES GOVERNING THE USE OF 

AIR POWER...V-l 

Purpose.V-l 

Approach...V-l 

Part I: North Vietnam.V-2 

Part II: Laos.V-21 

Part HI: Cambodia. V-38 

Part IV: Republic of Vietnam. V-47 


Part V: B-5 2 (ARC LIGHT) Employment. V-51 


Conclusions. V-55 

Footnotes. V-57 


Vll 


URMT 

UNCLASSIFIED 





















UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

Page 

CHAPTER VI. PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR AND THE 

LIMITED INCURSION INTO CAMBODIA . VI-1 


Purpose.VI-1 

Approach. VI-1 

Period Prior to Major US Buildup 

1963-1965 .VI-3 

US Buildup.VI-8 

Tet Offensive to Incursion. VI-16 

Intelligence Dispute. VI-21 

Political Crisis in Cambodia. VI-26 

US/RVN Incursion 1970 . VI-28 

Assessment. VI-38 

Conclusions. VI-40 

Footnotes. VI-42 

Chronology of Significant Events. VI-47 

CHAPTER VII. THE PRISONER OF WAR ISSUE. VII-1 

Purpose . .. VII-1 

Approach. VII-1 

Other Considerations. VII-2 

Impact of PW Considerations on US 

Military Operations. VII-3 

Administration Policy Concerning US 

PW's. VII-4 



viii 





















UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

Page 

ICRC Efforts. VII-6 

NVN and VC Attitudes. VII-8 

Release of Prisoners by the Adversaries. VII-13 

PW Recovery Efforts. VII-16 

Conclusions. VII-19 

Footnotes. VII-20 

CHAPTER VIII. REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES 

FORCES. VIII-1 

Purpose... VIII-1 

Approach. VIII-1 

Pre-1969 US Considerations of 

Disengagement. VIII-2 


Pre-1969 Efforts to Upgrade RVNAF . . . VIII-4 
Presidential Redeployment Decision . . . VIII-8 


US Troop Reductions 1969-1971 . VIII-11 

Influence of US Political and Economic 
Considerations. VIII-16 

Effects of US Redeployments. VIII-20 

Coping with the Problem. VIII-26 

Conclusions. VIII-29 

Footnotes 


ix 



UNCLASSIFIED 


VIII-30 

















UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

Page 

CHAPTER IX. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS. IX-1 

Rules of Engagement. IX-1 

Free World Military Assistance Forces . IX-2 

The Buddhist Uprising in 1966. IX-3 

Effect of Truces on United States and 

Allied Operations. IX-3 

Policies Governing the Use of Air 

Power. IX-4 

Prior Proposals for and the Limited 
Incursion into Cambodia.. . . . IX-4 

Prisoner of War Issue. IX-5 

Reduction of United States Forces. .... IX-5 


x 

draft 

UNCLASSIFIED 









UNCLASSIFIED 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 


TITLE 


EVOLUTION OF ROLLING THUNDER 
OPERATIONS 

JCS PROHIBITED AREAS 

BARREL ROLL AREA OF OPERATIONS, 

14 DEC 1964 

BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER AREA OF 
OPERATIONS JAN-NOV 1965 

TIGER HOUND OPERATIONAL AREA 

BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER OPERATING 
AREAS BEFORE MAR 1967 

BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER OPERATING 
AREAS MAR 1967-MAY 1969 

BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER OPERATING 
AREAS MAY 1969-NOV 1969 

FREEDOM DEAL OPERATING AREAS 
TERRAIN MAP, CAMBODIA 

POPULATION DENSITY, CAMBODIA 

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, LAOS, AND 
CAMBODIAN TRI-BORDER AREA 

DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONS AREA 1967 

SIGNIFICANT US AND ALLIED OPERATIONS 
ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER 

DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONS AREA, 1968 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


PAGE 

V-6A 

V-13A 

V-26A 

V-26B 

V-28A 

V-29A 

V-30A 

V-32A 

V- 46A 

VI- 3A 

VI-4A 

VI-10A 

VI-14A 

VI-16A 

VI-20A 





UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER I 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (U) 

PURPOSE 

(U) This chapter examines the effect of nonmilitary considera¬ 
tions on rules of engagement (ROE) applicable to the war in South¬ 
east Asia (SEA). 

APPROACH 

(U) Evolution of ROE will be related to: 

- The United States (US) advisory effort from 1961 to 1965; 

- Activity of US forces from 1965 to 1971; and 

- Border areas and the demilitarized zone (DMZ). 

(U) Discussion will include: 

- Sequential development of ROE; 

- Impact of ROE on military operations; and 

- Attempts by Commander, United States Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) to modify ROE in the interest of 
increased operational effectiveness. 

(U) ROE affecting employment of air power in North Vietnam (NVN), 
Laos and Cambodia, plus those relating specifically to B-52's, are 
addressed in Chapter V - "Policies Governing the Use of Air Power. " 



UNCLASSIFIED 




UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT 

BACKGROUND 

(U) ROE are directives issued by a US military authority that 
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will 
engage other forces. ^ 

(U) The US observes and enforces the policies of the 1907 Hague 

and 1949 Geneva Conventions. These policies are enumerated in 

Department of Army Field Manual 27-10, "The Law of Land Warfare, " 

2 

dated 18 July 1956 (also referred to as "the rules of land warfare"). 

(U) The Geneva Conference of 1954, convened to restore peace in 
Indochina, provided the initial source of many of the ROE promulgated 
by US authorities. That conference: 

- Created the states of Cambodia, Laos and "the free territory 
under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam" - now the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN); 

- Prohibited introduction of troop reinforcements, additional 
military personnel and advanced weaponry; 

- Established a "provisional military demarcation line" (PMDL) 
at the 17th parallel as the basis for regroupment of Viet Minh forces 
north of the parallel and French-supported State of Vietnam forces south 
of the parallel; 

- Established a DMZ five kilometers wide on either side of the 

3 

demarcation line as a buffer zone. 

1-2 

UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT 




accords. The US added it would view any renewal of aggression with 

4 

grave concern, as a serious threat to international peace and security. 

(S-NOFORN) ROE in a counterinsurgency environment are neces¬ 
sarily sensitive since battle lines usually are not clearly defined. In 
warfare of the type being waged within the RVN, winning of the people 
is of utmost importance. Victory over major enemy forces can be offset 
by unintentional injuries or deaths among the RVN civilian population. ^ 


(U) ROE adopted by the US in Vietnam have gone considerably 
beyond those necessary in past wars because of the: 


- Insurgent nature of the conflict; 

- Urgent and complicated task of protection of noncombatants; 

- Requirement to avoid international incidents; 

- Desire of the US to limit the area of operations; and 

- Need to control the intensity of the conflict. DECLASSIFIED 

damh-hsr-d# 

(TS) Concurrent with granting of authority to use or expand use oBATE. 
military means, the US administration, acting through the Secretary of 
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ; imposed rules generally 
intended to limit the war and to avoid international incidents. 


. nr y 

V C\ P’i K ; * 




included: 




‘ T liBitfORCLAS" 



- Restrictions on operations in border areas; 


REGRADED 

IS CRCER SEC - »• % 

: 9 BY TAG E2 


- Restrictions applicable to the DMZ; and 

- Restrictions on surface and air-delivered fires 


%84 0624-f 

Ny / / 


(TS) COMUSMACV translated this guidance into specific ROE for 

the ground war, tactical air operations and naval operations under 

his jurisdiction.^ Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) established 

ROE for remaining air and naval operations. COMUSMACV and his 

subordinate elements also published detailed implementing instructions 

since procedures involved in the application of ROE "on the firing line" 

necessarily required additional safety measures or control mechanisms. 

In practice, each lower command level found it necessary to add safety 

measures to insure a relatively high degree of assurance of compliance 

7 

with the intent of ROE directives. 


(U) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and Free 
World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) were not specifically bound 
by US ROE; however, COMUSMACV took positive action to encourage 
and obtain their compliance, as he did in the case of RVN civilian autho¬ 
rities.* DECLASSIFIED 

DAMH-KSR-DJf 

DATE; 

ROE, 1961-1965 


(U) From the US point of view, US military assistance provided 
prior to the introduction of US ground combat forces early in 1965 was 

UNCLASSIFIED 

EefiET DRAFT 








subject to the laws of warfare and US initiated ROE. Accordingly, the 
mission of advising and training RVNAF made it necessary to place 
severe operational restrictions upon US personnel and operations. Advisors 
and others in positions of influence encouraged RVNAF to comply both 
with the written and unwritten rules of warfare and ROE relative to: 


- Air operations; 

- Inland waterways; 

- Herbicide operations (defoliation and crop destruction); and 

- Riot control agents (RCA). ^ 


Air Operations 

(S) In November 1961, the United States Air Force (USAF) began 
in-country air training of Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) personnel in 
USAF aircraft under the JUNGLE JIM program. JUNGLE JIM aircraft 
carried VNAF markings and were specifically prohibited from engaging 
in combat. In December of that year, however, the JCS relaxed the 
rules and permitted JUNGLE JIM T-28 aircraft to fly combat/training 
missions under a new program entitled FARM GATE provided: 


- Combined US/VNAF crews were aboard the aircraft; 

- VNAF lacked the capability to accomplish the mission on its 


- Aircraft were based in-country; 

1-5 


DRAFT 




own; 






- Aircraft were of the same type (T-28) as flown by the VNAF, 



to include VNAF markings; and 

- The purpose of the combat mission was to train the VNAF to 
perform all missions at an early date.^ 


(S) Within this framework Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
(MACV) Directive Number 62, dated 24 November 1962, governed employ¬ 
ment of US aircraft on combat support (operational) missions. In addition 
to the FARM GATE restrictions, the directive applied the following rules: 


- No US personnel and/or aircraft (USAF) could undertake combat 
support missions unless these were beyond the capability of the VNAF; 

- United States Army (USA) CH-21C and United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) UH-34D transport helicopters, identified by US markings 
and manned by US personnel, could be armed for defensive purposes only, 
could return fire if fired upon but could not initiate fire; 

- USA UH-1 helicopters, identified by US markings and manned 
by combined US and RVN crews, could return fire if fired upon or if any 
aircraft they were escorting were fired upon, but could not initiate fire; 

- US air crews could engage any attacker with any means 
available; and 

- US aircraft normally could not approach closer to the Cambodian 

border than three miles with good visibility and five miles with reduced 
visibility. -_ _ _ ,_ 


1-6 


VNAF ROE addressed only the overflying of borders of neighbor! 


countries. 


11 


(TS) On 16 February 1963, the JCS commented to CINCPAO, a 


COMUSMACV that the MACV directive was more restrictive with 



respect to rotary wing aircraft than was intended. The JCS clarified the 
intent by specifically authorizing US rotary wing aircraft to initiate fire 
against clearly identified Viet Cong (VC) elements considered a threat to 
the aircraft or its passengers.^ 


(S) In connection with control of fixed wing aircraft, the 2d Air 

Division at Tan Son Nhut (ultimately redesignated 7th Air Force), 

established a buffer zone along the Cambodian border of five miles during 

daylight and ten miles at night. Additionally, it required FARM GATE 

crews to conduct strikes under control of a VNAF forward air controller 

(FAC) or a C-47 flareship that provided a radio link between RVNAF 

13 

contingents on the ground and strike air crews. 


(S-NOFORN) An incident indicative of ROE limitations occurred on 
the night of 10 September 1963, when Soc Trang airfield came under VC DECLASSIFY 
mortar attack. Within five minutes, after the first mortar rounds DATE' ^ 

impacted, four USAF pilots flying T-28's were airborne. They notified 
the air operations center (AOC) at Tan Son Nhut of the attack and asked 
for a flareship and additional fighters. During Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) counter mortar fires, the pilots expended their ordnance 








Special Handling Required 
not releasable to foreign 


on flashes that appeared to be VC positions. Immediately following the 
air strike the VC withdrew. The Commander of the 34th Tactical Qroup 
commended his pilots for their aggressiveness; however, he pointed out 
that such action was in violation of the ROE since: 


- There were no VNAF crew members on board, no FAC and 
no flareship. Moreover, 

- There was no way of "positively" identifying the target.^ 


(S-NOFORN) Another example of lack of positive target identification 
occurred in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) when USA helicopters fired in 
support of an outpost under attack at night. COMUSMACV stated his 
"concern that . . . US pilots conducted . . . firing against ground 

targets ... without communications with the ground forces . . . without 
prior arrangement or briefing . . . " ^ 

(S) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provided further ROE 
guidance on 20 May 1964 relative to both aircraft and advisory operations. 
He stated that commencing with initiation of US participation in counter¬ 
insurgency action in South Vietnam, it had been the policy of the US 
Government that US military personnel would not take part in combat. 

This policy was reaffirmed with the following exceptions: 

- FARM GATE aircraft were authorized to continue close air 

support subject to the condition that they fly bona fide operational 

training missions against hostile targets to prepare participating VNAF 

- -I-8T 



-mist DRAFT 


Special Handling Required 
not releasabli to foreign 
nationals 




personnel for eventual replacement of US pilots. The ultimate objective 
was stated to be elimination of the requirement for FARM GATE air¬ 
craft. 


- US helicopters would continue to transport RVNAF personnel 
into combat but their weapons were for the protection of the aircraft and 
its passengers only. Fire from armed helicopters would not be used as 
a substitute for close support air strikes. 

- US advisors to RVNAF units were to be exposed to combat only 
as required in the execution of their advisory duties,^ 


(TS) The Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 ushered in a new 
phase of the war. As a result, jet aircraft -- B-57's, F-100's and 
F-102's -- with US markings were introduced into the RVN that month. 
These were considered necessary because of the possibility of further US 
retaliatory strikes and the possibility of a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
invasion of RVN through the DMZ. 1 ' 


(TS) Within this setting VC terrorism directed against US personnel 
and installations increased: 



- Bien Hoa Air Base was attacked on 31 October 1964, five B-57 
aircraft were destroyed, four US personnel were killed and thirty wounded; 

and 

- A bachelor officer quarters -- the Brink, in Saigon -- was the 
target of a bombing on 25 December 1964, resulting in two US killed and 



1-9 




TOP SECRET 

DRAFT .r,-" 

O'-' 4 "' 

108 US and Vietnamese personnel wounded. 

These incidents caused COMUSMACV, the US Ambassador to the RVN, 

CINCPAC and the JCS to recommend immediate US reprisal strikes. 

No such strikes were authorized.^ 

(U) Also in 1964, Hanoi began to supply VC forces with a modern 

family of small arms and additional supporting arms to improve their 

combat capability quantitatively and qualitatively. This assistance 

culminated in introduction of regular NVA troops, including one 

19 

confirmed regimental sized unit. 

(TS) Meanwhile, on 24 August 1964, COMUSMACV had requested 
CINCPAC and the JCS approval of a change in ROE for FARM GATE 
to permit: 

- Aircraft to engage targets in self-defense without 
presence of a FAC; 

' L 

- Missions with an VNAF observer aboard instead of the 
mandatorily required VNAF student pilot; and 

- Response to requests for immediate support without VNAF 
personnel aboard. ^ 

(S) The JCS on 14 October 1964, in approving only a portion of the 

request, authorized either a VNAF student pilot or observer to be aboard. 

They went on to suggest that if the ROE with this change still inhibited full 

utilization of fixed-wing aircraft, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV should-— 

1-10 ' 

DRAFT 






r*- vj. b 

r 4 j **’ 

t, - a tuv 


provide additional justification for further relaxations in relation to 
FARM GATE. 21 


(C) The crux of the problem concerning ROE for fixed-wing air¬ 
craft was the shortage of VNAF student pilots and observers. Frequently, 
neither was available when needed, and response to normal air support 
requests was delayed or aborted accordingly. Inevitably, ROE violations 

resulted from pressure to provide critically needed support regardless of 

22 

non-availability of VNAF personnel. 


Inland Waterways 


(TS) Agreements reached at the Geneva Conference of 1954 had 

guaranteed free navigation on the Mekong River and its navigable tributaries, 

e. g., the Bassac River, by Laos, Cambodia, the State of Vietnam and 

those nations recognized diplomatically by these three countries. Because 

the VC were utilizing the Mekong and Bassac Rivers for infiltration, the JCS 

recommended that the Government of Vietnam (GVN) be encouraged to 

apply controls on traffic using these waterways. The GVN responded by 

instituting a measure of control; however, in order to keep within the 

principles stipulated in the protocols of the Geneva Conference as well 

as to comply with international law, the onus was placed more on customs 

23 

officials than military means to obtain desired results. ___ 


1-11 







Herbicide Operations 

(U) Use of herbicides for defoliation and crop destruction prior 
to 1965 called for positive controls because of world-wide sensitivity 
to the use of chemicals in war and need to safeguard the RVN food 
supply. 

(S) Three basic herbicides were used: 

- ORANGE, composed of dichlorophenoxyacetic and 
trichlorophenoxyacetic acids, was used both on broad-leaf vegetation 
and on mixed broad-leaf and grass-type targets. It was best suited 
for use in Vietnam. 

- WHITE, composed of trichloropicolinic and dichloro¬ 
phenoxyacetic acids, was most effective against broad-leaf 
vegetation. Because of its low volatility, it was used on targets 
where the spray area boundary was critical. 

- BLUE, a water-base desiccant composed of sodium 

cacodylate and dimethylarsinic acids, was used primarily for 

, . . 24 

grass-type targets. 

(S) All of these chemicals are used commercially in the US. In 

1968, for example, approximately 250 million acres were treated in 

the US, while use in RVN never exceeded a million acres in any one 
25 

year. 


1-12 


DRAFT 

—SEeSFT 



HKGRET 

DRAFT 


m: 



— r-.r. 

V * - ■*= 



(S) In July 1961, the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, 
Vietnam (CHMAAGV) suggested that herbicides might be used to: 

- Improve visibility along communications routes; and 

- Deny the enemy a source of food. 

Missions to test and evaluate this concept were initiated with US and 

RVN governmental approval in August 1961, to clear the jungle along 

Route 13 in Binh Long Province, an area wherein definite military 

2 6 

advantage could be gained from defoliation. 

(S) Testing and evaluation continued until May 1962, tightly 
controlled and restricted by both the US Departments of State and 
Defense. Recognizing that defoliation was the less sensitive of the 
two proposed uses of herbicides, authority to conduct defoliation 
missions was delegated to the US Ambassador and COMUSMACV in 
May 1962. State and Defense specified, however, that: 

- No crop destruction operations were to be initiated; and 

- Defoliation would be limited to clearing roadsides, 

27 

powerlines, railroads and other lines of communication (LOC). 

(S) In some cases, the authority granted to COMUSMACV and 
the Ambassador to defoliate involved an unacceptable delay from 
time of request by field units to implementation of aerial spraying 
operations. In response to a COMUSMACV request in January 1964, 


“T) 


1-13 







rrgnrr 

vwftCl 

DRAFT 


-t--"*—" r r 


the US senior advisor to each ARVN division was authorized to initiate 

28 

hand-spray defoliation operations. By the summer of 1964, defolia¬ 
tion had become a routine practice to enhance security of military 

installations and LOC by reducing concealment available to VC forces 

29 

and by improving fields of fire. 

(S) During the period under discussion research of crop destruction 
techniques had been undertaken even though political sensitivity as well 
as natural aversion to destruction of food resources held back approval 
of crop destruction operations. By the summer of 1962, both US and 
RVNAF military commanders were advocating destruction of enemy 
crops on a selective basis. The issue of whether enemy crops could 
be distinguished from friendly crops led President Kennedy to seek 
political assurance from the GVN on 25 September 1962 that the: 

- "GVN could differentiate between Viet Cong crops and 
Montagnard crops;" and that 

- "Usefulness of such an exercise would outweigh the 
propaganda effect of communist accusations that the US was indulging 
in food warfare. 

(S) Having received assurances from the GVN in regard to these 
two points. Presidential approval for crop destruction was granted, 
and the US State and Defense Departments authorized such operations 
on a case by case basis, subject to approval at Washington level. 






SECRET 

DRAFT 



TY7^' 
<L '\S . 



fcV4*«‘ L—“ •-- 



The following guidelines applied: 

- Operations to be implemented only where the stage of 
crop growth would give reasonable prospects of success; 

- Targets to be selected in areas where maximum damage 
would accrue to the VC as against minimum damage to the friendly 
populace; and 

- Psychological warfare aspects to be considered carefully 
with a view to minimizing anticipated adverse political repercussions 
both inside and outside RVN. ^ 

(S) Crop destruction missions were initiated during the period 
21-23 November 1962, in Phuoc Long Province. Using H-34 helicopters 
for aerial delivery as well as hand-spray operations, an estimated 300 
hectares of rice, beans and manioc were destroyed. This represented 
denial of roughly 1, 000 tons of food to the enemy. More projects of the 
same nature were completed between November 1962 and March 1963. 
On 20 March 1963, COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador requested 
continuance of crop destruction missions and delegation to them of 
authority to approve crop destruction requests. The State Department 
response in May 1963 stated: 

. . . All crop destruction operations must be approved in 
advance by Assistant Secretary Far East and the Department of 
Defense. Crop destruction must be confined to remote areas known 
to be occupied by VC. It should not be carried on in areas where VC 


1-15 


DRAFT 

‘Sfosri 





are intermingled with native inhabitants and latter cannot escape. 

Also should be limited to areas where VC do not have nearby alter¬ 
native sources of food or areas in which there is a food deficit, e. g. , 
high plateau and Zone D. ^2 

(S) In October 1963, after extensive review of the crop destruction 
program, COMUSMACV advised his superiors that these operations 
were an effective weapon against the VC, and asked again for authority 
to approve them when favorable opportunities presented themselves. 

On 29 July 1964, the requested authority was delegated to COMUSMACV 

3 3 

and the Ambassador. 

(S) An indicator of the success of herbicide operations was provided 

by the communists in April 1963 when the Secretary General of the 

International Control Commission presented a letter from NVN General 

Vo Nguyen Giap to the GVN. This letter charged that noxious chemicals 

had been used to carry out "collective reprisals" against the people of 

34 

RVN in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. 

(S) Additional examples of success included: 

% 

- Disclosure by the VC committee in Phuoc Thanh Province 
that food sources destroyed by herbicide operations in that province 
could have fed VC troops in the area for two years. 

- A 65 percent reduction in VC incidents against the railroad 

35 

after defoliation of the Saigon-Nha Trang right-of-way. 


1-16 

DRAFT 

■ *cgflg 



Riot Control Agents (RCA) 


SffltfJ 

DRAFT u 




.ir*' 


rs re 



(S) Another politically sensitive subject affecting ROE was RVNAF 

36 

use of riot control munitions in combat operations. US policy 

stipulated that RCA could be used in military operation only in defense 

3 7 

of American lives; however, no such constraint applied to RVNAF. 

Since RVNAF possessed the capability to employ RCA tactically, MACV 

assisted them in developing techniques for such employment. In late 

December 1964, these munitions were used by ARVN to support two 

separate heliborne assaults in Tay Ninh Province. Bulk delivery of CS 

as well as CA and CN/DM grenades was involved. In one operation, 

there was no contact. In the second, however, use of RCA was suc- 

38 

cessful in reducing ground fire against heliborne assaults. 


P 

Summary 

(U) Considerations influencing ROE prior to 1965: 

- Restrictions on application of military power had been an 
essential feature of US national policy; and 

- A limited response to aggression against RVN was designed 

to minimize risk of major escalation. 

(U) Within these parameters, air support activities were subject 
to application of ROE to insure compatibility with the Geneva Protocols. 
Because of political and psychological sensitivities associated with 


DRAFT 

—SESKT 





DRAFT u 


L X 'w 






their use, controls on herbicides were rigid from the outset. 

(S) Effects of ROE on military operations: 

- FARM GATE was hampered by the initial requirement 

that VNAF student pilots accompany USAF personnel on strike missions. 
The problem generated by student pilot shortage was ameliorated to a 
degree by relaxation of the requirement so as to permit either student 
pilots or observers to be aboard strike aircraft. 

- Despite availability of helicopter-mounted automatic 
weapons, initial ROE denied use of this firepower except in response 
to enemy initiated fire directed at the aircraft. Later authority 
"allowing helicopters to initiate fire on clearly identified VC threats" 
permitted limited operational utilization of this asset. 

- Although destruction of enemy crops represented the more 
urgent and effective use of herbicides, political and psychological 
considerations, reflected by ROE, delayed the granting of authority 
for such usage. 

Thereafter, enemy propaganda against both crop destruction and 

defoliation, plus ecological concern emanating from various sources, 

3 9 

served to impose uncommon restraints on herbicide operations. 


1-18 


DRAFT 




UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

ROE, 1965 - 1971 

(U) As 1965 began, assessment of the situation in RVN indicated 
that: 

- Authority and effectiveness of the GVN had declined 
steadily through 1964 as noted in Chapter III, "The Buddhist Uprising 
in 1966;" 

- The same instability that had plagued the government had 
permeated the RVNAF and reduced its effectiveness; and 

- Stepped up NVN assistance to VC units and introduction 
of NVA elements had swung the balance of political-military-psycho¬ 
logical power to the enemy. 

40 

- Survival of RVN was in jeopardy. 

(U) As an outgrowth of the assessment, ROE were adjusted in 
relation to: 

- Air operations; 

- Utilization of herbicides; 

- Employment of RCA; 

- Naval gun fire (NGF) and artillery support; 

- Coastal and inland waterway operations; and 

41 

- Action on the part of ground combat forces. 


1-19 


DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 





Air Operations 



(TS) On 26 January 1965, citing the fact that VNAF could not 
respond to the increasing requirements for air strikes, COMUSMACV 
requested emergency authority to employ USAF jet aircraft within 
RVN under the following conditions: 

- Concurrence of the US Ambassador prior to employment; 

- Control of strikes by FAC's; 

- Strike clearance by the Chief, Joint General Staff, 

RVNAF; and 

- Decision to execute reserved to COMUSMACV or his 

deputy. 

42 

The US Ambassador concurred. 

(TS) The JCS, on 27 January 1965, approved the request with the 
stipulation that both they and CINCPAC be notified immediately of any 
use of the emergency authority. ^ 

(U) Exercise of this authority occurred on 19 February 1965, when 
a VC regiment was reported to be concentrated in the jungles of Phuoc 
Tuy Province. After receipt of necessary GVN clearance, 24 USAF 
B-57 "Canberra" bombers were directed against this target. Five 
days later an enemy ambush on Route 19 between An Khe and Pleiku 
(the same area in which the Viet Minh had destroyed the French 

1-20 

DRAFT 









Group Mobile 100 in 1954), trapped two ARVN companies and their 
US advisors. B-57's attacked the ambushing force while helicopters 
extracted the beleaguered friendly units. The enemy lost 150 killed. 
Following this action, under procedures developed by the 2d Air 
Division, use of US jets to support the RVNAF became standard 
practice. ^4 

(S) On 9 March 1965, the JCS granted a COMUSMACV request to: 

- Mark FARM GATE aircraft with US insignia; and 

- When necessary, conduct combat operations with these 

45 

aircraft without VNAF personnel aboard. 

(S) The JCS did not authorize a request by COMUSMACV for use 

of Thailand-based aircraft for strikes in the RVN, and prohibited use 

of US aircraft for strikes VNAF could execute. COMUSMACV was 

reminded that utmost care should be taken to preclude incidents 

involving the RVN population or forces in connection with use of US 

46 

aircraft on strike missions. 

(TS) Responsibility for further development of ROE was vested in 
COMUSMACV who established rules governing use of air support. 
Approval of the province chief or higher GVN authority was required 
for strikes by US aircraft not involving close air support. ROE were 
established to protect urban areas, villages and hamlets. Special 


1-21 









DRAFT 



instructions took cognizance of religious monuments and public places 
having historical value. Of primary concern to COMUSMACV in these 
particulars was adoption of measures to minimize to the highest 
possible degree noncombatant casualties and damage to civilian 
property. ^7 


(TS) Continuing close involvement on the US side of senior 
administration officials in matters relating to tactical conduct of the 
war resulted in a message on 13 September 1965 from CJCS pointing 
out a problem of semantics regarding the term "free bomb or strike 
zones, " which term was believed by some to imply indiscriminate 
bombing. The CJCS also requested information from COMUSMACV 
on the nature of air interdiction to include target identification, 
approval authority required, type of control exercised, weapons used 
and results achieved. ^ 

(TS) COMUSMACV responded: 

- Target selection and identification: Targets were 
generated in both US and GVN channels by drawing on a country¬ 
wide surveillance system. Identity of legitimate targets was verified 
by RVNAF elements familiar with the terrain and situation within 
their areas of responsibility; 

- Type of control: Virtually all air strikes were under 
control of an airborne FAC -- USAF, USMC or VNAF; 

1-22 

DRAFT 


■** T 7T C* C 





- Weapons used: Types of ordnance expended within the 
RVN were napalm, general purpose bombs, fragmentation bombs, 
CBU2 and CBU14 bombs, 20 mm and 50 caliber ammunition, 2. 75 
inch rockets and 5. 0 inch rockets; 

- Typical results: After action reports indicated the 
number of VC structures destroyed and damaged, number of VC 
sampans sunk and damaged, vehicles destroyed and damaged, 
secondary explosions and fires. ^ 

(TS) Armed reconnaissance missions, because they depended 
on pilot judgment to identify targets, were not used. 

(S) Additional measures approved by COMUSMACV on 19 October 
1965 included: 

- The requirement for control of air attacks on hamlets 
or villages by an airborne or ground FAC, and execution only after 
US-GVN approval; 

- Permission to strike the enemy in hamlets or villages 
if prior announcement of the air strike by leaflets and/or speaker 
systems had warned the inhabitants to leave the village; 

- Authority to strike the enemy in hamlets or villages 
without prior warning in conjunction with a ground operation involving 
movement of friendly forces through the area; 









- Prohibition against striking hamlets or villages not 
associated with ground operations, and not warned prior to attack, 
even if light fire was being received from them; 

- Redesignation of "free bomb zones" as "specified strike 
zones"; and 

- Application to artillery and NGF of restrictions 
prescribed for air strikes. 

COMUSMACV stated that steps would be taken to obtain parallel 

51 

implementation of these policies by the RVNAF. 

(TS) ROE applicable to sensitive targets was updated and 

expanded in MACV Directive 525-13, 12 October 1968. The latter 

noted the enemy's use of areas and places which had religious or 

historical value to the Vietnamese. When the enemy sheltered 

himself in such areas, only the responsible "senior brigade or 

higher commander" involved could order an air attack against him. 

This commander was enjoined to identify the enemy positively and 

to use weapons and forces to insure his prompt defeat with minimum 

52 

damage to structures in the area. 

Herbicide Operations 

(U) Concurrent with introduction of US ground combat forces 
and greatly increased firepower into RVN, consideration was given 

1-24 


DRAFT 




DRAFT yt?c 



to expanded use of herbicides to assist in countering the enemy's 

r Q 

increasing strength and effectiveness. 

(S) Militarily, both defoliation and crop destruction programs in 
support of the counterinsurgency effort had demonstrated their value 
by: 

- Reducing the tactical advantage accruing to the enemy 
through use of natural concealment; and by 

- Denying subsistence to the enemy, thus reducing his 

54 

mobility and compounding his logistical problems. 

(S) These factors notwithstanding, the inherent objections to and 

the propaganda value associated with use of chemical agents of any 

kind, presented problems to those required to rule on an expanded 

program. It is not surprising, therefore, that increasing use of 

herbicides was subjected to careful scrutiny at Washington level. 

MACV's herbicide requests, for example, required Department of 

5 5 

Defense validation. 

(S) Underlying the US position was the thesis that use of 
herbicides for defoliation or crop destruction was primarily a GVN 

responsibility. Accordingly: 

- Subject to policy guidance by Departments of State and 
Defense, COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador jointly were required 
to approve US support of GVN requests for herbicide use; 


1-25 











u 




- A special US country team committee was tasked to 
expedite coordination of GVN requests for herbicide operations; 

- COMUSMACV was made responsible for command 
supervision, coordination and control of all US herbicide support 
effort. ^ 

(S) Using approval authority granted in 1964, COMUSMACV 

gradually increased the use of herbicides as a tactical weapon. By 

late 1965 this produced a shortage of both herbicides and delivery 

aircraft. Accordingly, at COMUSMACV 1 s request, the number 

of spray aircraft (UC-123) was increased from four in 1965 to 

twenty-four in 1967. Although Department of Defense continued to 

validate herbicide procurement requirements, in late 1966 MACV was 

informed that only half of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 requirements 

could be met. In response, COMUSMACV recommended that all 

sources be explored to obtain additional deliveries. The continuing 

shortages resulted in projects being delayed as much as six months 

by the end of 1966. ^ The JCS informed COMUSMACV in February 

5 8 

1969 that herbicides were no longer in critical supply. 

(S) Although the expanded program was highly controlled, a 
number of US scientists in 1966 began actively to protest military 
employment of herbicides, describing such use as "barbarous 


1-26 




because herbicides are indiscriminate, " and claiming that it 

"constituted a dangerous precedent. " Significantly, the American 

Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), in December 

1966, demanded an investigation into "the uses of biological and 

chemical agents to modify the environment, whether for peaceful 

or military purposes. " Failing in an attempt to obtain United Nations 

sponsorship for a field trip to the RVN, the AAAS sponsored their 

own trip. Although disagreement developed within the organization 

over the long-range effects of herbicides, the published findings 

5 9 

were critical of the program. 

(S) In further pursuit of scientific analysis of herbicide use, 
the Department of Defense sponsored a study by the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the National Research Council (NRC). 
Results included the view that the long-range effects of defoliation 
were not predictable at that time. This undertaking led to a revision 
of MACV herbicide operations policy Directive 525-1 in August 1969. 
The directive is updated periodically and reviewed by NAS and NRC. bl 
(S) In September 1969, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to reduce 
herbicide operations by 70 percent from 1 November 1969 to 1 July 
1970. 61 

(C) Information reported to the US Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) on 13 April 1970 indicated some 

DRAFT 







1 


ftrnnrr 

DRAFT uric 




herbicide ingredients used commercially (also in Orange) "might 
produce abnormal development in unborn animals. " On 15 April 

L 9 

1970 the JCS directed that the use of Orange be discontinued. 

(S) On 23 October 1970 the Embassy-MACV interagency committee 
on herbicide operations met to develop recommendations concerning 
the future of the program. As a result, in December 1970, the 
Ambassador and COMUSMACV agreed effective May 1971 to: 

- Terminate crop destruction operations; and 

- Use defoliation only to enhance security of friendly 
installations using helicopter or hand spray techniques. ^ 

(S) COMUSMACV's evaluation of the crop destruction program 
indicated that herbicides used for this purpose constituted an 
important element of combat support in connection with resource 
denial programs. Additionally, the evaluation considered use of 
herbicides overall as having contributed significantly to support of 
the pacification and Vietnamization programs. ^ 


Riot Control Agents 

(S) Although the RVNAF was using RCA in tactical operations 
when US ground combat forces arrived in RVN early in 1965, an 
incident on 5 September of that year propelled into the limelight 
its use by US forces. Near Qui Nhon, a USMC battalion had chased 

1-28 


DRAFT 

saw 




approximately 20 VC soldiers into a tunnel which also contained 
some 390 women, children and aged civilians. Whereas the commander 
could have used high explosives, flame throwers, grenades or other 
"conventional" munitions to destroy the enemy with associated heavy 
loss of life among the noncombatants, use of tear gas in an attempt 
to "flush" the VC from the tunnel was not authorized. ^ 

(S) As it developed, the commander, unaware of the prohibition 

against US use of this agent, authorized his men to throw tear gas 

grenades into the tunnel. Soon thereafter all 20 VC were captured 

and the civilians were released unharmed. Press coverage was 

critical of the action, however. The charge was made, for example, 

that "testing of new gas agents" was being conducted in RVN. To this 

MACV stated that riot control agents are not lethal gas; rather they 

represent a humane method of protecting noncombatants being held 

hostage by VC/NVA forces. Interestingly, neither the communist 

nor foreign press commented significantly concerning the alleged use 

of "gas. " Yet, on the US side many were prone to condemn use of 

the humane approach, while many who might have been expected to 

6 7 

comment favorably remained silent. 

(S) Investigation confirmed that the battalion commander was 
unaware of the restriction and had acted on his own initiative to 


1-29 

DRAFT 

jam 









accomplish the mission in such fashion as to hold noncombatant 
casualties to the minimum. Based on the favorable results achieved 
and the logic associated with this use of RCA, COMUSMACV requested 

L Q 

authority to employ them on a continuing basis. DO 

(S) On 23 September 1965, the Secretary of Defense authorized 

use of RCA in a single combat operation planned for 25 September. 

The CJCS, commenting on this authority, stated that steps were being 

taken to gain permission for COMUSMACV to use RCA whenever he 

6 9 

considered it necessary. 7 

(S) The exceptional results attained by forces employing RCA 
to cope with VC in caves and tunnels prompted a new COMUSMACV 
request for their use on another specific operation. Subsequently, 

70 

he asked again for authority to use them as he deemed appropriate. 

(TS) On 3 November 1965, COMUSMACV received authority 

to employ RCA at his discretion during the course of military 

71 

operations in RVN. Examples of such employment are highlighted 
by: 

- A VC Hoi Chanh (one who "rallies" to the GVN) report 
that an attack by US forces employing RCA during the week of 18-25 
October 1969 completely disrupted activities in his base camp; and 

- Successful denial to the VC of tunnels and bunkers by 
the 173d Airborne Brigade in late 1969. ^ 

1-30 7 ' * 


DRAFT 




■I— T* T* /■«»." r ~ m *” ^ 

l » f ». i; f. 'j ■ k -.- V - • ; 

t { tj vj t •; h- 

W «2m ■% V 'V«a^ . 

DRAFT 

(C) The enemy has employed tear gas against US and GVN forces 

on several occasions, apparently for purposes of harassment. On 

20 and 23 January 1970, for example, an agent of this type was 

employed against US fire support bases NORA and SHERRY, but 

73 

with little effect. Such use can be expected to continue. 

Artillery and NGF Support 

(S) NGF support of both anti-infiltration and ground operations 
within RVN was initiated in May 1965. Application of this firepower 
was guided by ROE which stipulated that: 

- Observed NGF missions would be controlled by US 
personnel from either airborne or ground observation posts; 

- Unobserved NGF, authorized in late 1965, could be 
applied against VC forces outside of hamlets in target areas declared 
hostile by the GVN; and 

- Missions against known or suspected targets in hamlets 
or villages occupied by noncombatants would be controlled by air¬ 
borne or ground observers, executed only after approval by US and 

GVN authorities and subject to ROE applicable to other categories of 
74 * 

firepower. 

(C) Unobserved fire could be delivered on specified strike 
after the appropriate US and GVN clearance authorities had 

1-31 




zones 






xm\ 

mn 


Jb — 






i^. .L. 


been notified. The latter were the senior US commander in the area 

in which the SSZ was located and the RVNAF corps commander in 

each CTZ. This procedure necessarily caused some time lag in 

75 

obtaining clearance to fire. 

(C) Evolution of NGF and artillery ROE during the perio^ 

1965-1971, entailed weighing the results to be achieved by application 

of supporting gunfire against risk to the lives and property of 

friendly forces and noncombatants. Restrictions and implementing 

instructions were governed by appropriate MACV directives and 

7 6 

generally were normal for artillery operations. 


Coastal and Inland Waterway Operations 

(S) On 16 February 1965, an Army medical evacuation helicopter 

reported a "fair sized ship" in Vung Ro Bay on the central coast of 

RVN. The ship, a North Vietnamese 130-foot, diesel-powered 

trawler, was sunk by air strikes. The registry of the ship, her 

100 tons of war cargo and the caches of weapons found on shore led 

to implementation on 24 March 1965 of MARKET TIME, a combined 

United States Navy (USN) and Vietnamese Navy (VNN) anti-infiltration 

77 

effort in the coastal waters of RVN. 

(S) The area of operations included 850 miles of RVN coastline 
notched with a succession of bays, harbors, coves, and rivermouths 

1-32 





which provide excellent cover and concealment for hiding and unload¬ 
ing of vessels suitable for use by pirates, smugglers or enemy 
infiltrators. ^ 8 

(S) Enemy vessels had complete freedom of movement along the 

coast outside the RVN twelve-mile limit. When directly seaward of 

its destination, the infiltrator could either make a high speed dash 

for shore or work its way in by merging with friendly coastal traffic. 

Although USN forces had no authority to board and search suspected 

79 

enemy vessels, the VNN could do so in RVN territorial waters. 

(TS) USN vessels committed to MARKET TIME reported suspi¬ 
cious vessels to the VNN for "stop and search" operations. In 
reality, however, the VNN was incapable of responding to all 
suspicious sightings. This situation was rectified to a degree on 
11 May 1965, when the GVN authorized USN vessels to: 

- Stop, search and seize any vessels not clearly engaged in 
innocent passage within three miles of the South Vietnamese coast¬ 
line; and 

- Stop and search any vessel out to twelve miles which 
was or reasonably could be assumed to be of South Vietnamese 
origin. 

(TS) Pursuit into Cambodian waters was not permitted under US 
ROE. 80 VNN observed this prohibition. 81 

1-33 - -r - — - -— 

DRAFT 

TOP gpriP^C T 






itbftEtJ 

DRAFT 


UK 


t* t r-v' 


V 'V»3» .-- --'• -'•* 


'V __:*i 


(S) In May 1966, the GVN declared that the twelve-mile terri¬ 
torial waters of the RVN were defensive sea areas, making ships 
of any country operating therein subject to "visit" and search. The 
waters inside the five-mile territorial sea claimed by Cambodia were 
not to be entered. 

(S) Effectiveness of MARKET TIME could be assessed in terms 
of increased NVN dependence on slower, more difficult and more 
expensive overland routes. Contacts in coastal waters decreased; 
indeed, in some areas there was total absence of contact with 


vessels attempting to infiltrate. 


83 


(C) Of equal importance to denial of coastal waters to the enemy 

was denial of RVN inland waterways. Initial denial operations began 

on 18 December 1965 under the code designation, GAME WARDEN. 

Operations involved surveillance to enforce curfews and to prevent 

VC infiltration, movement and supply activity along the major rivers 

84 

of the Mekong Delta. 

(U) Significant problems attended development of completely 
effective ROE for GAME WARDEN. Central to the difficulty was 
provision by the 1954 Geneva Conference of free navigation for the 
signatories throughout the Mekong River, its tributaries and navigable 
mouths in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, and on the waterways giving 


1-34 


DRAFI 



•TJ 


f 



DRAFT uncl:. 


«'w' 5 


access to the port of Saigon. This freedom of navigation could be 


granted to other states subject to consent of the signatories. 


85 


(S) In light of the foregoing, the GVN could do relatively little 
to interdict ships bound for Cambodia, despite intelligence indica¬ 
tions that Cambodia was playing an increasing role in connection 
with logistic support of VC/NVA forces. Its authority, however, did 


encompas s: 


- The requirement for commercial ships to obtain GVN 
authorization to transit the RVN portion of the waterway system. 

- Denial of authorization for ships enroute from commu¬ 
nist ports or from countries that did not recognize the GVN; 

- Denial of passage to any ships carrying manifested 
munitions or military commodities without GVN approval; 

- Permission for navigation only during daylight; and 

- Authorization for night layovers only at prescribed 

O L 

anchorages. OD 

(TS) Concurrent with implementation of GAME WARDEN, 
COMUSMACV considered imposition, of a naval blockade against 
Cambodia. A group formed to study the requirements necessary 
for an effective blockade indicated subsequently that: 


1-35 


DRAFT 









DRAFT 



- VNN resources were not sufficient to enforce a blockade 
of the Mekong entrance to Cambodia and of the sea approaches to 
Cambodian ports; 

- A quarantine similar to that used by the US during the 
1962 Cuban crisis would be more suitable than a blockade, notably 
within the framework of international law; however, 

- A quarantine was impractical because of the nature of 

8 7 

cargo being shipped. 

(TS) Of possible remaining courses of action, the one recom¬ 
mended by COMUSMACV called for strict GVN enforcement of current 
regulations, since this measure could be taken immediately within 
existing authority and protocol. Additionally, he sought US Embassy 
assistance in obtaining controls on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers 
beyond those authorized in relation to the 1954 protocols. While this 
approach was being considered, infiltration continued. 1966 witnessed 

unloading of large quantities of war materiel from Chinese Communist 

88 

ships at the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. In December of that 
year, following Washington-level study of the COMUSMACV - US Embassy 
proposals, the JCS approved for GAME WARDEN instructions similar to 
those in effect for MARKET TIME. Immediate pursuit into Cambodian 
territory, airspace, or internal waters was prohibited. However, 


1-36 

DRAFT 





authority was granted GAME WARDEN vessels to return hostile fire 
received from VC/NVA forces as necessary for self-defense. 

(S) From a state of virtually "no control" in early 1966, COMUS- 
MACV was able to proclaim in 1968 that: "GAME WARDEN has been 
successful in maintaining control of major rivers of the Mekong 
Delta, and has continued to interdict and harass the enemy's logistic 
lines of communication throughout the GAME WARDEN tactical area 
of responsibility. " 9 ® 


Ground Combat Operations 

(U) Missions assigned to US ground forces in RVN revolved 
around combat operations and pacification. Although a traditional 
Army and Marine Corps mission, combat operations in RVN, 
including those associated with support of pacification, were com¬ 
plicated by the extensive control measures necessary to protect 
noncombatants and their property, by difficulty in identifying and 
fixing the enemy and by the number of sanctuaries available to the 
enemy. The rules of land warfare, ROE for land and water areas 
contiguous to RVN, and ROE for supporting firepower combined to 
provide safe haven for the enemy throughout RVN and in areas 
adjacent thereto. The enemy, of course, required and exploited 
this advantage in furthering his mission. 91 

1-37 

DRAFT 




UNULAbblNtU 

DRAFT 

(U) An example of the relationship between ROE and enemy use 
of safe haven, in this case a fortified hamlet, is provided by a USMC 
operation on 3 August 1965 against the Cam Ne village complex in 
northern RVN. Here one finds highlighted the specific problems of 
safety of noncombatants and use of other than "conventional" muni¬ 
tions. The operation was directed against a known VC company 
within Cam Ne. ^ 

(U) A Canadian newsman, Morley Safer, and his CBS camera 
crew accompanied the Marines and filmed the action for subsequent 
viewing by the American public. Mr. Safer remarked that "a burst 
of sniper fire from an unidentified direction" caused the Marines to 
react. The film indicated that in retaliation an estimated 150 dwell¬ 
ings were burned down by use on the Marines' part of everything from 
cigarette lighters to flame throwers. The pleas of the Vietnamese 
noncombatants to delay the burning so their belongings could be 

removed appeared to be ignored. As might be expected, publicity 

% 

surrounding the incident touched off a controversy concerning ground 

operations against a village and use of other than the so-called "con- 

93 

ventional" munitions, flame in this instance. 

(U) Cam Ne was a fortified hamlet - -an enemy base. The CBS 
film did not cover the preliminary action involving enemy fire coming 
from the village complex, nor the cement fortifications and extensive 

1-38 

DRAFT 

UMPi flQCiFirn 




trench works discovered later. ^ 

(S) As an outgrowth of Cam Ne, a CJCS message to COMUSMACV 
on 14 August 1965 requested information relative to actions on the part 
of US ground troops that might impact on noncombatants. CJCS closed 
his message by stating he felt the predominant interest of the American 
public would be to make sure that US forces were given every opportu¬ 
nity to protect themselves while at the same time keeping noncombatant 

95 

casualties as low as possible. An additional message from the CJCS 
to COMUSMACV on 26 August 1965, requested information on further 

96 

actions planned or taken already within RVN to protect noncombatants. 

(S) In reply on 28 August 1965, COMUSMACV noted that a genuine 
problem existed that would continue for as long as US forces remained 
in Vietnam. In his view there were no "rules of engagement" that 
could take the place of judgment, or which would be of much assistance 
to the commander faced with balancing his responsibility for the safety 
and lives of his men against desire to minimize noncombatant casual¬ 
ties. Thus, hard decisions had to be made at all levels of command 
down to the squad on patrol. In the long run, hope was seen to rest 
on the effectiveness of MACV's indoctrination program, one designed 
to induce a "state of mind" in all forces aimed at bringing about the 
desired results. Another hope resided in instructions issued to 


1-39 







commanders, FAC's, armed helicopter pilots and all others who had 

the capability to cause noncombatant casualties to use utmost discre- 

97 

tion and restraint in their combat actions. 

(S) COMUSMACV reiterated that US troops necessarily would be 
used in populated areas important to both the NVA and VC. In this 
circumstance he advocated: 

- Continued efforts in the US to explain the nature of the 
war and the fact that the real battle was for control of the people and 
the hamlets in which they live; 

- Establishment of some control over press and photo¬ 
graphic coverage; and 

- Intensification of the existing MACV indoctrination 

program to insure that all commanders and troops understood the 

98 

importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties. 

(TS) A Secretary of Defense memorandum for the JCS on 21 April 

1971, contained the assumption that all ground combat responsibilities 

would be turned over to RVNAF by 1 July 1971, and requested plans 

99 

for remaining US forces. 

(TS) The JCS response on 14 May 1971 stated that the role of US 
ground combat forces after 1 July 1971 would be: 

- Dynamic defense of US installations; 

- Security and processing of equipment and supplies to be 


1-40 





retrograded; and 



- Contribution to the capability and development of the 
RVNAF by provision of essential combat support and combat service 
support. 

(TS) Under the dynamic defense concept US forces with GVN 
Regional Force and Popular Force units are to conduct operations at 
a distance from vital installations to keep the enemy off balance and 
disrupt his operations against the installations. This portion of the 
concept is intended to differ from combat operations which are 
viewed as offensive actions designed "to locate and neutralize VC/NVA 
Main Force Units, their equipment, base areas, and lines of commu¬ 
nication. ’'101 Concurrently, improved Regional Forces, Popular 
Forces and National Police, augmented by US military police as 

required, assume increasing responsibility for local security of 

102 

sensitive US installations. 

(U) In addition to written rules, there were some in the unwritten 
category. A US corps commander remarked in June 1970, for example, 
that although he was never instructed in writing to reduce casualties 
(recognizing that normal operational planning calls for mission accom¬ 
plishment with minimum casualties), "One would have to have been 
blind to not recognize the need, above all else, to reduce US casualties 





UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

and still accomplish the mission. I so instructed my commanders. " 

No written rules could spell out the procedures to accomplish these 

conflicting tasks. It was a matter of judgment on a case by case 

10 ^ 

basis on the part of responsible commanders. u 

Summary 

(U) Effects of ROE on military operations: 

- In the case of tactical air, ROE progressively permitted 
wider and more effective exploitation of these resources. At the 
same time they tightened measures designed to insure maximum 
protection for noncombatants and their property. Although these 
measures degraded optimum use of air power to some degree, the 
loss was more than offset by the favorable impact on the RVN 
populace and by provision of evidence to the US public of restraint 
and humanitarian concern in employment of air delivered firepower. 

- Limitations on herbicide operations prevented full 
utilization of their potential. From the outset, political and psy¬ 
chological sensitivities associated with herbicide use, later joined 
by scientific concern over long-term genetic and ecological effects 
of such use, led to development of highly restrictive ROE. 


1-42 


DRAFT 

! nun ACQIFIFn 



UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

- From an initial policy banning employment of RCA by 
US forces, ROE gradually permitted effective operational use under 
approval authority delegated to COMUSMACV, 

- Responsiveness of NGF and artillery support was retarded 
to some degree by the time required to obtain clearance to fire. 

- Within the framework of international law and the 1954 
Geneva Protocols, MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN operations 
improved steadily in effectiveness as ROE were relaxed to permit 
full application of naval resources and of GVN control over shipping 
bound for Cambodia via the Mekong River and its lower tributaries. 

- Ground combat operations were rendered more difficult 
and complex by ROE designed to protect noncombatants and civilian 
property. "Sensational" news media reporting of incidents at times 
exerted forceful pressure on the nature, scope and application of 
ROE governing ground combat operations. 

BORDER AREAS AND DMZ 

Cambodia 

(U) Coverage of ROE applicable to Cambodia is included in 
Chapter VI, "Prior Proposals for and the Limited Incursion into 

Cambodia. " * 

1-43 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIRFD 




Laos 



(TS) Ground operations affecting Laos were of two types: 

- Combat operations near the RVN-Laotian border; and 

- Cross-border reconnaissance and intelligence operations 
carried out by mixed US-RVNAF Special Forces (code designation, 
PRAIRIE FIRE). 104 

(TS) As the US combat commitment in RVN increased in 1965, 
PRAIRIE FIRE operations were expanded with Washington approval. 
New authority permitted participating elements to: 

- Emplace anti-personnel devices; 

- Capture or kill enemy personnel; 

- Perform bomb damage assessment for ARC LIGHT 
missions; and 

- Control air strikes. 10 ^ 

(TS) No ROE having been established previously for combat 
operations near the RVN-Laotian border, in March 1966 COMUSMACV 
requested instructions similar to those for the RVN-Cambodia border. 
(See Chapter VI, "Prior Proposals for and the Limited Incursion into 
Cambodia. ") Three months later, in June, the JCS promulgated 
appropriate guidance which it specified as being highly sensitive. 


1-44 


DRAFT 




(TS) The new ROE stipulated that when, in the judgment of the 
local US ground force commander, enemy actions from within Laos 
clearly endangered his forces, he could take counteractions in self- 
defense to include: 

- Artillery and air strikes against enemy forces firing 
from the Laotian side of the border on US forces, RVNAF or FWMAF; 

- Maneuver of US troops, while in actual contact with the 
enemy, into Laos as necessary for the preservation of the friendly 
force; and 

- Delivery of fire against Laotian villages if fire was being 
received from them (a notable difference from ROE pertaining to 
Cambodia wherein delivery of fire against villages was prohibited 
under all circumstances).^^ 

(TS) COMUSMACV further enjoined commanders at all echelons 

to exercise sound judgment when attacking a populated area, to 

include weighing the consequences of noncombatant casualties 

10 8 

against the threat to their forces. 

(TS) As demands for intelligence increased, COMUSMACV 

proposed in November 1966 to extend the PRAIRIE FIRE operational 

area further into Laos so as to cover the area bordering Quang Tri 

Province in RVN. The request was reviewed; however, no decision 

109 

was forthcoming. 


1-45 










(TS) On 26 January 1967, COMUSMACV advanced a plan for 
further expansion of PRAIRIE FIRE operations to include deep 
penetrations of long duration in Laos for the purpose of developing 
a resistance movement within selected ethnic groups. The US 
Ambassador felt that a clear assessment of the political implications 
could not be made but that further study might clarify the picture. 
Action on the expanded plan for PRAIRIE FIRE "stalled-out. " ^ 

(TS) An additional operation into Laos was proposed by COMUS 
MACV in April 1967. The plan, called SOUTH PAW, involved use of 
regular RVNAF units as follows: 

- Initial insertion of reinforced battalion with the mission 
of intensifying interdiction of NVA infiltration; and 

- Follow-up by a division-sized unit tasked with conduct 
of sustained operations against enemy forces and bases in Laos. 


Although the plan was approved with modifications by both CINCPAC 
and the JCS, the Secretary of Defense in November 1967 decided 
against implementation at that time. ^ 

(TS) On 3 December 1967, COMUSMACV made still another 
proposal to CINCPAC for operations into Laos, which envisioned use 
of US and GVN forces staged from I CTZ to penetrate and destroy 
NVA base areas. Entitled YORK, this plan was approved by the JCS 

1-46 

DRAFT 




DRAFT 




T TT* 

U .• 


_ —-"T" 

Mf /»V . ' „ t 

"T T V. ' 


on 6 December 1967, for implementation on or about 3 February 

112 

1968. Although it would have heralded a major change in ROE for 
Laos, execution of the plan was thwarted by the enemy's Tet offen¬ 
sive in 1968„^ In the aftermath of that offensive, COMUSMACV 
requested authority to raid selected border sanctuaries in Cambodia 


and Laos. On 24 March 1968, the CJCS notified him that any signifi¬ 
cant change in US military strategy for the war in RVN was remote. 


114 


(TS) PRAIRIE FIRE operations continued in 1970. Because of 
the Cooper-Church amendment, however, US forces were prohibited 


from crossing into Laos on PRAIRIE FIRE missions after April 1971 


115 


The DMZ 

(U) Provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1954 served for 
roughly a decade to "neutralize" the DMZ. Commencing in the early 
1960's, however, NVN activity in the zone increased in connection 
with its support of insurgent effort in RVN. The International Control 

Commission, which had access to portions of the area on a limited 

^ . 116 
basis, was cognizant of the increase. 

(TS-LIMDIS) During this same period RVNAF patrols operated 

periodically in the DMZ to gather intelligence on and monitor enemy 

.. .. 117 

activity. 


1-47 


DRAFT 





Sv 


UMDIS 


DRAFT 


u: 


/r i --«■ 


(U) It was against this backdrop that evidence of significant 
enemy infiltration through the DMZ appeared in mid-1964. Whereas 
the GVN favored positive intervention, the US made it clear that it 
could neither countenance nor support such action by virtue of the 
1954 protocols. 

(TS-LIMDIS) Accordingly, RVNAF developed plans for deployment 

of forces to meet overt thrusts by NVN across the DMZ. Later, in 

1965, COMUSMACV forwarded a series of proposals calling for 

special operations both in the DMZ and portions of Laos bordering 
119 

it. These were not approved. 

(U) On 20 July 1966, the JCS authorized limited use of US fire¬ 
power to counter another cycle of increased NVA infiltration through 
the DMZ. Based on serious threat to friendly troops posed by the 
infiltration, US commanders were authorized to direct air strikes, 
artillery fire and NGF against clearly defined enemy military activity 
in the area south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line 


(PMDL). 


120 


(TS) In 1966, it became evident that the NVA had developed a 

vast armed camp north of the PMDL which remained immune to 
121 

attack. Accordingly, in October of that same year, COMUSMACV 


requested authority to utilize RVNAF teams accompanied by US 


1-48 



personnel in the western portion of the DMZ to observe enemy activity, 

develop targets and carry out selective attacks. Washington denied 

the request and 1966 closed with no relaxation of rules prohibiting 

122 

employment of US personnel within the DMZ. 

(TS) ROE for the DMZ were modified in December 1966 to permit 
artillery fire against enemy weapons firing on friendly forces from 
positions north of the PMDL. Artillery was to be emplaced to mini¬ 
mize potential damage to the friendly noncombatant population by 

123 

enemy counterbattery fire. 

(TS) On 23 February 1967, following numerous requests therefor, 

authority was granted to conduct NGF against targets in the DMZ 

124 

north of the PMDL. 

(TS) JCS approval on 27 February 1967 of modified ROE governing 
PRAIRIE FIRE permitted: 

- Extension of PRAIRIE FIRE operations in Laos to a 
distance of 30 kilometers above the DMZ; and 

- Employment of up to three platoons of mixed US - RVNAF 

personnel in the entire PRAIRIE FIRE area. 

125 

Authority to employ exclusively US units in the DMZ was withheld. 

(U) On 1 November 1968, all offensive actions by US forces into 
the DMZ were suspended incident to cessation of air operations 

1-49 

DRAFT 








u. 




against NVN. New ROE dealing with reaction to enemy operations 

south of the DMZ were established by the JCS.^^ 

(S) In the months that followed, COMUSMACV made numerous 

requests for authority to take more aggressive action against enemy 

activity in and above the DMZ. Results of this endeavor are reflected 

in the following ROE whose key provisions have continued in effect 

12 7 

for approximately two years. 

- Enemy small arms, artillery, mortar or rocket fire 
from north of or within the DMZ may be countered with heavy counter - 
battery fire and/or air attack until enemy weapons are silenced; 

- Surface-to-air missile or anti-aircraft artillery firing 

at allied aircraft from across or within the DMZ is to be neutralized; 

- Enemy ground attacks up to battalion size from north of 
the southern boundary of the DMZ are to be repulsed by whatever 
action is deemed necessary by the US commander to defend his 
command. Counteraction may include ground operation south of the 
PMDL. However, at no time are ground forces to be employed north 
of the PMDL; 

- Enemy large-scale attacks from north of the southern 
boundary of the DMZ which demand a response beyond those authorized 
require JCS authority for appropriate counteractions; 


1-50 







- Overflight of NVN by B-52's during the conduct of B-52 
strikes in the DMZ is not authorized; 

- Sensors are authorized in the DMZ south of the PMDL 
to provide the required degree of intelligence necessary for safety 
of forces; 

- Squad-size reconnaissance patrols with appropriate 
infantry unit backup to assist extraction if required are authorized in 
the DMZ south of the PMDL; and 

- Nothing in ROE provisions is to be construed as precluding 
each commander from exercising the inherent right and responsibility 
to conduct operations for self-defense of his forces. 

(TS) A further request during 1970 for PRAIRIE FIRE teams to 

operate in the DMZ south of the PMDL awaits decision by the Secretary 

# 128 
of Defense. 

(TS) During the 1965-68 period, restraints on US ground opera¬ 
tions and artillery fire in the DMZ placed primary reliance on air 
power to counter enemy activity. Areas adjacent to the DMZ were 

vital to the VC/NVA infiltration and logistic efforts and all were 

129 

targetted in various air interdiction programs. 


1-51 


DRAFT 







DRAFT 


? 1 ^' 


Summary 


\ 5 £ 


N. 


(U) ROE applicable to border areas and the DMZ, to include 
employment of ground combat forces, air and NGF, involved three 
major considerations: 

- Political constraints to avoid international incidents; 

- Gradual increase in application of firepower as enemy 
intentions clarified and international risks were identified; and 

- Enemy use of border areas as sanctuaries. 

(TS) Resulting ROE affected military operations by: 

- Preventing adequate ground engagement of enemy base 

areas and LOC in sanctuaries, including the DMZ; 

» 

- Reducing the effectiveness of air interdiction of the 
enemy’s base areas and LOC; and 

- Increasing the vulnerability of friendly forces. 


ASSESSMENT 

(U) During the period 1961-1963, the enemy continued to gain 
strength and to develop both an infrastructure and a tri-level force 
structure (guerrillas, local forces and main forces). The GVN 
counter-effort progressed more slowly. Insofar as the US was 
concerned, ROE for the period were intended to keep its involvement 
to a minimum and to uphold international agreements. Primary 

I-5Z 

DRAFT 








UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

emphasis was focused on helping the GVN to suppress the externally- 
controlled and supported insurgent movement. Ironically, as 1963 
ended, the size of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group was 
reduced on the basis that the insurgent threat had diminished. 

(U) The year 1964 was a significant turning point in RVN. 
Deterioration of GVN energy and authority, concurrent with greatly 
increased effort on the part of the VC and NVN, combined to tilt 
the balance of power strongly in favor of the enemy. In response, 
the level of US assistance was raised, MACV advisors were increased 
and ROE were modified to make more effective use of US resources 
short of overt participation in combat operations. 

(U) Beginning in 1965 and reaching a peak in 1968, impressive 
US military power was brought to bear in support of RVN. ROE 
moved in the direction of improving the effectiveness of US military 
forces while at the same time insuring maximum protection for 
noncombatants and civilian property. 

(U) For the 1968-71 period, ROE modifications generally were 
responsive to need for raising the effectiveness of allied forces to 
the maximum in relation to the enemy threat. Revisions permitting 
improved air interdiction of enemy LOC in Laos, operations into 
the Cambodian and southern Laotian sanctuaries, protective reaction 


1-53 



UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

strikes against enemy air defense sites in NVN and employment of 
VNN forces on the Mekong River in Cambodia were instrumental in 
improving the allied posture. ROE pertaining to the DMZ continued 
to place US-GVN forces at a disadvantage by restricting them pri¬ 
marily to defensive reaction to enemy offensive initiatives. 

CONCLUSIONS 

(U) Non-military considerations have exerted strong, continuing 
and generally restrictive influence on ROE governing conduct of 
ground, sea and air operations in SEA. Salient among these consider¬ 
ations are: 

- US adherence to Hague and Geneva Conventions on warfare, 
together with selective US observance of both the 1954 Geneva 
Conference provisions relating to Indochina, and the provisions of 

the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos; 

- Insistence on the part of the US public, expressed in part 
through congress and the administration, on minimizing noncombatant 
casualties and destruction of civilian property; 

- Traditional aversion to employment of chemical munitions 
which, in the minds of some, encompasses RCA. In addition, restric¬ 
tive influence has been generated by concern on the part of various 
scientists and environmentalists over long-term genetic and 

1-54 

DRAFT 

UMfi AQCFFirn 



UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

ecological effects of herbicides as used in RVN; 

- Political restraints on military action to neutralize 
enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos and southern NVN, the 1970 
incursion into the enemy's Cambodian base areas notwithstanding; 

- Orientation toward sensational reporting and in some 
cases, anti-war bias on the part of the news media; and 

/0 

- US Congressional enactments such as the 1970 Cooper- 
Church Amendment. 

(U) Broadly speaking, ROE have affected military operations in 
SEA by: 

- Frustrating the application of airpower against NVN; 

- Preventing adequate ground engagement of enemy base 
areas and LOC in sanctuaries, including the DMZ; 

- Reducing the effectiveness of air interdiction of the 
enemy's base areas and LOC; and 

- Increasing the vulnerability of friendly forces. 

(U) During the 1965-71 period, ROE as utilized in SEA moved in 
the direction of improving the effectiveness of US military forces, 
while at the same time insuring maximum protection for noncombatant 
and civilian property. 


1-55 

DRAFT 

IIMCI AQQIFIFn 







UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

(U) ROE pertaining to the DMZ have continued to place US-GVN 
forces at a disadvantage by restricting them primarily to defensive 
reaction to enemy offensive initiatives. 


I 


DRAFT 


impi Accinrn 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER I 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (U) 


1. AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, Mar 69, 
p. 386. 

2. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Army 
Field Manual, July 1956, pp. 3-4. 

3. Kahin, George McTurnan and Lewis, John W. The United States 
in Vietnam. New York: The Dial Press, 1967, pp. 43-63, 348. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Rept (TS) Project CHECO, Evolution of the Rules of Engagement 
in South East Asia 1960-1965 (U), p. 14 (S). 

6. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol I, p. 351 (TS). 

9. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

10. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Evolution of the Rules of 
Engagement in South East Asia 1960-1965 (U), pp. 2-6 (TS). 

11. Ibid. , pp. 6-8 (S). 

12. Msg (S), CJCS to CINCPAC, 161946Z Feb 63. 

13. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Evolution of the Rules of 
Engagement in South East Asia 1960-1965 (U), p. 12 (S). 

14. Ibid. , p. 14 (S). 

15. Ibid. , p. 15 (S). 


1-57 


DRAFT 

! nun Accinrn 







16. 


17. 


18. 


19. 


20 . 

21 . 

22 . 

23. 

24. 


25. 

26. 


27. 


28. 


29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

Msg (S), CJCS to CINCPAC, 201630Z May 64. 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Escalation of the War, 
July-December 1964 (U), pp. 23-49 (TS). 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 381 (TS) 
and Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 193 (U). 

Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), 
CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, 1969, p. 84. 

Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 240724Z Aug 64. 

Msg (S), CJCS to CINCPAC, 142035Z Oct 64. 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1964 (U), pp. 81-84 (TS). 
Ibid. , pp. 91-92 (TS). 

Rept (S-NOFORN), CINCPAC Scientific Working Paper No. 10-68, 
A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam (U), August 
1968, Annex B-l (S). 

Ibid. , p. 22, Annex A-l (S). 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1961 (U), p. 190 (TS). 

CINCPAC Scientific Working Paper No. 10-68, pp. 2-6 (S). 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 365 (S). 
Ibid. 

CINCPAC Scientific Working Paper No. 10-68, p. 6 (S). 

Ibid. , pp. 6-7 (S). 

Ibid. , p. 7 (S). 

Rept (S-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Herbicide Operations in 
Southeast Asia, July 1961 - June 1967 (U), p. 11 (S). 

1-58 


IIMPI 


UK 


cicn 



34. 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 94 (TS). 

35. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comand Hist 1964 (U), pp 365- 
366 (S). 

36. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 95 (TS). 

37. Ibid. , p. 96 (TS). 

38. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 386 (TS) 
and MACV Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 96 (TS). 

39. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

40. Ibid. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 260532Z Jan 65. 

43. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 272333Z Jan 65. 

44. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), 
CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, 1969, pp. 107-108. 

45. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), pp. 182-183 (TS). 

46. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 092108Z Mar 65. 

47. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), pp. 187-190 (TS). 

48. Msg (TS), GEN WHEELER to GEN WESTMORELAND, 131256Z 
Sep 65. 

49. Msg (TS), GEN WESTMORELAND to GEN WHEELER, 200145Z 
Sep 65. 

50. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

Msg (S), GEN WESTMORELAND to GEN WHEELER, 191210Z 
Oct 65. 

1-59 


DRAFT 

i iiur*i n er>Fr-irr% 


51 . 





UNU-ASSINtU 

DRAFT 

52. MACV DIRECTIVE 525-13, dated 12 Oct 68. 

53. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

54. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol II, 
pp. VII 15-21 (S). 

55. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol I, 
pp. 410-414 (S). 

56. Rept (S-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Herbicide Operations in 
Southeast Asia, July 1961 - June 1967 (U), pp. 34-36 (S). 

57. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol II, 
p. VH 19 (S). 

58. Ibid. 

59. Rept (S), Project Corona Harvest, Defoliation Operations in 
Southeast Asia (U), pp. 27-28 (S). 

60. Ibid. , pp. 27-28 (S). 

61. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol II, 

p. VII 24 (S). 

62. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol II, 
p. XIV 7 (S). 

63. Ibid. , p. XIV 8 (S). 

64. Ibid. , p. XIV 15 (S). 

65. Ibid. , pp. XIV 10-13 (S). 

66. Msg (S), GEN WESTMORELAND to SECDEF, 231025Z Sep 65. 

67. Ibid. 

68. Ibid. 

69. Msg (S), GEN WHEELER to ADM SHARP and GEN WESTMORELAND, 
232221Z Sep 65. 

1-60 

DRAFT 

iiMn AQQiFirn 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

?0 * irm 7 ci^ , ^ GE ^ WESTMORELAND to ADM SHARP and GEN WHEELER 
1UU Io\jL Oct 65. ' 

71. Msg (S), GEN WHEELER to ADM SHARP and GEN WESTMORELAND 

030001Z Nov 65. ’ 

72. Msg (C), CG I FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 240025Z Jan 70. 

73. Msg (C), CG I FFORCEV to AIG, 251947Z Jan 70. 

74. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), pp. 177-180 (S). 

75. Operation Order, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, #201-70 (C), 
Rules of Engagement, 18 Sep 69. 

76. MACV DIRECTIVE 525-13 (C), 9 Mar 69. 

77° Rept (S-NOFORN), The United States Navy in the Pacific 1965 (U), 

18 July 1967, pp. 26-30 (S). 

78. Ibid. , p. 32 (S). 

79. Ibid. , p. 33 (S). 

80. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 071459Z May 65. 

81. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

82. Operation Order, 201-69, Commander Coastal Surveillance 
Force, USN, Vietnam, 28 Feb 69 (S), Annex D, Rules of 
Engagement (S). 

83. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol I, p. 467 (TS). 

84. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), p. 409 (S). 

85. Ibid. , p. 778 (U). 

86. Ibid. , p. 779 (S). 

87. Ibid. , p. 780 (TS). 


1-61 

DRAFT 

IIMPI fl CCinrn 




UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

88. Ibid., pp. 783-785 (TS). 

89. Ibid. , p. 786 (TS). 

90. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol I, p. 459 (S). 

91. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), pp. 338-339 (TS). 

92. Speech Fragments, Commandant of the Marine Corps to all 
General Officers, 11 Aug 65. 

93. "An Invitation to Return to Cam Ne," Saturday Review , 4 Sep 65. 

94. Speech Fragments, Commandant of the Marine Corps to all 
General Officers, 11 Aug 65. 

95. Msg (S), GEN WHEELER to GEN WESTMORELAND, 141812Z 
Aug 65. 

96. Msg (S), GEN WHEELER to GEN WESTMORELAND, 262124Z 
Aug 65. 

97. Msg (S), GEN WESTMORELAND to GEN WHEELER, 281040Z 
Aug 65. 

98. Ibid. 

99. Msg (TS-SPECAT), COMUSMACV for ADM McCAIN, 050620Z 
May 71. 

100. MEMO (TS), JCSM-232-71, JCS for SECDEF, 14 May 71, subj: 

US Redeployments from Southeast Asia (U). 

101. Ibid. 

102. Ibid. 

103. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

104. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1966 (U), Vol II, 
p. 631 (TS). 

1-62 

DRAFT 

IIMPI ACCnrn 





105. 


Ibid. 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 


106. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), pp. 355-356 (TS). 

107. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Supplement, 
p. TSS-20 (S). 

108. Ibid. 

109. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1966 (U), Vol II, pp. 
631-632 (TS). 

110. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol II, p. 

745 (TS). 

111. Ibid. , p. 751 (TS) 

112. Ibid. 

113. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

114. Rept (C), The Origins of the Post-Tet 1968 Plans for Additional 
American Forces in RVN, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 

9 Nov 70, p. 27 (C). 

115. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol II, 
p. 215 (TS). 

116. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

117. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1966 (U), Vol II, 
p. 632 (TS) 

118. Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade. New York: Dodd, 

Meade &: Company, 1970, p. 233. 

119. Author's Personal Knowledge. 

120. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), p. 353 (TS). 

121. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 240326Z Nov 66. 

1-63 

DRAFT 

IINCI ASSIFIFD 









UNCLASSIFIED 

ORAF 

122. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1966 (U), Vol II, 
pp. 631-632 (TS). 

123. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 240326Z Nov 66 and Rept (TS- 
NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), p. 355 (TS). 

124. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 230311Z Feb 67. 

125. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol II, 
pp. 743-744 (TS). 

126. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol I, 
pp. 374-375 (TS). 

127. Msg (TS), JCS to COMUSMACV, 220429Z Oct 69. 

128. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol II, 
p. 214 (TS). 

129. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Air Operations in the DMZ 
Area, 1966 (U), p. 83 (TS). 


1-64 

DRAFT 

iimpi AQCinrn 






UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER II 

FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES (U) 

PURPOSE 

(U) Introduction and employment of Free World Military Assitance 
Forces (FWMAF) in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) have provided a 
notably instructive example of the influence of nonmilitary considera¬ 
tions on the conduct of military affairs. This chapter will expand on 
the example and frame certain conclusions with respect to it. 

APPROACH 

(U) In examining the FWMAF primary consideration will be given 
to: 

- Political considerations underlying their introduction into 

RVN; 

- Command and control arrangements; 

- Constraints limiting their full potentialities; and 

- Economic support furnished by the United States (US). 

(U) FWMAF relate to those countries, other than the US or the 
RVN, that have provided military manpower and material assistance 
in combatting Viet Cong and North Vietnamese aggression. Although 


DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 











UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

this discussion will concern itself primarily with ground forces, FWMAF 
include limited naval and air elements. 

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS - MORE FLAGS 
(U) When it became evident in 1964 that military reinforcement 
from external sources would be required to enable the South Vietnamese 
to withstand growing enemy pressure, the US Government and the 
Government of Vietnam (GVN) addressed the possibility of obtaining 
additional outside assistance. Among factors considered was the 
desirability of concerted effort by the free nations of the world, 
especially those of Southeast Asia, to come to the aid of the RVN 
whose freedom was being threatened. Further, it was recognized 
that participation by other nations would also diminish communist 
propaganda claims that US aid and intervention constituted "imperialist 
aggression. " With these thoughts in mind. President Lyndon B. 

Johnson, on 23 April 1964, advanced what came to be known as the 
"More Flags Concept" when he stated: 

I would hope that we would see some other flags in there, 
other nations as a result of the SEATO meeting, and other conferences 
we have had, and that we could all unite in an attempt to stop the 
spread of communism in that area of the world, and the attempt to 
destroy freedom. ^ 


H-2 

DRAFT 


I imps /iQQsnrn 







. — P! —U 



U T - 7 




:n 


r v <4 * > JLs .£' i- ^ *“ 


(U) Unfortunately, the effort to gain "more flags" met with only 
limited success. Four nations -- Australia, New Zealand, Republic 
of Korea (ROK) and Thailand -- sent combat troops. The Philippines 
sent a civic action group (PHIL.CAGV), the Republic of China (ROC) 
a political warfare advisory group, and Spain a medical team. ^ 

^S^^Before the end of 1964, an International Military Assistance 
Office was formed to serve as the agency of Commander, United 
States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), for 
dealing with matters concerning FWMAF in the RVN. On 6 October 
1965, the title of this instrumentality was changed to the Free World 
Military Assistance Office, a designation that continues today. Operat¬ 
ing under the staff supervision of COMUSMACV's Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Plans, the agency’s first task was preparation of a policy and 
procedures guide to be used in working with forces from the contribut¬ 
ing countries. The guide was developed, staffed and subsequently 

3 

published in January 1965 as a Commander in Chief, Pacific manual. 
*"fS)^Free World Military Assistance Policy Councils (FWMAPC) 

4 

were established early in 1965 to facilitate assignment of missions, 
conduct of planning, coordination of effort and consummation of sup¬ 
port agreements for each national contingent. Each council consisted 

of: 





II-3 








DRAFT u 



* 

uc 


r*i 




- The Chief, RVN Joint General Staff (JGS), who served as 
chairman; 

- COMUSMACV; and 

- The senior commander of the FWMAF concerned. 

In practice, the councils rarely have met in formal session in that 
most problems are solved by direct coordination between the principals 
or by normal staff action. 

<TS>- It is significant that in US joint channels consideration was 
given during mid-1965 to establishment of a formal multi-national 
command organization even though such an arrangement would have 
been expensive in personnel and facility requirements. Whereas the 
organization might have given the appearance of unity of command and 
control, COMUSMACV considered that imposition of a political super¬ 
structure would have had the opposite effect. In essense, the council 

arrangements had the advantages of a unified command without the 

5 

political disadvantages. Moreover, time required to assemble, 
organize and train an international staff, plus lack of trained personnel 
within assets of the smaller countries, made this approach impractical. D 


DRAFT 


r o 





DRAFT 


COMMAND, CONTROL, CONSTRAINTS 


Australia - New Zealand 


(U) Prior to the initial US efforts in 1964 to gain greater inter¬ 
national representation in the RVN, only the Government of Australia 
(GOA), among ultimate troop contributors, had become actively 
involved in the counterinsurgency operations there. In 1962, GOA 

provided a 30-man army training team which had been integrated 

7 

into the US advisory effort. 

(S) Initially the GOA had imposed certain restrictions regarding 
use of Australian troops in combat operations. In June 1965, for 
example, the first Australian battalion to arrive came under the 
operational control (OPCON) of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade for 
use only in the defense of the Bien Hoa base area east of Saigon. In 
October 1965, the restriction was lifted to permit Australian combat 
units to be employed anywhere in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The 
Australians were not, however, to become involved in any incident 

g 

along the Cambodian border. In June 1966 the Australian Task 
Force, which by then contained two infantry battalions and supporting 
units, was put under the OPCON of Commanding General, II Field 


Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV). 9 New Zealand forces (an 











L 





z & 


% 


DRAFT 


battery later augmented by two infantry companies) were under OPCON 
of COMUSMACV and were, in turn, placed under the OPCON of the 


Australians. 


10 


(S) During the mid-1966 time frame, the Australian-New Zealand 
contingent was committed to Phuoc Tuy Province southeast of Saigon. 

The move, designed to establish a long-term tactical area of respon- 
bility in a locale needing reinforcement and to facilitiate develop¬ 
ment of both a major base camp and a logistics complex, was under¬ 
stood by all parties concerned to be permanent. Since that time, as 
a matter of political preference on the Australian side, the task force 
has remained within this area except for a few occasions on which it 
has operated in immediately adjacent areas in coordination with other 
allied forces. OPCON remained with Commanding General, II FFORCEV, 
but the restriction on deployment relegated this authority to a formality 
for all intents and purposes. ^ 

(S) Recurring Australian public and political sensitivity to 
casualties made its influence felt on what became a consistently 
modest scale, tempo and intensity of task force effort, albeit a highly 
professional one. New Zealand sensitivities on this score appear to 
have been of lesser magnitude, but composition of the task force was 
such as to give the New Zealand element no separate operational 


identity ' 12 -4^AS»CI 

OAMH-HSR-D#? 

DATE: 2 3 MAR 1989 |J| 




T?TT#rS 







UNCL 



(U) HMAS Hobart, a guided missile destroyer later rotated with 
HMAS Perth, was under the national command but served "as an 
additional ship of the United States Navy, without operational restric¬ 
tions, " The Royal Australian Air Force Canberra squadron and 
Caribou detachment remained under Australian authority for command 

and administration but under the OPCON of the US Air Force units 

13 

with which they worked. 



Republic of Korea 


The command and control relationship with Republic of Korea 


Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV) required very considerable attention, tact 
and diplomacy on the part of COMUSMACV. Under the provisions of 
the military working agreements of February and September 1965, 
between Commander, Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, 
Vietnam (ROKMAGV) and COMUSMACV, the initial Korean unit, the 
"Dove" civic action contingent, functioned under the operating para¬ 
meters established by the FWMAPC. ^ 

(TS) With arrival of initial ROK Army and Marine Corps combat 
units in 1965, however, it soon became evident that the ROK forces 
desired to avoid any written arrangement placing them under the 
OPCON of COMUSMACV. Underlying this development was ROF 




declassified 

OAMH-HSR-D#'/ 
2^ MAR 1989 


• J + i i 













flRAFT 

at such an arrangement might conote sub¬ 
ordination to the US in a mercenary capacity. COMUSMACV reached 
an agreement with the Commanding General, ROKFV -- successor 
to ROKMAGV -- that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) 
directives sent to him would be phrased as requests, but would be 

honored as directives. Although ROK officials in RVN continued for 

15 

a time to affirm this arrangement orally, in reality they observed 
an autonomous position vis-a-vis both MACV and the GVN, relying on 
mutual cooperation and coordination as the basis for conduct of mili¬ 
tary business. This circumstance placed General Westmoreland in a 
particularly awkward and difficult situation in that during the course 
of a visit to the ROK in September 1966, he had been told personally 
by President Park that non-publicized OPCON was in effect. 

Obviously, however, ROK governmental instructions did not reflect 
this understanding. ^ 

(TS) Although appearing on the surface to be nominally satisfactory, 
the cooperation/coordination formula could have been improved. A 
US corps commander, commenting on his command and control pro¬ 
blems with the ROK Marine Brigade, singled out several points that 
have general application to relations with ROK forces countrywide 
over an extended period: 




DECLASSIFIED, 
OAMH'HSR'D# l 
OATEg 3 MAR 1989 


UNCLASSiF3j8 














The ability of MACV to influence the military and 
pacification activities in the ROK tactical areas of operation is 
limited; 



- With the controlling ROK headquarters located in 
Saigon, reaction time is slowed because of need to seek guidance 
from higher headquarters so far away; and 

- ROK operations often are out of phase with province 

military and pacification programs by virtue of ROK inclination to 

17 

conduct independent operations. 

(TS) Although intensely and justifiably proud of their progress 
subsequent to communist invasion of their homeland in June 1950, 
and mindful of their pioneering role as an Asian nation coming to the 
aid of a threatened ally, it was evident from the outset that ROK 
forces deployed to RVN were intent on holding the US to every com¬ 
mitment -- real, implied or imagined -- relating to government to 
government agreements concerning support of the ROK effort. This 

has been, and continues to be, the source of excessive administrative 

18 

involvement and diversion of command attention. 

(TS) Tightly governed by policy guidance from Seoul through 
Commander, ROKFV, the ROK forces have gone through periods in 



II-9 


■dr' ° oil 


AFT 


CLASZlFIC*r- 

T)JTf'T icrr-w 

—\ (J_ 




-V oUi. 


-D BY: 


cr/QADR 






DECLASSIFIED 

DAMH-HSR-D#s 

0AT I3 MAR 1989 















~CLA3lM 



f U 


|^which their orientation has borne no resemblance to demands of the 
war. At times they have ceased all but local security operations in 
effort to eliminate casualties during periods of domestic political 
sensitivity; at other times they have changed abruptly their relations 
with the South Vietnamese populace, officialdom and military in their 
areas of deployment; consistently, they have taken root in their agreed 
areas of responsibility and, with only minor exceptions, have made 
their considerable strength unavailable outside those areas. Regrettably, 
their teamwork with Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces, 
including territorials, has been tenuous at best, token contributions 
to training of those forces notwithstanding. 19 

(TS) Command and control of ROKFV naval and air elements in 
RVN has been retained by Commander, ROKFV. Whereas coordination 
with US, GVN and other FWMAF has presented no problems of con¬ 
sequence, the type and levels of US support have been at issue 
periodically. 


Philippines 

(C) Command and control of the Philippine contingent presented 
relatively few problems since their effort revolved around provision 



/*> 








eral, PHILCAGV, exercised direct com¬ 


mand of his forces, whose mission was formalized by a FWMAPC 
composed of Commanding General, PHILCAGV; COMUSMACV; and 


20 U 


the Chief, RVN JGS. 


(TS) As a prelude to PHILCAGV's arrival in RVN commencing 
in October 1966, a potentially serious political crisis involving the 
area to which the unit was to be assigned made its appearance. 
Whereas planning at one stage contemplated introduction of PHILCAGV 
into Hau Nghia Province near Saigon, the location was changed to Tay 
Ninh Province as a result of military level coordination. A key factor 
in this modification related to mutual desire to build on previous 
Philippine experience, contacts and community relations in Tay Ninh 
Province in connection with Project "Brotherhood" (a US sponsored 
undertaking in which Philippine technicians were employed to assist 
the GVN). Through further coordination, including an on-the - ground 
survey of Tay Ninh Province by representatives of the Philippine 

21 

Government, the issue was settled amicably at governmental level. 

(C) Domestic political pressures, stimulated by resurgence of 
Huk dissidence, plus disagreement with the level of US support, 
induced the Republic of the Philippines to withdraw PHILCAGV from 


RVN in 1969 and 1970. 


dN< 



DECLASSIFIED 

DAMH-HSR-D#^ 

DATE: 2 3 MAR 1989 



















pS) In 1966 the Royal Thai Government (RTG) announced it would 

support the war effort in the RVN " to help oppose Communist aggres- 

P P 

sion when it is still at a distance from our country. Initially, a 

regimental combat team was provided under the designation Royal 
Thai Volunteer Force, Vietnam (RTVFV). By 1969 this force increased 
to the 10, 500 man "Black Panther" (later redesignated "Black Leopard") 
Division, whose headquarters was established at Camp Bearcat east 
of Saigon, and whose tactical area of operations generally lay between 
US units in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh area and the Australian-New 
Zealand Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province. 

(U) Command of the RTVFV was vested in the Commander, 

RTVFV, designated by the RTG. He in turn was under Commander, 
Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam, a joint commander with headquarters 
in Saigon. Combined coordination was achieved at the latter level 
through a FWMAPC whose basic function was to develop, prescribe 
and synchronize the general concept of employment of the Thai ground, 
naval and air elements on a basis acceptable to the Republic of 
Vietnam Armed Forces (as agent of the GVN), MACV and the RTG. 

(C) Commander, Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam and COMUSMACV 






[ $ TV* f t iUv. ;• 



v-- I j 


jji s signments, insure establishment and maintenance of arrangements 
calculated to facilitate mission accomplishment, and resolve matters 
of mutual interest relating to the RTVFV. OPCON of the operating 
elements of the RTVFV nominally were to be vested in COMUSMACV 
and exercised through the appropriate field force commander. ^ 

(C) Initially, Thai ground forces were placed under the OPCON 
of Commanding General, 9th US Infantry Division; later of Command¬ 
ing General, II FFORCEV. Here again, however, activities of the 
RTVFV, largely defensive in nature until early 1971, were governed 
for the most part by guidance from Bangkok. The real-world relation¬ 
ship was one of coordination, with the key to Thai responsiveness 
residing rather importantly in the personality of the field force 

O A 

commander and his relationship with the RTVFV commander. 

(C) Small Thai Navy and Air Force detachments, while under 
direct Thai command, have been satellited for all intents and pur¬ 
poses onto counterpart US units in the interest of operational cohesion 
and support. The Thais have on occasion manifested sensitivity 
against mission assignment procedures that appear to subordinate 

25 'll 

their contingents to US units. _11 


UNCLA 


V ; ; . , I 

»_■ J_)_ 


DECLASSIFIED 

DAMH-HSR-D# 

DATE; 2 3 MAR 1339 



















/r*v 



.... JRAFT 

XJ O Lsi-O ^ ~ * : R^3tr'&lic of China 

(U) Upon request of the GVN, the Republic of China Military- 

Advisory Group, Vietnam (ROCMAGV) was activated on 7 October 

1964, to assist the RVNAF in establishing a political warfare 

(POLWAR) system, training POLWAR cadre and conducting a POLWAR 

program. Within the combined matrix, a FWMAPC was established 

2 6 

to provide an appropriate system of control. Although COMUSMACV 
is a member of the council and has agreed to provide ROCMAGV with 
selective logistic support, the group's activities are largely bilateral 
in nature, ROC-GVN. 

US ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO FREE WORLD TROOP CONTRIBUTING 


COUNTRIES 


“tJ&^NOFORN) With the exception of GOA and Government of New 
Zealand (GNZ) forces deployed to the RVN, the US has defrayed costs 
generated by the FWMAF on a "cost-plus-incentives" basis. 

Philippines 

($&) In the case of PHILCAGV, it has been estimated that the cost 

r 

to the US was $39 million between 1967 and 1969, or approximately 
$26, 000 per man. In return, the PHILCAGV performed acceptably 
on the construction projects it undertook. More could have been done. 


Further, the same work could have been accomplished with ARVN and 
27 


US resources. 


— r- T ' 


declassified, 
DAMH-HSR-DI^ 
DATE® 3 MAR 1989 








Special Handling Required 
not releasable to foreigt) 
nationals 

















y 





The Philippine contribution essentially was political in 


nature -- addition of another "flag. " Concerning continuation of 
PHILCAGV in the RVN, the US Embassy had this to say: 


. . On balance, therefore, we feel that we should not 


ourselves take any initiative to maintain PHILCAG in Vietnam. If we 
relent and acquiesce to the Philippine demands that we pick up the 
entire check, we will only serve to make it impossible to demand 
that PHILCAG improve its performance, since one does not preface 


an effort to shape up a unit by begging them to stay. 28 U 


Thailand 


(S) The Thailand "flag" also costed out at a high level. As agreed 
in 1967, the US undertook to assist the RTG in deploying a division for 
combat in RVN and to assist in maintaining and improving Thai forces 
in Thailand. The division was to be fully equipped, including basic 
loads, allowed to retain its equipment upon return to Thailand, and 
all of its personnel paid an overseas allowance by the US. All costs 
associated with preparation, training, maintenance, equipment, 
transportation, supply and mustering-out of the Thai forces sent to 
Vietnam were assumed by the US. Improvements agreed to within 
Thailand included a HAWK battery (equipment, training and con¬ 
struction), additional helicopter resources and an increase in Mili¬ 
tary Assistance Program (MAP) funds for 1968 and 1969 from $60 



DECLASSIFIED 
DAMH-HSR-BS? 
DATE2 3 MAR 1989 













DRAFT 



Republic of Korea 

71 C : r ‘T) 

' £T “ a1 -- r>^ T ^ pr^-jtjed the largest combat force (50,000 


men), the cost thereof to the US has been higher than for any other 
Free World country. This in turn relates to a decision made in 
Washington in 1964 that the US would be willing to underwrite what¬ 
ever was needed to enable ROK combat forces to take part in the 
war. Subsequently, one US report estimated that under this policy 

the RVN effort provided the ROK with 20 percent of its foreign exchange 
, 31 

earnings in 1969 alone. 

(S) Among incentives given to the ROK Government "to see that 
the integrity of Korea's defense is maintained and strengthened and 
Korea's economic progress is further promoted," were those to: 

- Modernize ROK forces in Korea; 


- Finance all additional costs for the forces deployed to 


the RVN; 


- Expand the ROK arsenal for increased ammunition 


production in Korea; 


Provide for exclusive ROK use of communications 


facilities between Seoul and Saigon; 


- Assume costs of overseas allowances for ROK forces 


in RVN 


■J 


DECLASSIFIED 
damh-hsr-d# ? 
DATE: 2 3 MAR 1989 


7- C 4 C 1 '■ 1 ** * r '' 

UNCI..-—'- 

aJkEVIETC date ? ' 

F1RAFT CLASSIFICATTCN C0NTIi ~ SD BY: <>1 fVfll 


II-16 ,U>! 


DECLASSIFY ON: 


or/OADR 













!L 6 

_ - Provide death and disability gratuities of RVN casualties 
at double the previous ROK rates; 

- Pay the cost of mobilizing and maintaining in Korea 
extra reserve forces; 

- Suspend the MAP transfer program for as long as sub¬ 
stantial ROK forces remain in the RVN; 

- Increase technical assistance to the ROK in the field 
of export promotion; and 

- Give ROK preferential treatment for construction and 

o y 

employment opportunities in the RVN. 

Australia - New Zealand 

(C) Australia and New Zealand forces have been self-supporting 
except for common use items supplied in country, plus some hardware 
provided during initial outfitting to meet the peculiar environment of 
the RVN. Those common items supplied by the US were paid for by 
both GOA and GNZ on a reimbursable basis. ^3 



CONCLUSIONS 


(TS) Unilateral political factors, plus constraints imposed by 
the principal Free World troop contributing countries on employment 
of their forces in RVN have diminished the effectiveness of FWMAF, 

— - r* 

V 


DECLASSIFP 

DAMH-HSft.-Btti 

WTE *3 MAR 


1989 



, . ... *[ /—■ ; • 

• \ y' 1 ' ' 

» lfc7 »• 

J> XT 

u-n^REvt^ DATE; 

A iKUM 7 T, o v 

DE 
tJ 






or 
















and control arrangements. 

(TS) In the case of the Philippines, ROK and Thailand, it is 
evident that economic gain at US expense has weighed as heavily, if 
not out-weighed, commitment to containment of the threat to the 
national life of the RVN. Here again, one witnesses a circumstance 
that has worked to the disadvantage of FWMAF effectiveness and 


potential 


JT 


(U) The foregoing notwithstanding, the "more flags" policy did 
produce additional forces to confront aggression in RVN. These 
forces have contributed in varying degree to the war effort, while 
increasing their material posture in so doing. Moreover, they have 

o A 

strengthened the anti-communist front of the Free World. 

(U) A centralized, integrated combined command apparatus 
encompassing all allied forces in RVN is impracticable on political 
grounds and by virtue of formidable organizational requirements. 


(U) Allied command and control arrangements that have evolved 
in RVN have provided a reasonable, though not wholly satisfactory, 
basis for coordination and cooperation among all Free World 
elements within the limits established by political facts of life. 


11-18 


^SSIFTED 


declassified 
damh-hsb-d# % 

DATE- o 

2 3 AMR 7989 













FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES 



1. Rept (FOUO), Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward South¬ 
east Asia, 1943-1968, A Chronological Compendium (U), USAF 
Historical Division, 1968, p. 265 (U). 


2. U. S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on U. S. Security Agree¬ 
ments and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Hearings, 91st Congress, 2d Session, Feb 70. U. S. 

Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad; Republic of Korea. 

Washington, D. C. , GPO, 1970, pp. 1541-59. 

3. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), pp. 94-95 (^).li 

4. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol I, p. IV-8 C§).ll 

5. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol I, pp. 221-22 (TS1.ll 


6. Author's personal knowledge as MACV Chief of Staff, June 1965 
April 1967. 


7. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), p. 71 (U). 

8. Military Working Arrangement Between COMUSMACV and Chairman, 
Chiefs of Staff Committee Australia, 30 Nov 67 (C). 

9. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd History 1966 (U), p. 93 (\).U 

10. Military Working Arrangement Between COMUSMACV and Com¬ 
mander, New Zealand Army Force Far East, 10 May 68 (C). 

11. Author's personal knowledge as MACV Chief of Staff, June 1965 - 
April 1967, and Deputy Commander, USMACV, April 1969 - September 

1970. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol I, pp. 248-49 (S).li 



14. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), p. 72 (*TSf. U 


S/S .DRAFT 


















16. Author's personal knowledge as MACV Chief of Staff, June 1965 - 
April 1967. 


17. Msg (TS-SENSITIVE) BOM, CG XXIV Corps to DEPCOMUSMACV, 
101500Z Aug 70, subj: Appraisal of Allied Effort in SVN (U). 

18. Author's personal knowledge as MACV Chief of Staff, June 1965 - 
April 1967, and Deputy Commander, USMACV, April 1969 - 
September 1970. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol I, p. IV-35 (G^.li 


21. Author's personal knowledge as MACV Chief of Staff, June 1965 - 
April 1967, and Deputy Commander, USMACV, April 1969 - 
September 1970. 


22. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol I, p. IV-40 fU).\l 

23. Military Working Arrangement Between Commander, Royal Thai 
Forces, Vietnam, and COMUSMACV, 29 Jul 67 (C). 

24. Author's personal knowledge as MACV Chief of Staff, June 1965 - 
April 1967, and Deputy Commander, USMACV, April 1969 - 
September 1970. 



Ibid. 

Military Working Arrangement Between COMUSMACV and Com¬ 
mander, Republic of China Military Assistance Group, 19 Dec 68 (C). 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol I, p. IV-38 (^). 



- ^ 





/tft 


NCLASGIFIE 





29. U. S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agree¬ 
ments and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Nov 69. U. S. 
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad; Kingdom of 

Thailand. Washington, D. C. , GPO, 1970, pp. 624-57. 

30. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), p. 366 

31. Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade . New York: Dodd, Mead 
h. Company, 1970, p. 267. 

32. Ltr (S) Ambassador Brown to Lee Tong Won, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, ROK, 4 Mar 66; and Financial Working Arrangement 
Between USMACV and ROKFV, 15 Dec 65 

33. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1965 (U), pp. 362-63. ll 

34. U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agree¬ 
ments and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Hearings, 91st Congress, 2d Session, Feb 70. U. S. 
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Republic of Korea . 

Washington, D. C. , GPO, 1970, pp. 1541-59. ~1 



















CHAPTER HI 

THE BUDDHIST UPRISING IN 1966 (U) 

PURPOSE 

(U) The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of the 
1966 Buddhist uprising on military operations, particularly in the I 
Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ), * Republic of Vietnam (RVN). 


APPROACH 


(U) This chapter addresses the 1966 crisis with emphasis on: 

- Developments leading to the uprising; 

- Diminished effectiveness of government in RVN during the 

crisis; 

- Reduced level of military activity directed against Viet Cong 
(VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces; and 

- Diversion of military resources to cope with the crisis. 


DEVELOPMENTS 


(S) During the period 1 November 1963 to 28 February 1966, an 
extremely close interrelationship existed between political develop¬ 
ments in the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and military operations. 
Basically, political instability, as attested to by a succession of short¬ 
lived regimes, carried over into the domain of military operations. 
Throughout the period Buddhist pressure was a major factor contribut¬ 
ing to instability. 

^Subsequently redesignated Military Region 1. 


JSSGRHT 







(S) Following the overthrow of the Diem regime on 1 November 

1963, Major General Duong Van (Big) Minh headed a military junta 
(Military Revolutionary Council - MRC) that moved to stabilize the 
government. However, lack of aggressive leadership within the MRC 
led to a bloodless coup on 30 January 1964 by Major General Nguyen 
Khanh, II Corps Commander. These successive developments had a 
devastating effect upon the morale and efficiency of the Republic of 
Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Throughout Khanh's regime turmoil 
within the country continued. After seven months,frustration and grow¬ 
ing dissatisfaction, primarily among politico-religious factions, led 

to riots and the formation of a new caretaker government on 16 August 

1964, pending establishment of a national congress. At this point, 
governmental machinery ground to a standstill. An unsuccessful 
coup attempt on 13 September 1964 triggered early establishment of a 
High National Council headed by a civilian premier, Tran Van Huong. 

In December 1964, however, a group of young military officers, the 
"Young Turks," formed an Armed Forces Council (AFC) to advise 
the Government and illegally abolished the High National Council. In 
turn, a Buddhist uprising resulted in Khanh's reassumption of leader¬ 
ship on 27 January 1965. In the face of opposition to his role, Khanh 
stepped aside on 12 February for civilian Phan Huy Quat, but remained 


III-2 













in the government. Continuing pressure caused Khanh to leave Vietnam 
on 25 February and the AFC to be dissolved on 6 May. ^ 


(C) In June 1965 a military junta, known as the National Leadership 
Committee (NLC), headed by Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu as 
chairman and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky as premier, assumed 
direction of the GVN. This arrangement provided a relatively stable 
environment into early 1966. However, four continuing sources of unrest 
were: 


- Basic dissatisfaction with rule by decree; 

- Continuing political differences between Catholics and 
Buddhists; 

- A growing Buddhist sensitivity to the increasing American 
presence; and 

- A worsening economic situation, which overshadowed all other 

factors.^ 

(U) On 15 January 1966, in response to growing pressures and unrest. 
Premier Ky announced that the armed forces had assumed power to 
create conditions for setting up a genuine democracy. He also stated 
that the main targets for the GVN in 1966 would be: 

- To win the war; 

- To pacify and reconstruct rural areas; 



III-3 




RAFT 

- To stabilize the economic situation; and 

- To build democracy. 

(C) For the next several weeks unrest was at a minimum except 

in the I CTZ. In the ancient capital of Hue, militant Buddhist leader 

Thich Tri Quang, using alleged GVN suppression of Buddhism as a 

springboard and benefitting from some assistance provided by the I 

Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi, continued 

to rally followers. In contrast, Saigon Buddhist leader Thich Tam 

Chau remained quiescent, reportedly because he thought Ky was doing 

4 

an acceptable job. 

(C) Then on 21 February, Ky announced a cabinet reshuffle, 

reiterated that a Democracy Building Council soon would be appointed, 

stated that adoption of a constitution would be subject to popular 

referendum, and proclaimed that election of a national assembly would 

follow in 1967. In the wake of this development Thich Tam Chau 

maintained that the cabinet reshuffle favored the Catholics, and that he 

could neither support the GVN nor counter the opposition of the militant 

Buddhists. Thich Tri Quang, among his anti-GVN pronouncements, 

stated that the regime was "more hopeless than ever, " and that "a way 

must be found to restore retired General Tran Van Don (a Buddhist) 

5 

to a position of political prominence. " At this point the stage was set 
for four months of intense political and military confrontations. 












I 




(S) On 3 March, Premier Ky arrived in Hue to investigate the 
allegation that Lieutenant General Thi, in concert with retired General 
Don, was engaged in political activity directed against the government. 
The meeting between Ky and Thi on 4 March resulted in a heated 
dispute. Thi ignored Ky's suggestion that he forego political aspirations 
and seek to improve relations with the people. ^ 

(S) At a special meeting of the NLC on 10 March (with Thi present), 
Ky moved that Thi be replaced as Commanding General, I Corps, 
because of insubordination. This was approved. The Republic of 
Vietnam Army (ARVN) 1st Division Commander, Major General Nguyen 
Van Chuan, was then appointed Acting Commanding General, I Corps. 

He was the second of five generals to hold that position during the period 
March-May 1966. ^ 


(S) Upon announcement of the relief. Commander, United States 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), instructed all 
United States (US) commanders to counsel their RVNAF counterparts 
to accept Thi's dismissal and to concentrate on getting on with the war. ^ 


(S) The events which followed during the balance of March bore a 
striking similarity to the events of May 1963, which ultimately had led 


to the downfall of the Diem regime. The Buddhists used the Thi 

L': X J § 


HI-5 





dismissal as an opportunity to strike out against the Ky regime and 


9 

to call for a civilian council to serve as a national assembly. 


(S) Reaction to the dismissal began in Danang on 11 March when 
2, 000 persons, including ARVN personnel, took part in a peaceful 
demonstration in support of Thi. Over the next several days additional 
demonstrations took place in Danang and Hue, and the tone became 
increasingly belligerent. At this juncture the I Corps "Military and 
Civilian Struggle Committee, " which included ARVN personnel, 
instigated a general strike in Danang for the period 13-16 March. The 
strike was 90 percent effective and closed the civilian port. A follow-on 
general strike occurred both in Hue and Danang on 23 March. ^ 

(S) During this period Buddhist agitation continued to develop and 
grow in scope throughout the country, aided and abetted in some cases 
by the communists. Hue and Saigon were the centers of Buddhist 
activity. Reinstatement of Thi, who had been allowed by the GVN to 
return to Hue, became secondary to the more inclusive effort on the 
part of Buddhist leaders to undermine the Ky regime. 11 

(U) On 26 March, Premier Ky warned that continued disturbances 
not only would cause serious military problems, but possible loss of 
allied confidence and support as well. He also warned that 5, 000 


enemy troops had infiltrated into the northern two provinces in the past 
two months, that the I CTZ food_situatipn was serious, and that strikes 



III-6 









12 

had slowed supply of fuels and weapons to military installations. 

(S) Subsequently, on 29 March, Premier Ky announced that 

the GVN intended to move to restore authority in I CTZ. On 30 

March, the Department of State in its turn recommended that the US 

Mission urge the GVN to isolate and arrest agitators and to discipline 

13 

or transfer key military personnel involved. 

(S) At the beginning of April, the US Mission reported that 
Buddhist "struggle" forces virtually had taken the levers of power in 
Danang and Hue; moreover, that hard core (struggle movement) 
elements had been established in most I CTZ towns and villages.^ 

(S) Meanwhile, US and Republic of Korea forces continued 
to seek out the enemy. ^ RVNAF combat contact, however, dropped 
off sharply. RVN casualties countrywide for the week of 3-9 April 
were 278, the lowest weekly total since February 12-19, 1964 in the 
wake of the Khanh Coup. ^ 

(TS) A COMUSMACV appraisal on 4 April noted that the I Corps 
Commander's control of the 1st ARVN Division and the Danang Garrison 
was doubtful. The report also stated that the Danang Police were 
unreliable and that the Hue Police had gone over to the struggle move¬ 
ment. The Commanding General, I Corps estimated that popular support 
of the movement varied from approximately 10 percent in the countryside 






~T±- 


*n?n 


17 

to 70 percent in Hue. 


(TS) During the night of 4-5 April, two Vietnamese Marine 
Corps (VNMC) battalions were flown to Danang in United States 
Air Force aircraft. A third battalion soon followed. However, the 
VNMC units did not move against the struggle forces but remained 
on Danang Airbase in a show of force. At the height of the con¬ 
frontation, significant local forces, including artillery and tanks, 
were deployed for possible use against the VNMC. As it developed, 

no fighting took place, GVN authority was not restored, and the last 

1 ft 

VNMC battalion was removed from Danang on 12 April. 

(S) On 8 April, Ambassador Lodge provided a detailed analysis 

of the situation that stated in part: "Buddhist demands, when stripped 

of hypocrisy and cant, boil down to a naked grab for power. . . the 

unity of the government is severely threatened, and effectiveness of 

19 

the armed forces is in question. " 

(S) In mid-April, following the withdrawal of the VNMC, the 
situation calmed somewhat but remained potentially explosive. RVNAF 
logistical activity experienced major disruption and combat operations 
against the enemy virtually ground to a halt. The struggle movement, 

7 0 

with General Thi's open support, continued to consolidate its strength.^ 


(TS) It was in this setting that the GVN initiated a unilateral move 





HI-8 











on 15 May. Spearhead forces consisting of two VNMC battalions 
and an ARVN airborne battalion were airlifted to Danang and imme¬ 
diately launched an operation to restore GVN authority. Because 
of their vulnerability in this situation, US aircraft were evacuated 

from Danang Airbase on 21 May. GVN authority was successfully 

21 

restored on 23 May and the operation concluded. 

(S) During this period several US installations were the acci¬ 
dental victims of fire delivered by both the struggle forces and GVN 
forces. US personnel took appropriate protective measure, and at 
one stage averted what could have been a dangerous situation by 

threatening to return fire. Twenty-three US personnel were wounded. 

22 

US aircraft returned to Danang on 25 May. 

(S) RVNAF casualties in the Danang operation were estimated 
at 150 killed, 700 wounded; an estimated 500 civilians were treated 
for injuries. ^3 

(S) As events in Danang wound down Hue took on the appearance 
of an armed camp and the level of violence there increased sharply. 
Demonstrations increased in Saigon, at times closing down sections 
of the city. ^ 

(S) On 30 May the GVN moved against dissident elements in Hue 
with military and police contingent. In response the militants introduced 



i 




III-9 




a non-violent technique of placing family altars and Buddha statues 
in the street and sitting around them to block traffic. Normal 
traffic was disrupted, but not stopped. The police took action to 
clear essential roads. ^ 

(C) Initial efforts having failed to achieve desired results, the 
GVN on 15 June moved the ARVN 5th Airborne Battalion into Hue 
where,in conjunction with riot police, it moved in earnest against the 
struggle movement. Steadily reinforced thereafter, the GVN forces 
successfully concluded the operation on 19 June. The 1st ARVN 
Division was returned to an active combat role in support of the GVN 
by 28 June. ^ 

(C) A final spasm of extremism developed in Saigon on 18 June 
when a policeman was clubbed to death and a second dragged into the 
Buddhist Institute. After the latter had been sealed off by the 38th 
ARVN Ranger Battalion, GVN troops and police moved into the 
Institute on 23 June, rounded up 530 persons, seized a quantity of 
weapons and apprehended the man who murdered the policeman. 27 

(S) At this point. Premier Ky stated that insofar as he was 

concerned, the immediate political crisis had been solved. He added 

that the GVN was preparing for elections, fighting inflation and had 

? ft 

resumed operations against the VC. 



III-10 








ASSESSMENT 

(U) In his report on the war in Vietnam as of 30 June 1968, 

General W. C. Westmoreland stated: 

If any generalization can be made about the war in South 
Vietnam, it is that the US effort, both military and political, prospered 
to the extent that the government of Vietnam was strong, coherent, and 
active. The corollary, of course, is that none of our efforts had any 
chance of success in the periods during which the government of Vietnam 
was weak, divided, and thus ineffectiveo ^ 

The relevance of this appraisal to the struggle movement of 1966 is 
manifest. 

(S) The campaign against President Diem, among other things, had 
given the Buddhists a new sense of unity and an appetite for power. 

That factor constituted a continuing obstacle to GVN effectiveness from 
1 November 1963 to 1 July 1966. During the uprising, revolutionary 
development suffered an extensive retardation in I CTZ; to a lesser but 
nonetheless damaging degree in neighboring II CTZ. No effective action 
was taken to combat the continuing inflation. Frequent changes in the 
I Corps Commander, who was also senior GVN representative for the 
area, precluded meaningful continuity of military efforts in I CTZ. 

(S) During 1966, NVN infiltration reached a high point in mid¬ 
summer with introduction through the demilitarized zone into 
I CTZ of the NVA 324-B Division. Country-wide, 73 percent of the NVA 



r ' 


III-11 





input was accomplished in the first six months of the year, with 
February, March, May, and June being the high months. During 
July, the first NVA regimental size attack occurred in I CTZ. Fifty- 
eight percent of the VC initiated incidents occurred in the first half of 
the year, March being the high month. Although there is no known 
evidence of a "de facto truce" with the enemy in I CTZ for the period 
in question, 30 it is apparent that the enemy exploited the opportunities 
presented to him by GVN preoccupation with the crisis. 

(S) RVNAF operations. 

- VNMC. Diversion of two battalions to the Danang area 
forced delay of an amphibious operation. 

- VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force). Thirty-five percent of the 
transport capability during May was diverted to the Danang area. VNAF 
fighter aircraft were diverted periodically during the period. 

- ARVN. The 1st ARVN Division and Danang local forces 

concentrated their attention on support of the struggle movement 

throughout the period. ARVN psychological warfare effort in I CTZ 

ceased. The staff of I Corps steadily decreased, reaching a low of, 

approximately 50 percent at the end of the period. Operations against 

31 

the VC/NVA decreased markedly. 

(S) US operations: 

- No coordinated US/RVN operations were conducted during 
the crisis in the 1st ARVN Divisions area of responsibility nor in 








Quang Nam Special Sector (coterminous with Quang Nam Province 
south and west of Danang). 

- Attention of senior US commanders was shifted from operations 
against the VC/NVA to the GVN internal political problem. 

- Three US Marine Corps battalions, in company with necessary 
support, were diverted from their primary combat role to provide a 

op 

ready reaction force. 

(U) In his book. Strange War, Strange Strategy , General Lewis 

Walt, Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, makes this 

comment about the Buddhist uprising: "In only a few days most of what 

we had accomplished in almost a year appeared to collapse. The 

American forces found themselves nearly alone in trying to maintain 

33 

some semblance of order in a hopelessly complex situation. " 

(U) However, General Walt went on to state that: "When it was 

over, the bonds between ourselves and the Vietnamese were strengthened. 

We had been together in the crisis and together we faced the future more 

34 

closely than we had before. " 

(U) Looked at another way, the uprising can be seen as the end of 
a long political campaign. As Sir Robert Thompson observed: 


I caused some surprise, when asked what I thought of the 
Buddhist uprising against Prime Minister Ky in the spring of 1966, 
by replying that it was a form of an election. Ky's position depended 





on whether he still had the power to remain in power. That was 
being put to the test. He had, and the Buddhists lost the election. 

Their support just melted away. 35 

CONCLUSIONS 

(C) The period November 1963 - June 1965 saw a steady decline 
in the effectiveness of the GVN. Coups and counter coups had a 
debilitating effect on RVNAF morale and fighting esprit. The relative 
stability of the GVN for the period June 1965 to January 1966, made 
possible largely by increased US assistance and introduction of combat 
forces provided some improvement. By virtue of its timing and 
duration, however, the 1966 Buddhist uprising was particularly detri¬ 
mental to the war effort. The GVN was not yet strong enough to cope 
with two national problems simultaneously, that is, VC/NVA aggression 
and the Buddhist crisis. The government, of necessity, concentrated 
on the latter, thus according the VC/NVA benefit of reduced pressure 
against them. 

(C) The fact that elements of the RVNAF, particularly in I CTZ, were 
forced to choose sides during the confrontation weakened the total military 
structure considerably. In addition to the immediate impact, there was 
the longer term requirement to restore confidence, reinstill loyalty and 
heal scars left by the struggle. 








(C) On the US side, a determined effort to keep pressure on 
the VC/NVA notwithstanding, operations in I CTZ virtually came to 
a standstill. The requirement for increased security for US 
installations, interruption of logistical support and need to guard 
against a sudden and determined attack by VC/NVA forces combined 
to render significant US military operations into VC/NVA controlled 
areas temporarily out of the question. 

(C) Although many of the original political problems remained, 
the GVN emerged from the Buddhist confrontation considerably 
strengthened. Increasing prestige, authority, cohesiveness and 
stability of the central government became major contributing factors 
to the steady improvement in prosecution of the war. Under new 
leadership and with benefit of close working arrangements with US 
units, I Corps, 1st ARVN Division and 2d ARVN Division overcame 
the divisive effects of the episode and moved to the front rank of 
effectiveness among all RVN forces. 



III-15 




CHAPTER in 

THE BUDDHIST UPRISING IN 1966 

1. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol III, pp. 1135-38 

(S). 

2. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), pp. 598-99 (S). 

3. Ibid. 

4. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol III, p. 1139 (C). 

5. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV The March-June 1966 Political Crisis 

in South Vietnam and its Effects on Military Operations (U), pp. 3-4 (TS). 

6. Ibid. , p. 5 (S). 

7. Ibid., pp. 5-6 (S). 

8. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), p. 602 (TS). 

9. Rept (S-NOFORN), PACOM Wkly Intel Digest (U), No. 46-66, 

16 Dec 66, p. 2 (S-NOFORN). 

10. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Political Crisis 1966, pp. 5-6 (S). 

11. Rept (S-NOFORN), PACOM Intel Digest No. 46-66, 16 Dec 66, 
pp. 2-3 (S-NOFORN). 

12. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Political Crisis 1966, p. 10 (S). 

13. Ibid. , pp. 12-13 (S). 

14. Ibid. , p. 13 (S). 

15. Ibid. 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), p. 605 (TS). 


Ill-16 



16. 








17. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Political Crisis 1966, pp. 14-15 (TS). 

18. Ibid., pp. 16-26 (TS). 

19. Ibid. , p. 21 (S). 

20. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), pp. 608-09 (TS). 

21. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Political Crisis 1966, pp. 32-49 (TS). 

22. Ibid. 

23. Ibid. , pp. 48-49 (S). 

24. Ibid. , pp. 50-53 (S). 

25. Ibid. , pp. 55-63 (TS). 

26. Ibid. , pp. 64-66 (S). 

27. Ibid. , pp. 66-67 (S). 

28. Rept (S-NOFORN), PACOM Intel Digest No. 46-66, 16 Dec 66, 
p. 4 (S-NOFORN). 

29. Rept (U) Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, p. 71. 

30. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), pp. 22-35 (S). 

31. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Political Crisis 1966, p. 59 (S). 

32. Ibid. , p. 58 (S). 

33. Walt, Lewis W. , General USMC. Strange War, Strange Strat¬ 
egy . New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970, p. 115. 

34. Ibid. , p. 134. 

35. Thompson, Sir Robert. No Exit from Vietnam . New York: David 
McKay Company, Inc. , 1969, p. 115. 


Ill -17 




A 




UNCLASSIFIED 



CHAPTER IV 


EFFECT OF TRUCES ON UNITED 
STATES AND ALLIED OPERATIONS (U) 


PURPOSE 


(U) Beginning with Christmas 1965 through May 1971, there have 
been twenty truces announced by the United States (US), the Republic 
of Vietnam (RVN), North Vietnam (NVN), and Viet Cong (VC) forces 
in RVN. This chapter will analyze their effect on US/allied operations, 
with special note being taken of consequences attending the VC/NVN 
truce violation of TET 1968. 

APPROACH 

(U) This chapter will embrace four aspects of the truce question 
as related to effect on US/allied operations. First, presentation of 
selected background data to include political/military considerations. 
Secondly, TET 1968 will be briefly reviewed with emphasis on overall 
effects on the allies and the enemy. Additionally, opposing views on 
the significance of TET 1968 will be presented to indicate the divergent 
opinions held by the military, the US public and US political leaders. 
Finally, note will be taken of truces since 1968, and propaganda efforts 
by both sides pertaining to truces will be reviewed briefly. 







BACKGROUND 


-* ->► f". -♦ tiv v •» y\ 


•• 1 


tt*.j 


(U) A truce, by definition, is the cessation of active hostilities 
for a period agreed upon by the belligerents. Rather than being a 
partial or temporary peace, it is a suspension of military operations 
to the extent agreed upon by the parties. A truce is binding upon the 
belligerents from the time of the agreed commencement, but officers 
of the armies concerned are responsible only from the time they 
receive official information of its existence. ^ In Vietnam, however, 
all truces have been the result of unilateral announcements. No 
agreements have been reached between the belligerents concerning 
the timing or implementation of the truces. (See Appendix. ) 

(U) In the conflict being waged in RVN, truce observance entails 
formidable difficulties. There are no well-delineated front lines; 
opposing forces invariably are in a mobile, shifting configuration. 
Enemy communications with his scattered guerrilla and local force 
units are uncertain. Interpretation of truce terms is subject to 
considerable variation by all parties. Additionally, as Sir Robert 
Thompson points out, "In People's Revolutionary War, the breaking 
of a truce, or for that matter, the provisions of a treaty, is a 
perfectly legitimate ruse of war. These considerations notwith¬ 
standing, first the enemy and subsequently the US and Government of 
Vietnam (GVN), acting unilaterally, have utilized the propaganda 



I V-2 


r 

* 




1 ) ^ V*^.. v ■ v <_* U 


i il. 


to 


UNCLS 


.A - QT'Orr- 

value of truce proposals in efforts to further their respective aims 


and interests, 


(U) For the most part the Vietnam truces relate to a period of 
traditional religious or historical observance -- Christmas; the 
Western New Year; TET, the celebration marking the beginning of 
the Lunar New Year; and Buddha's birthday. Therefore, it is to be 
underscored that, initially, truces at these periods were tied not 
only to the propaganda objectives, but to the pragmatic consideration 
of troop morale, particularly as regards TET. Traditionally, 
Vietnamese military personnel have been granted leave to return to 
their families for these annual celebrations, and the continuation of 
this practice in a wartime environment produced rewards not unlike 
the US military "R&R" (rest and recuperation) program. Moreover, 
the enemy has consistently used all truce periods as an opportunity 
to resupply, redeploy and refit. Therefore, the requirement for 
vigilance during truce periods has curtailed radically the granting of 
leaves for Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). 

POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS 


(U) Late in 1965 the VC announced a Christmas truce. In respon 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, speaking for Jke US and RVN Govern- 

oNCLS ... 

ments, announced that: 






- Air operations over NVN would be suspended for a 24- 


hour period during Christmas. 


- All other military operations would be limited to defensive 

3 

actions during the same 24-hour period. 


(U) The suspension of air operations over NVN subsequently 


was extended, and the US employed what began as a truce of undeter¬ 


mined duration to dispatch high ranking emissaries to various capitals 


of the world to investigate the possibilities of achieving a negotiated 

4 

settlement of the Vietnam war. 


- On 31 December 1965, Pope Paul VI sent messages to Moscow, 
Peiping, Hanoi, and Saigon urging national leaders to seek an end to 

the Vietnam war. These messages were made public on 1 January 
1966. 

- Even though the US effort for a negotiated settlement was 
denounced by the North Vietnamese press as a "noisy propaganda 
campaign, US efforts in support of negotiation along with suspension 
of air operations continued until 31 January 1966. 


(U) Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) commented 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the difficulties stemming from 
short-notice extension of a truce. He also pointed out the advantage 
to the enemy of being able to move freely to improve his military 
posture during the truce. He went on to suggest that future truces be 


UNCLASSI^:- 


! \ ] 

u.:/ J _ . J J 



planned in detail well in advance and to propose that aerial observa- 

7 

tion of key installations in NVN continue during any truce. 

(U) The theme of military disadvantage was to appear with 
predictable regularity as later truces were proposed and/or agreed 
to by the Governments of the US and RVN for political and psychological 


8 


reasons. 

(U) Anticipating a Christmas truce proposal for 1966, the JCS 
informed the Secretary of Defense on 22 November 1966, that they 
opposed any stand down in military operations during the Holiday 
season. The JCS indicated that if a truce was directed, any bombing 
stand down should be limited to a maximum of 48 hours in order to 
minimize the military advantages to the enemy, and that, if there was 
no indication of NVN's willingness to negotiate, we should be allowed 
to strike unusual military targets in NVN which might develop. This 
action by the JCS supported the positions of CINCPAC and Commander, 
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) 

9 

on this matter. 


(U) As TET 1967 approached, intelligence indicated that the enemy 
had anticipated and calculated in their planning the probability of a 
bombing pause during TET. Over five days of truce were observed 
in this instance, and the enemy took advantage of the period to conduct 


IV-5 







major resupply operations and to reconstitute and replenish his forces. 
Intensive friendly photographic reconnaissance conducted over NVN, 
supplemented by aerial sightings from ships and aircraft, revealed 
that NVN moved by sea and land between 22, 300 and 25,100 tons of 
supplies to logistical base areas in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, 
and to transshipment points just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).^ 


PRE-TET 1968 


(U) In late 1967, no official US position had been announced con¬ 
cerning a Christmas or New Year's stand down when Radio Hanoi stated 
that the National Liberation Front (NLF) was ordering a suspension of 
military attacks from 23 to 26 December 1967 for Christmas, from 29 
December 1967 to 1 January 1968 for the New Year, and from 26 January 
to 2 February 1968 for TET. Subsequently, on 15 December 1967, the 
GVN announced a 24-hour Christmas truce for the allied forces which 
went into effect as announced. On 30 December an additional announce¬ 
ment by the GVN proposed a New Year's truce from 31 December 1967 
to 2 January 1968. The latter included a 12-hour extension added by 
the GVN in response to an appeal by Pope Paul VI to make 1 January 
1968 a "day of peace. " Prior to these truces, there were clear indi¬ 
cations that the enemy planned to take advantage of them. Pilot sight¬ 
ings recorded truck movement from NVN into the DMZ and Laos at 
almost ten times that sighted during the same Holiday truces in 1967. ^ 







(U) A notable problem relating to exercise of initiative in pro¬ 
posing truce periods was that posed by need for multi-national coordin¬ 
ation on the friendly side. Delays imposed by this requirement often 
enabled the enemy to establish the parameters for both the terms and 
duration of a particular truce. While the allies did not elect neces¬ 
sarily to honor the exact duration of NVN-announced truces, generally 
they honored the particular Holiday period, often at sacrifice of 
potential political and psychological advantage that could have 
accompanied a first move on their part. 

TET 1968 

(U) After the Communist announcement that a 6-day truce was 
to be observed by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC forces for 
TET 1968, the US and the GVN responded by agreeing only to a 36-hour 
truce (1800 hours, 29 January to 0600 hours, 31 January). 

(S) Because of Communist use of past truce periods to further 
their military aims, and by virtue of broad intelligence indicators 
available to him, COMUSMACV took the following actions: 

- Requested that five northern provinces of the RVN located 
in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) be exempted from participation in the 
truce because of the high level of enemy movement indicated in and 
around these areas. 12 President Nguyen Van Thieu agreed to this request. 




IV-7 






- Reinforced the Khe Sanh garrison with an additional US 
Marine Corps battalion. 

- Shifted the 1st Air Cavalry Division to the Thua Thien 
area from II CTZ. 

- Moved a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division to I CTZ. 

- Recommended that one Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN) airborne battalion and two Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) 
battalions be moved to Saigon. 

- Placed the 199th Light Infantry Brigade on security opera- 

1 ^ 

tions around the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex. 

(C) The intelligence indicators, as reflected in more compre¬ 
hensive intelligence estimates, forecast the following probable VC/NVA 
high threat areas: 

- In I CTZ, the enemy had the capability to launch coordinated 
attacks throughout the CTZ with a principal threat at Khe Sanh. 

- In II CTZ, attacks by fire and sapper attacks were probable 
in Kontum and Pleiku Cities. 

- In IV CTZ, an increase in enemy activity in Dinh Tuong, 
Phuong Dinh and Chuong Thien provinces could be expected.^ 

(U) These estimates proved to be valid to a degree not anticipated 
by the intelligence analysts. The violation of the TET 1968 truce was 



IV- 8 






unparalleled, compared wl 


rfe.nd subsequent violations by 


Communist forces. The enemy had gained tactical surprise. 

(U) General Westmoreland subsequently reported that, although 
he was certain that a major offensive was planned by the enemy at 
TET, he had not surmised the true nature or scope of the country¬ 


wide attack. ^ 


(S) Ambassador Bunker stated before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations that a substantial offensive was expected about the 
time of TET, but he frankly admitted that the enemy's military 


16 


capabilities and intentions were underestimated 


(U) Just minutes after the beginning of TET in the early morning 
hours of 30 January 1968, the NVA and the VC launched a series of 
ground attacks against provincial capitals and friendly military 
positions and installations in I and II CTZ's. These were followed 
by major attacks on similar targets throughout the RVN during the 
nights of 30-31 January. The intensity and magnitude of these 
attacks accelerated and for several days the NVA/VC had over 60, 000 
troops engaged in combat in the cities and against allied military 
installations throughout the country. During the period 30 January 
to 25 February, when the last NVA unit was driven from the old 
imperial capital of Hue, the communist forces had boldly attacked 


U - 



IV -9 


> 



'^-.UNCLASSIFIE 


34 of 44 provincial capitals, dozens of lesser towns, many military 


installations and the US Embassy in Saigon. 


17 


THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TET 

(U) An assessment of the effects of TET 1968 from a military 
viewpoint reveals the following: 

- The enemy offensive was exceedingly costly to the VC/NVA 
in men, materiel and morale. In the first two months of 1968 he had 
lost over 55, 000 killed in action (KLA) (two-thirds of the total for 
1967) and over 13, 000 weapons. VC/NVA losses in hardcore, irre¬ 
placeable cadre were high. 

- Performance of Regional and Popular Forces was hearten¬ 
ing. 

- Although the enemy had been defeated militarily and in 
terms of his immediate political objectives, the cost to the RVN in 
civilian lives and property lost was tragic, particularly in population 
centers such as Hue and Saigon. 

- With US urging, the GVN established a relief program 
that offset the fomenting of internal uprising and dissent by the VC 
infrastructure. ^ 

- The South Vietnamese populace was galvanized into a 
higher order of awareness of the enemy threat. This translated 




FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

DRAFT 

into an effective national mobilization program that permitted replace¬ 
ment of combat losses and expansion of the indigenous armed forces 

19 

as consistently urged by COMUSMACV. 

At the annual meeting of the American Ordnance 
Association, on 18 November 1968, the Chief of Staff, United States Army 

had the following to say on the significance of TET. 

The RVNAF, instead of disintegrating and defecting, fought 
well and with determination. They successfully defended off the 
enemy's attack, defeated him, and emerged from the battle with new 
pride, self-confidence, and resolve. The TET offensive, while a 
"Pearl Harbor" for the Vietnamese was for the enemy and for us more 
a "Battle of the Bulge. " In retrospect, it was actually a very fortuitous 
development for the allies. It enabled, if not forced, much progress 
to be made that otherwise would have taken years. Not only did it 
unify the people, strengthen the government, instill confidence in the 
Vietnamese Armed Forces and solidify the country, it allowed us to 
inflict damage to the heretofore elusive enemy of a magnitude never 
before approached. 20 

• (U) Despite the success of the RVNAF and the allies from a 
military viewpoint, it was apparent that among the press, the public 
and government officials there was appreciable variance in inter¬ 
pretation of TET 1968. For example, Joseph Buttinger, in his 
Vietnam, A Political History, says: "Almost overnight, the TET 
offensive had wiped out the picture drawn by the Administration at 
the end of 1967, while emphatically confirming almost everything 

the critics of the Administration had been saying for the past three 
21 

years. " 

IV-11 ' '* 


DRAFT 


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 









f~> ",- 


(U) For reasons that have yet to be surfaced in their entirety. 


much less understood by the public at large, the news media on the 


whole seized upon TET 1968 to magnify their consistently negative 

portrayal of US involvement in Vietnam, Administration objectives, 

policy and programs related thereto and efforts aimed at fulfilling 

the mission assigned to the Armed Forces. Significantly, that this 

continues (with but isolated exceptions) to be the media's thrust is 

not the outgrowth of the events and ramifications of TET 1968; 

rather, the latter provided a convenient vehicle for exploitation of 

a persuasion already well founded. Whereas the occasional views of 

a Joseph Alsop might be advanced in support of Administration 

endeavor and the military appraisal of the situation, the general line 

presented to the public is portrayed succinctly by David Brinkley's 

statement that: "Fifty percent of the American people dislike the 

way the war is being run now; it is hard to see why it is not one 

22 

hundred percent. " 

(U) Outspoken anti-war judgments by members of Congress were 
brought to the attention of the world and the American public: 


- Senator Robert F. Kennedy offered the judgment as of 


8 February 1968 that the TET attacks had "finally shattered the mask 
of official illusion with which we have concealed our true circum¬ 
stances, and that a military victory was not in sight and that it 


probably will never come. " 


23 




IV-12 



- Senator Albert Gore, in a“l'TFebruary 1968 statement 
advocating US extrication from the morass of Vietnam: "We are 
destroying the country we profess to be saving. "^4 

(U) In contrast to the foregoing, another point of view was 
expressed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in "The Vietnam Negotiations, " 
an article published in Foreign Affairs in January 1969: 


To be sure, from a strictly military point of view, TET was 
an American victory . . . But in a guerrilla war, purely military 
considerations are not decisive; psychological and political factors 
loom at least as large . . . The TET offensive was a political defeat 
in the countryside for Saigon and the US. ^ 


(U) Still another significant view was presented by Mr. Eugene 
V. Rostow, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, on 20 
February 1968: 


. . . o During the TET offensive the Communists suffered 
tremendous military losses. Their purpose in these attacks was not 
a purely military one. Their primary purpose, rather, was to weaken, 
or even destroy the Government of South Vietnam. For the Communists 
know, and we must never forget, that if they ever did succeed in destroy 
ing the constitutional elected political authority in South Vietnam, they 
would indeed have won the war. They would have won it even if the 
Khe Sanh, a Dakto, a Loc Ninh, or any other point in geography, and 
dozens of others to boot, were successfully defended. The [NVN/VC] 
did not succeed in their maximum goals. The popular uprising which 
they told their troops would occur in the cities never materialized. 
Indeed, the urban population of Vietnam has clearly demonstrated it 
is not willing to throw in its lot with the Viet Cong. This was a failure, 
hopefully, a revealing failure to the Vietnamese Communists. But we 
cannot say yet whether or not it was a decisive failure. 


(U) Dr. Kissinger later addressed the impact of TET in these 


terms: 



u »t 


n ’ c 3 










The TET offensive marked the watershed of the American 
effort. Henceforth, no matter how effective our actions, the pre¬ 
valent strategy could no longer achieve its objectives within the 
period or with force levels politically acceptable to the American 
people. This realization caused Washington for the first time, to 
put a ceiling on the number of troops for Vietnam. Denied the very 
large additional forces requested, the military command in Vietnam 
felt obliged to begin a gradual change from its peripheral strategy 
to one concentrating on the protection of the populated areas. This 
made inevitable an eventual commitment to a political solution and 
marked the beginning of the quest for a negotiated settlement. Thus 
the stage was set for President Johnson's speech of March 31, which 
ushered in the current negotiations. ^ 


POST-TET 1968 


(U) Subsequent to TET 1968, truces have been announced by both 
sides for all major holidays and for special undertakings related to 
release of prisoners of war. Total incidents initiated by the enemy 
during these periods and casualties resulting therefrom continue to 
be instructive (reference again is made to Appendix). 

PROPAGANDA EFFORTS 


(U) The enemy has used the truce ploy as a propaganda vehicle. 
The allies in turn have not been insensitive to rewards available to 
them. A typical example relates to December 1969. On 5 December 
1969, the VC Liberation Radio (clandestine) made the following 
announcement: 


... So long as the US imperialists remain stubborn, our 
people will continue to fight resolutely in compliance with President 







Ho's teaching in which he urged our people to fight until the Americans 
leave and the puppets topple in order to win complete victory. How¬ 
ever, as in previous years, basing itself upon its unchanged humani¬ 
tarian policy, upon its respect for the customs and habits of our people 
and the people of other countries, and upon its deep concern for the 
feelings and legitimate aspirations of our compatriots, the American 
people, the peoples of other countries, and large numbers of US, 
puppet, and satellite troops, and to create adequate conditions and 
provide sufficient time for our compatriots and for the puppet, US 
and satellite troops to prepare for and participate in the celebration 
of Christmas and New Year's Day 1970, the Republic of South Vietnam 
Provisional Revolutionary Government has decided to cease military 
attacks on the puppet, US, and satellite troops for 3 days over Christ¬ 
mas . . . and for 3 days over New Year's Day. ^8 

(U) Asked to comment on the proposition that the Government of 
the NLF had given its troops a three-day truce for Christmas and a 
three-day truce for the New Year, the Office of President Thieu (GVN) 
gave the following reply [Press Release of 6 Dec 69]: 


. . . Only the Communist lackeys who want to lend a hand 
to the enemy in order to kill the soldiers and innocent people still 
believe in the Communists' good will to have a truce. We have to 
remember that during Christmas and New Year of the previous years, 
the Communists always proposed in a false manner to have a longer 
truce than our side's truce, with the sole purpose to violate it in 
order to increase the killing of our soldiers and innocent people . . . 
In conclusion, the President confirms that he maintains his decision 
to have a 24-hour truce as announced on December 4, 1969, and the 
President thinks that for humanitarian purposes the 24-hour period 
is sufficient. ^ 

(U) Illustrative of the friendly counter to the enemy's continuing 
endeavor to generate propaganda advantage through exploitation of 
truces is this 1968 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam message: 


On December 2, President Thieu announced a Christmas 
ceasefire for the period 241800 December to 251800 December. The 


mCLABBTFm 


-*V-15 









Free World forces will also observe this cease-fire. Because of 
the short duration of this cease-fire it is not considered feasible to 
conduct any special PSYOP program for friendly or enemy forces. 
However, the cease-fire period does lend itself to the following themes: 

- Point out to enemy soldiers that they have fought honorably 
and the cease-fire offers an opportunity to rally with dignity and 
accept the good treatment due a courageous soldier. 

- Emphasize that a permanent cease-fire would be possible 
if the North ceases its aggression. 

- The cease-fire does not mean a relaxation in security by 
the GVN and her allies. Violators will be repelled at tremendous 
cost to the enemy. 

On December 5, the Liberation Radio announced they would 
have two periods of cease-fire. The first from 240100 December to 
270100 December, the second from 300100 December to 200100 January. 
To avoid publicizing the announcement, avoid all mention of the NLF 
proclaimed cease-fire in all PSYOP output. 

If previous enemy cease-fire violations are exploited, avoid 
giving the impression the enemy still has the capability to launch 
attacks at will. 30 


CONCLUSIONS 


(U) The enemy has yet to honor in full a truce in Vietnam. On 
the contrary, he consistently has used these periods to enhance attain¬ 
ment of his political and military objectives. Duplicity thus is 
identified as a routine and highly important element of his make-up 
and modus operandi. 


.UNCI 


77 C* 
r* 








IV -16 






(U) The one major effort to channel a truce into negotiations aimed 
at lasting peace was unsuccessful despite initiatives on the part of 
leading world figures and earnest diplomatic endeavor by the US. 
Meanwhile, cessation of bombing for a 37-day period proved to be a 
windfall for the enemy in terms of respite, recuperation, and prepara¬ 
tion for future campaigning. 

(U) US and allied forces consistently have been placed at a mili¬ 
tary disadvantage during truce periods. Not only has the enemy used 
these occasions to resupply and reposition his forces, but he has 
employed them for conduct of operations under circumstances favorable 
to him. Over the years, however, the consistent pattern of enemy 
violations has served to produce heightened vigilance and pre-planned 
countermeasures on the part of friendly forces with resultant lessen¬ 
ing of disadvantage. 

(U) The enemy's 1968 TET truce violation appears destined to take 
its place in history as a major strategic error. Apart from failure to 
achieve the intended objective of a mass uprising against the Saigon 
regime and the penalizing effect of heavy losses, infrastructure 
included, the episode provided the "Pearl Harbor" needed to rally 
the South Vietnamese populace and armed forces. Nonetheless, the 
anomaly of US and Free World psychological dismay produced by the 



u 




enemy's initiative, audacity, and strength -- however short-lived -- 
provided telling support to anti-war sentiment, particularly in the 


US 


(U) Use of truces in connection with prisoner of war releases 
is justifiable and desirable. 

(U) Since TET 1968, establishment of holiday truces has become 
pro forma on both sides. Each side endeavors to gain political and 
psychological advantage through the timing, duration, and publicity 
associated with its unilateral position vis-a-vis the other. 


IV-18 




CHAPTER IV 


EFFECT OF TRUCES ON UNITED 
STATES AND ALLIED OPERATIONS 


1. US Department of Army, Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land 
Warfare (U), July 1956, pp. 172-75. 

2. Thompson, Sir Robert. No Exit From Vietnam. New York: 

David McKay Company, Inc. , 1969, p. 70. 

3. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, p. 21. 

4. Extract from: "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia 
and Vietnam (U). " Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 1967, 
pp. 24-26. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, p. 21. 

8. Ibid. , p. 7. 

9. Ibid. , p. 41. 

10. Ibid. , pp. 41-43. 

11. Ibid. 


12. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol II, pp. 881-908 
(S). 

13. Ibid. 


14. Rept (C), USMACV, OP-5, SEA Ground Operations Weekly 
Summary (U), 29 Jan 68, pp. 16-17 (C). 

UNCLAP 


IV-19 


h i!i t . 


r * 







15. 



Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, p. 158. 

16. Ambassador Bunker's Statement to Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 14 May 70 (S). 

17. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol II, pp. 

881-908 (S). 

18. Ibid. 

19. Rept (C), The Origins of the Post-TET 1968 Plans for Additional 
American Forces in RVN (U), 9 Nov 70, Office of the Chief of 
Staff, DA, p. 5 (C). 

20. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol III, 
p. 113 (U). 

21. Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam; A Political History. New York 
and Washington; Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, p. 505. 

22. NBC-TV News, David Brinkley, 15 Feb 68. 

23. Buttinger, p. 507. 

24. Rept ( PQUQ ), Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward South¬ 
east Asia, 1943-1968, A Chronological Compendium (U), USAF 
Historical Division, 1968, p. 583 (FQ U Q ^ . 

25. Kissinger, Henry A. "The Vietnam Negotiations, " Foreign 
Affairs , Vol 47, No. 2, Jan 69, p. 215. 

26. Selected Statements on Vietnam by DOD and other Administration 
Officials, January 1 - June 30, 1968 (U), Research and Analysis 
Division, SAFAA, p. 215. 

Kissinger, Henry A. "Kissinger's Formula for Vietnam Talks," 
Washington Post , 22 Dec 68 and The Origins of the Post TET-1968 
Plans for Additional American Forces in RVN (U), p. 27 (C). 


IV-20 


V.- • 



♦ 


tl 


C; 




27. 









28. 

Msg 

29. 

Msg 

30. 

Msg 


(U), FBIS Saigon 051149Z Dec 69. 

(U), AMEMBASSY Saigon 24217, 061300Z Dec 69. 

(U), MACV 43784, 220900Z Dec 68. 


UNCL 

IV-21 




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CHAPTER IV 


SOURCE LIST TO APPENDIX 

A 1969 Summary (U), MACV Office of Information, p. 109 . 

B Joint US Public Affairs Office Files (U), Saigon, Vietnam. 

C Extract from: "Background Information Relating to Southeast 
Asia and Vietnam (U), " Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

July 1967, pp. 24-26. 

D Rept (U), Cease Fire Summary, 1971, MACV Office of Information. 

E Rept (U), TET 1968, MACCORDS Library, undated. 

F Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports (U), 1970, 
MACV Office of Information. 

G Msg (S), SECSTATE 91750, 262154Z Nov 66. 

H MFR (U), Cease Fire Incidents, MACJ3-08, undated. 

I_ MFR (U), Cease Fire Incidents, MACJ3-08, 7 Feb 70. 

J_ MFR (U), Cessation of Offensive Operations - Buddha's Birthday 
~~ 1970, MACJ3-08, 20 May 70. 

K Msg(U), AMEMBASSY Saigon 956, 210428Z Jan 71. 

L MFR (C), 1970-71 New Year's Truce (U), MACJ3-08, 6 Jan 71. 

M Rept (U), MACV Monthly Summary, Dec 70, MACV Office of 
Information, p. 18. 

N MFR (U), 1970 Christmas Truce, MACJ3-08, 26 Dec 70. 

O MACV Command Center Journal (C), 280730Z Jan 71. 

P News Release No. 129-71 (U), 9 May 71, MACV Office of Information. 


IV-25 


^ n 


unclassified 






Q MFR (C), Cessation of Offensive Operations - Buddha's Birthday ( 

1971 (U), MACJ3-08, 10 May 71. 

R Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol II, p. 889 (C). 

S CINCPAC, RYN Data Base (C), J3C4. 


( 


IV-26 
r "i • 




UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER V 

POLICIES GOVERNING THE USE OF AIR POWER 

PURPOSE 

(U) This chapter addresses the effects of nonmilitary considera¬ 
tions, primarily political, on the employment of air power in 
Southeast Asia (SEA). 


APPROACH 

(U) Emphasis is accorded analysis of policies governing air 
operations, the impact of these policies on military courses of 
action and their effect on the overall war effort. Among specific 
subjects to be examined are: 

- The 37-day bombing halt commencing 24 December 1965; 

- Partial cessation of air strikes against North Vietnam (NVN) 
on 31 March 1968; 

- Cessation of air attacks against NVN beginning 1 November 

1968; and 

- Employment of B-52 aircraft. 

(U) Although employment of air power in NVN, Laos, Cambodia 
and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is interrelated, the evolution of 
air power employment policy has been such as to require a five-part 






analysis encompassing NVN, Laos, Cambodia, RVN and B-52 employ¬ 
ment. Conclusions integrate the separate analyses. 

PART I: NORTH VIETNAM 

Retaliation 

(TS) On 4 August 1964, after the second attack against US 
destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin (the first having occurred on 2 August), 
CINCPAC requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to authorize puni¬ 
tive air attacks against selected targets in NVN. Based on approval 
at higher governmental level, the JCS instructed CINCPAC to conduct 
a one-time attack against North Vietnamese PT/Swatow boat staging 
areas and petroleum storage areas near Vinh. This undertaking was 
carried out on 5 August, utilizing resources of the US Seventh Fleet. ^ 
(TS) On the morning after the US strikes. General Nguyen Khanh, 
RVN Prime Minister, agreed for the first time to allow US jet aircraft 
into the Republic. He stated also that all Republic of Vietnam Armed 
Forces (RVNAF) were on alert status ready: 

- To attack NVN should the latter's forces attack to the 

south, or 

2 

- To attack Cambodia should an enemy threat develop there. 
(TS) To detect possible southern movement of enemy troops in 

NVN or movement of enemy elements into Laos, Commander, United 


V-2 










recom- 


SECRET 

DRAFT 

States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) 
mended on 6 August 1964 that photographic reconnaissance flights begin 
over NVN. Approval was not forthcoming. 

(TS) In early August, Ambassador Graham Martin, US Ambas¬ 
sador to Thailand, elicited an agreement from Thailand's Minister 
of Defense, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasap, for launch by US Air 
Force (USAF) tactical air forces based in Thailand of combat sorties 
against targets outside that country. The authority granted was 
unlimited and included strikes against NVN. However, Ambassador 

Martin reported that approval was granted with reluctance, and 

4 

emphasized the importance of discretion in its employment. 

(U) In addition to events that were influencing initial US policy on 
employment of air power against NVN, significant developments in 
RVN were providing the basis for hard decisions on American policy 
in SEA. In the minds of some in Washington, the time had arrived 
either to withdraw or to make a substantial commitment of US 
support. 5 Political instability in the Government of Vietnam (GVN), 
the apparent intention of NVN to widen the war and weakness of the 
RVNAF were prime causes of concern. Moreover, US domestic 
political problems associated with the 1964 Presidential elections 
were generating reappraisals of overall US policy and strategy 


V - 3 







< 



regarding Vietnam. In this uncertain and controversial setting the 
President seized the initiative by requesting a congressional resolu¬ 
tion to express the unity and determination of the US in its support of 
freedom and protection of the peace in SEA. ^ The result was the 
7 August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which armed the President 
with the mandate to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed 
attack against the forces of the United States" and "to assist any 

member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 

7 

Treaty requiring assistance in defense of its freedom. " 

(TS) The Tonkin Gulf incidents and subsequent resolution 
heralded new emphasis on the role of air power. Initially, the 
retaliatory air strike became the order of the day. Under JCS 
auspices an operation order nicknamed FLAMING DART was 
developed for use in responding to possible governmental directives 

Q 

to carry out such strikes. ° 

(U) As a result of enemy attacks in Pleiku and Qui Nhon, RVN, 
in February 1965, both costly in US casualties, decision was made 
at governmental level to apply FLAMING DART. A joint USAF/South 
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) task force struck military targets and 
port facilities in NVN. ^ The limited nature of the attacks emphasized 
that the US was committed to a restrained and moderate use of force, 


V-4 





and was applying that force in response to specific communist violence 
directed at US troops.^® 


Change in US Policy 

(U) At this point internal problems in RVN became paramount. 
The US Ambassador to RVN, General Maxwell D. Taylor, informed 
the President that the GVN was toppling, the economy deteriorating 
and infiltration from NVN increasing monthly. Something must be 
done. In his view there were two alternatives: 

- Either the US had to withdraw, or 

- It must increase its commitment to the South Vietnamese, 
entailing thereby major changes in US policy.^ 

As an outgrowth of subsequent deliberation on the Vietnam issue, 
the decision was made to pursue essentially the course of action 
reflected in the second alternative. 

(TS) Against the contingency that the US would increase its 
support of the GVN through application of air power against NVN, 
Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) had prepared a plan named 
ROLLING THUNDER whose objective, to use CINCPAC's words, was 
"to give a good clobbering to NVN" through use of air strikes. As 
developed, the Chief Executive authorized execution of ROLLING 



r 








THUNDER operations, and the first strike was conducted on 2 March 

1965. Recognizing that these operations marked a major change in 

US air policy, targets were tightly controlled by the President 

through the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. Heavy restrictions 

13 

were placed on the manner of execution. (Map 1) 

(TS-NOFORN) As March and April unfolded, several of the 
restrictive provisions were eased: 

- Use of napalm in NVN was authorized; 

- Strike missions against NVN were developed and approved 
on a weekly rather than daily basis 

- USAF Thai-based tactical air was committed against NVN; 

- Permission was granted to use additional aircraft to 
achieve a high damage level; 

- Armed reconnaissance missions were inaugurated; 

- US strikes were separated from VNAF missions; and 

- Low-level and medium altitude bomb damage assessment 

15 

reconnaissance was authorized. 

(TS-NOFORN) Although relaxation of operational restrictions 
heightened effectiveness of execution and improved the results 
achieved, they did not materially alleviate restrictions on targets.^ 
Choice of the latter, as recommended by the JCS, continued to be 



V-6 











PHONG SALT 


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fern 


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MM 


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LUANG PRABANG 


X1ENG KKXIANG 


tinh 


EVOLUTION OF 
ROLLING THUNDER 
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 


DONG HOI 


° THAKHEK 


lLLjIrESTRICTEO zone 

AUTHORIZED STRIKE AREAS 
19 MAR 65 

LIMIT OF STRIKE AREA 


SAVANNAXHET 


2 APR 65 
18JUN 65 
25 JUN 65 

2 JUL 65 
9 JUL 65 

3 SEP 65 


100 


MILES 


104 ° 


106 ® 

m—* i L.U iui 


108 ®. 


Map 1 


V-6A 








































































































































exercised at Presidential level, as did decision on mode, timing 
and weight of attack. 

(TS) Reflected in the easing of restrictions was a shift of 

emphasis in employment of air power to make it more difficult 

and expensive for NVN to support the communist effort in RVN. 

Operations concentrated on conduct of attacks against the enemy's 

lines of communication (LOC), while at the same time maintaining 

17 

additional pressure by attack of fixed military targets. 

First Suspension 

(U) On 12 May 1965, to underscore efforts in the diplomatic field 

to stimulate initiation of peace talks with Hanoi, ^ the President 

suspended air strike and armed reconnaissance operations against 
19 

NVN. A special reconnaissance program was launched to observe 

the reaction of the NVN rail and road transportation system to the 
20 

suspension. 

(U) During the pause, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a 
comprehensive recommendation on the future course of the air 

campaign. He considered it necessary: 

- To weigh carefully the capabilities and limitations of 
US air power when it was required to operate within specific political 


V -7 








parameters; and 

- To assess the vulnerability of NVN within that frame¬ 
work. 

He went on to propose a demonstration of the capability of air 

power through an around-the-clock program of immobilization, 

21 

attrition and harassment of NVN military targets. 

(TS) With the suspension having failed to achieve its intended 
objective after four days, CINCPAC, based on evaluation of ROLLING 
THUNDER, suggested to the JCS that further respite for NVN would 
create future problems in RVN and Laos. He recommended resump¬ 
tion of ROLLING THUNDER, ^ noting that air strikes conducted up 

to that point had not reduced NVN military capacities in any major 

2 ^ 

way. The air campaign was resumed on 18 May. 

(TS) With resumption of the strikes, authorization was received 

for armed reconnaissance from the Demilitarized Zone to the 20th 

parallel. Emphasis was placed on restricting traffic in and out of the 

important LOC hub at Vinh. Emphasis notwithstanding, operational 

and geographical restrictions still in effect kept the authorized sortie 

24 

level below the military capability. 


V-8 



< 







Reappraisal 



(U) It was clear by September 1965 that, despite considerable 
damage caused by air attacks in NVN, the North Vietnamese mani¬ 
fested no willingness to negotiate or terminate support of the VC. ^ 

This in turn generated increasing dialogue between Washington and 
the field on the subject of targetting restrictions. In late November, 
CINCPAC recommended destruction of major military targets in the 
northeast, including those in Hanoi and Haiphong, a disruption of 
major port facilities and subsequent increased armed reconnaissance 
directed at the road, rail, inland waterways and coastal LOC from 
China. His request was denied. 4,0 

(TS) Many of the most lucrative targets on the JCS Target List, 
particularly in the Hanoi and Haiphong area had not been hit. Obviously, 
the effectiveness of the air effort would have been increased had strikes 

been directed against targets that constituted a major portion of the 

2 7 

NVN war making and industrial capacity. The fact that engagement 

of those targets finally approved and attacked had been long delayed 

enabled NVN to disperse key elements and improve its air defense 

capability in the target areas. This in turn caused greater pilot 

losses than would have occurred had the strikes been conducted 

Z 8 

early in the ROLLING THUNDER campaign in 1965. 

DRAFT 

T0F=SECSET- 








(TS) Despite restrictions on target engagement and geographical 
areas, ROLLING THUNDER operations during 1965 provided impres¬ 
sive statistical results. Over 3, 000 moving targets were destroyed, 

29 

including almost 700 railroad vehicles. Potential destruction, had 
restrictions not been imposed on the employment of air assets, is 
relegated to the domain of speculation. 

Second Suspension 

(TS) In December 1965, CINCPAC advised the JCS that ROLLING 

THUNDER was not accomplishing its purpose. Soon thereafter, on 

24 December, initially in conjunction with the 1965 Christmas cease 

fire and later in conjunction with US and international efforts in 

support of negotiations,^^ all ROLLING THUNDER operations were 

31 

suspended a second time. Attention then shifted to the effect of 
ROLLING THUNDER limitations on NVN's surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) capability. 

(U) In April 1965, photography revealed the first enemy SAM site 
under construction southeast of Hanoi. A second site appeared about 
a month later and by mid-July several more were discovered in 
various stages of construction, forming an irregular ring around 
Hanoi. Subsequently, the number of sites increased rapidly north 


V-10 



< 




DRAFT 



it 


/ 



of the 20th parallel. By the end of 1965, more than 60 sites had been 
discovered protecting the vital military-industrial complex around 
Hanoi and Haiphong and the LOC south to Thanh Hoa. ^ Relatively 
few of these were open to attack because of their location in restricted 
areas. 

Resumption 

(U) In early January 1966, CINCPAC forwarded a detailed dis¬ 
cussion of the relationship of military operations in NVN to the 
overall strategy of the war in RVN„ He gave it as his view that plans 
should be made to resume effective operations against NVN if nego- 

n a 

tiations did not bring an early cease fire. 

(S) Concrete evidence of NVN's exploitation of the pause included: 

- Daytime sightings of vehicles and trucks moving south of 

Vinh; 

- Evidence that Hanoi had removed daylight restrictions on 
the movement of materiel ; 

- Construction activity apparently aimed at facilitating truck 

movement; 


- Accelerated truck movement in southern NVN; and 

- Communist activity within the Laos infiltration corridor. 




(U) On 31 January 1966, all peace efforts having been spurned by 

3/1 

the enemy, air attacks on the north were resumed. 

(TS) A January 1966 conference in Honolulu presided over by 
Secretary of Defense McNamara brought forth recommendations by 
his commanders for a stronger approach. Three tasks were proposed: 

- Reduce, disrupt and harass the external assistance being 
provided to NVN; 

- Destroy in depth those resources already in NVN which 
contributed most to the support of aggression; and 

- Harass, disrupt and impede movement of men and materiel 
through southern NVN into Laos and RVN. 

This concept required: 

- Attacking and mining the harbors of Haiphong, Hon Gay 
and Cam Pha; 

- Interdicting the two main rail lines leading from the 
Chinese border to Hanoi; and 

- Concentrating attacks on destroying POL (petroleum, oil 
and lubricants) systems, power plants and military facilities. The 
interdiction effort in the southern part of NVN was to be regarded as 
only a part of the overall package. ^7 


V-12 








(TS) Secretary McNamara saw things differently. He was 

satisfied that the limited 1965 offensive had achieved its objectives 

and believed that the campaign should continue at the same level. He 

viewed interdiction of the LOCs in southern NVN to be the key to 

achieving limited objectives rather than attacks on entry points and 

38 

military stores of supplies farther north. The outcome was a 
1966 campaign closely resembling that of the previous year. Armed 
reconnaissance was authorized south and west of the restricted area 
(Map 2), but extensive limitations on the types of targets which could 
be struck remained in effect. In military eyes, these restrictions had 
the effect of creating a haven in the northeast quadrant of NVN into 
which the enemy with impunity could import vital war materiel, 


construct sanctuaries for his aircraft and strengthen his anti-aircraft 


39 

artillery defenses around the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. 

(TS) Tasks for ROLLING THUNDER operations in 1966 were 
weighted in favor of interdiction as against disruption of external 
assistance and destruction of resources. At the Honolulu Requirements 
Planning Conference in June 1966, CINCPAC noted that major elements 

of the concept for an effective air campaign advanced in January had 

40 

not been authorized. 



V -13 



1966 - Restrictions Prevail 



(TS) While the June conference was in session, CINCPAC recom¬ 
mended to the JCS that highest priority be given to strikes against 
POL facilities in NVN. Late that month the administration directed 
that air strikes be conducted against seven POL storage areas in 
NVN, including those around Hanoi and Haiphong. The political 
sensitivity of this escalation was mirrored in the stringent restric¬ 
tions set down for the operation. After marginal weather delayed the 
first strikes, two-thirds of NVN's POL storage capacity was destroyed 
in a three-day period. Rather than press ahead on an integrated 
campaign basis to engage and inflict comparable damage on all other 
target categories, the governmental decision was to continue the 
doctrine of graduated pressure. With this one-time exception, 
previous restrictions on engaging the Hanoi-Haiphong area continued 
for the remainder of 1966. ^ 

(U) Throughout the year proliferation of SAM sites continued. 
Discovery of additional sites raised the total to about 150. Continuous 
SAM coverage extended from Yen Bai to Haiphong in the north, to the 
Ha Tinh area in the south. Radar assets by the end of 1966 consisted 
of a well-balanced inventory of over 100 early-warning, ground 
controlled intercept, anti-aircraft artillery fire control and SAM- 
associated items. ^ 

V -14 ?'-- 

DRAFT 









Irt+XUrfeti: 


'7 •• ••••••, 


BUFFER 


(25 NM) 


mm 


TUYEN OUANG 


PMOWG SALT 


'.Wt’I-'rv- 


SAM NEUA' 


HOI XUAN 


CENTER HAIPHONG 


^CENTER 


LUANG PRABANG 


MUONG SEN 


OIEN CHAU 


106 ° 


108 ° 


Map 2 


CIFIED 


V-13A 


MEN6-TZU 


XIEN6 KMOUANG 


A T I NM 


OONG HOI 


UOON THANI 


° THAKHEK 


NORTH VIETNAM 


savannakhet 


PROHIBITED AREAS 


ESTABLISHED BT JCS 


100 


MILES 


4 “ 22 ° 


18 ° 


16° 






































t t r ^.' 



(TS) After reviewing again the results of ROLLING THUNDER, 
CINCPAC in late 1966 formulated a long-term concept emphasizing 
target systems but, more importantly, stressing a steady weight of 
effort on a sustained basis. Peaks and valleys typical of 1966 opera¬ 
tions were to be avoided. 43 The review identified critical air power 
tasks and commented on each as follows: 

- Reduce or deny external assistance. Very little was 
accomplished. Haiphong was out-of-bounds except for limited strikes 
against POL stores and facilities. This meant that the port was 
almost undisturbed though it handled 85 percent of NVN's 1966 imports, 
to include a broad range of war-making materiel. 

- Increase Pressure by Destroying in Depth those Resources 
that Contributed Most to Support of Aggression . The results achieved 
were minor in comparison to what could have been accomplished. Of 
104 JCS-numbered targets in northeast NVN, only 19 had been authorized 
for strike in 1965, and only 20 in 1966. 

- Harassment and Disruption of the Movement of Men and 
Materiel to RVN. This mission consumed the greatest proportion of 
effort and was effective. Less than one percent of some 81,000 attack 
sorties were against JCS-numbered targets in 1966. Armed reconnais¬ 
sance had absorbed the remaining 99 percent with the bulk of these 
gQ 2 »£tcs devoted to LOC harassment and disruption. 











(TS) The first few months of 1967 saw a gradual liberalization of 
restrictions and targets applicable to ROLLING THUNDER. In 
January and February, strikes were authorized against dispersed 
POL and SAM support areas within the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted 
areas. In April, an expanded list of targets in the Hanoi area was 
approved. Strikes were authorized against air fields east and north¬ 
west of Hanoi, but they were limited to small and random harassment 
efforts. For the first time, however, US aircraft engaged in immediate 
pursuit of enemy aircraft were permitted to attack enemy air fields. 45 

(TS) These changes represented a gradual expansion of the bomb¬ 
ing phase of the war. For some, however, expansion was too gradual. 
The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in a Targetting Concept 
Review, asserted that the ROLLING THUNDER effort should not be 
expended on transient targets; rather, that the closing of the port of 
Haiphong should be accorded first priority. 46 In rejecting this view 
the Secretary of Defense contended that an intensive air campaign to 
interdict war - supporting materials risked a direct confrontation with 
the Soviet Union. 47 

(TS) In July, however, a major change took place. For the first 
time, attacks were authorized against a total of 49 point targets in 







DRAFT 

the buffer zone adjacent to Communist China and within the Hanoi/Hai¬ 
phong ’’circles. ” Authority to strike additional targets within these 
areas was added in August 1967 in company with guidance that, in the 
interest of obviating charges of escalation from either foreign or 
domestic sources, these additional authorities would be exercised in 
a "measured manner. " 

(TS) The most active air effort against NVN occurred during 
August 1967. a major campaign was launched to isolate Hanoi and 
Haiphong from each other and from the northern and southern logistic 
routes, by destruction of the main bridges in these areas. Numerous 
bypasses were put into operation and both truck and watercraft acti¬ 
vity increased as NVN attempted to overcome the bombing effects. 
Large open storage areas multiplied throughout Haiphong. By 

October, some 200,000 tons of goods imported by sea had been 

49 

accumulated and stacked in these areas. 

(U) In all, ROLLING THUNDER operations in 1967 reflected 
progress toward full exploitation of air power, but did not apply 
continuing and steadily increasing pressure over an extended period 
of time. The objective was approached briefly only during the summer 
months --a period wherein the air campaign began to exert its 
greatest impact on NVN. However, the pressure period was 

r— »_ 

V-17 

DRAFT 





foreshortened, even as the enemy gave evidence of being hurt. ^ 
Restrictions Prevail Again 

(TS) The ROLLING THUNDER operations order for 1968 indi¬ 
cated that campaigning generally would be harassed by restrictions 
characteristic of the pre-1967 period, and that the weight of effort 
would continue to be placed on interdiction of LOC's into RVN from 
the north. ^ 

(TS) Rigidity of the restrictions for the coming campaign was 
the subject of a message from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air 
Forces (CINCPACAF), to Commander, 7th Air Force. CINCPACAF 
stated that restrictions on US air operations in NVN were: 

- Disadvantageous to allied forces operating in an extremely 
difficult air defense environment; 

- Serving enemy aircraft to advantage; 

- Providing sanctuaries the enemy was using to great 
advantage in Hanoi, Haiphong and throughout the LOC structure in 
NVN; and 

- Inconsistent from a military point of view in light of 
US efforts in RVN. 52 

(U) Apart from the restrictive effect of the administration's 
guidance, the air campaign in NVN during the first three months of 


V-18 



-TQEzSfiSBST 





. . wFT 

1968, including post-strike reconnaissance, was curtailed drastically 



by the northeast monsoon, ^ 



Partial Halt 

(TS) The periodic plea for more bombing latitude and for a relax¬ 
ation of restrictions was pre-empted by Presidential decision. On 
31 March, in a further attempt to get Hanoi to the peace table, the 
Chief Executive, by discontinuing strikes north of the 20th parallel, 
placed outside the reach of American air power precisely that area 

considered by military judgment to be most essential. Two days 

54 

later the line was moved one degree southward. 

(S) Hanoi was quick to exploit this new development. As rapidly 
as basic facilities could be rehabilitated, the center of military 
supply shipments moved from Hanoi/Haiphong to Thanh Hoa, 80 
miles closer to RVN. Within two months, barreled POL in quantities 
exceeding any seen during the war appeared at Thanh Hoa. By May, 
activity at the Thanh Hoa rail yards had increased by 300 percent and 
water-way traffic had increased sharply. Farther north, the clogged 
Haiphong storage areas began to be cleared. Dredging operations 
picked up in that city's badly silted harbor. Ship turn around times 

decreased. Rail line repairs were accelerated from Communist 
55 

China to Vinh. 


V-19 




(S) During 1967 the concept of interdiction of logistics flow at 
choke points had been proven. Following the partial halt, this tech¬ 
nique was used for an interdiction campaign in southern NVN. The 
traffic flow through the area between 18° - 19° North was fairly well 
established at the start of this campaign in April 1968, with Route 1A 
being the primary North-South LOC. The cessation of offensive air 
operations against North Vietnam on 1 November 1968 brought down 
the curtain on the most intensive interdiction campaign in the history 
of air warfare. When all bombing stopped on 1 November, the 
cumulative results of the campaign were impressive. There was no 
rail traffic south of 19°, and two major inland waterways (W14, W8) 
were interdicted, thereby preventing barge traffic from moving 
southward; truck sightings in the area south of the major interdiction 
points had dropped from an average of 82 trucks per day on 30 April, 
to 21 trucks on 1 November. Coastal traffic was negligible with only 
a few small junks occasionally attempting to slip down the coast at 
night. 56 

Ces sation 

(TS) Effective 1 November 1968, reportedly as an outgrowth of 
international "understandings" reached in Paris, the US terminated 


V-20 










thl 


I 


r* C: \ ' ^ 


tH--' 


all offensive operations against NVN and the DMZ, and within the 
contiguous 12-mile territorial waters claimed by NVN. New guid¬ 
ance provided for immediate pursuit into NVN territorial waters or 
air space in response to hostile acts, but US forces engaged in such 


pursuit were denied authorization to attack other hostile forces or 
installations encountered, except in response to an attack by them. 

US aircraft engaged in reconnaissance missions over NVN or operating 
in RVN were also authorized to attack, as a "protective reaction", 
any missile site or antiaircraft site which initiated hostile actions 
against US aircraft. In a later clarification of this rule, permission 


was extended to include those sites threatening by hostile actions 


allied aircraft operating in Laotian airspace. 57 


(TS) Thus ended the ROLLING THUNDER campaign. In early 
1968, just prior to the 1 April partial halt, there was reason to believe 
that graduated pressure through use of US air power against NVN had 
reached a point permitting maximum pay-off during the summer 
season of good weather. The partial halt limited this effort; the 
1 November cessation ended it. 

PART II: LAOS 


(S) Any assessment of employment of air power in SEA must 
recognize the unique relationship of Laos to the war in RVN; namely. 


V-21 







NVN use of Laotian territory for infiltration of men and supplies to 
RVN. Additionally, all US military air operations in Laos have been 
carried out by aircraft based in other countries in SEA. Moreover, 
they are controlled for all intents and purposes by the US Ambassador 
to the Kingdom of Laos. ^ 

Aerial Reconnaissance 

(S) In March 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
recommended to the President, based on a JCS proposal, that the 
US launch reconnaissance flights over Laos. While the President 
approved the concept, it still required approval by Souvanna Phouma, 
the Premier of Laos. ^0 

(S) On 17 May 1964, communist Pathet Lao forces turned against 
Lao rightists and neutralists on the Plaine des Jarres in northern 
Laos. There followed a US decision that aerial reconnaissance might 
provide a means of proving that NVN and Communist China were 
assisting the indigenous enemy. Such evidence then could be presented 
to the International Control Commission (ICC) established by the 
Geneva Accords of 1954. 61 COMUSMACV, finding need for recon¬ 
naissance of NVN infiltration activities in Laos, also had requested 
flights over the southern reaches of that country. 62 







ri't-tffT ij r ' . 

(TS) On 18 May, the jCsftransmitted authorization for the first 
US reconnaissance missions in Laos. Due to the international 
political sensitivity of the situation and to avoid violation of NVN 
air space, overflight of NVN or northern Laos was not authorized 

L o 

for these flights. Operations began on the 19th with the Air Force 
concentrating on the panhandle of Laos and the Navy planes from 


the carrier Kitty Hawk flying over the Plaine des Jarres. 


64 


(U) Three days later, the US State Department announced that 
Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, had requested 
reconnaissance flights in order to "observe the activities and move¬ 
ments of forces which are invading, attacking, and fighting in Laos. 


„65 


(TS-NOFORN) The reconnaissance effort was christened formally 
in late May 1964 under the JCS-assigned nickname, YANKEE TEAM.^ 
CINCPAC appointed COMUSMACV as coordinating authority. Pro¬ 
hibition against overflights of NVN remained in effect, but overflight 
restrictions applicable to northern Laos were removed. The purpose 
of YANKEE TEAM operations was twofold: 

- Obtain intelligence information, particularly on border 

infiltration from NVN into Laos; and 

- Remind friendly and hostile leaders of US military 
67 


presence in the area. 




(TS) Communist gunfire downed two aircraft in early June 1964. 

A retaliatory strike authorized by the administration against the 
enemy antiaircraft installation served to demonstrate that the US 
would continue reconnaissance in support of the Royal Lao Govern¬ 
ment, by force if necessary. Additionally, it served to reduce a 
number of operational constraints and to introduce the policy of 
armed response to enemy fire directed at reconnaissance aircraft. 

In particular, retaliatory strikes with air-to-ground rockets and 
conventional 750-pound bombs against antiaircraft units were 
authorized, Under the prevailing rules, however, CINCPAC still 

69 

was not able to use napalm or cluster bombs in attacking the enemy. 

(U) Because of the extremely sensitive nature of the YANKEE 

TEAM and BARREL ROLL flights, the official comments concerning 

our activities were restricted to confirming the fact that US aircraft 

were flying reconnaissance missions over Laos, and that they engaged 

in combat only when fired upon. For the first time. President Nixon, 

in his 6 March 1970 policy statement concerning Laos, admitted 

officially that the US had been flying ". . . certain interdictory missions 

70 

against invaders who were violating Lao neutrality. " 

(TS-NOFORN) An assessment of YANKEE TEAM after six months 
of activity indicated the operations had: 


V-24 






I 


> 



- Verified with low and medium level photography suspected 
activities obtained from high altitude coverage; 

- Forced the enemy to move at night, thereby slowing 
infiltration; 


- Served as a reminder to friends and enemies of American 
presence in the area and our determination to stay; and 

- Furnished information on enemy build-up, routes of 

71 

infiltration and field locations. 

(TS) Following the downing of two additional aircraft in a three - 

day period, 18-21 November 1964, the operating rules were changed. 

The minimum altitude level was raised, and authority for low-level 

72 

missions required approval on an individual basis. Despite the 
hamstringing effect of operational restrictions and excessive time 
involved in obtaining political approvals, progress thereafter was 
encouraging. Effectiveness of strike missions by Royal Lao Air Force 
(RLAF), as well as strikes by US aircraft operating in defense of 
reconnaissance flights, increased in direct proportion to intelligence 
produced by YANKEE TEAM. 

Interdiction, 1964-65 

(TS) In December 1964, the first US air interdiction mission 
against communist logistic activity in Laos was flown under the 


V-25 V 



> 










73 

BARREL ROLL program. (Map 3) Administration guidance. 


strongly influenced by the views of the US Ambassador to Laos, 


embodied a number of restrictive requirements: 


- Strikes were allowed only during daylight hours; 


- Missions were limited to small numbers of strike air¬ 


craft committed infrequently; 


- Use of napalm as a weapon was prohibited; 


- Overflight of NVN was not permitted; 


- A two-mile buffer zone was established along the Laos/NVN 


border; and 

- All missions required final approval by the JCS. 

(TS) In February 1965, MACV recommended that all such restraints 

be closely monitored since they created unnecessary restrictions on 

the responsible tactical air commander, notably the requirement for 

final JCS approval of all BARREL ROLL missions. ^ By mid-1965, 

many of the restrictions gradually had been removed or modified. 

75 

Daily missions had become the rule. 

(TS) STEEL TIGER, begun in April 1965 to interdict the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail (Map 4), was to be conducted under the same general 

ground rules as BARREL ROLL with one important exception -- napalm 

76 

could be used when authorized by the Ambassador to Laos. 


V-26 











JARRES* 


VIENTIANE 


Ktoaromouane 


SOUT 


VIETNAM 


Saravane 


.Pakse 


MAP NO. 6,043 JUL 70 ENGR USARPAC 

* % 

Map 3 


V-26A 


SCIFIED? 


__ 




20 


Huong Soui PLAINE - 


DEMARCATION LINE 


BARREL ROLL AREA 
14 DEC 1964 


LAOS 

PANHANDLE 


Road 
Wa terway 

International boundary 


100 Miles 


100 Kilometers 


CAMBODIA 


,04 





























































































Ssu-maoi 


Ning-ming 


LaiChai 


LANG SON 
NGUYEN A' 


■ ^ Muong Luonj 
Nam Tha 

houa y 


HAI 

DUONG 


UAftREL'ftOfct 


LUANG 
®PRABANG_ 


THANH H' 


Phou 

Khoun 


•Kitil. 

Khouang 

ANG 


Ta Viang^.*-^ 


BORIKH 


Muang 

Phrae 


Muang ^ 
Nakhon Phanoi 


UDON THANI 


Muang Sakon Nakl^orv 


STEEL 


Mukdahan 


SAVANNAKHET 
\ \SAVANNAKI 


‘ Maha L 
SarakhamP 


YAPIKHA^ 
“V WPNG 


SOUTH 


Yasothon 


yiETNA, 


UBON PATCHATH 


Warin 

Chamrap 


Surin 


AttopeiA 


SlTpA! 


^ARREL ROLL/STEEL 


qJANi-*NO>Vi1965 


NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTMORITATIV C 


T" 


P'ingkuo 0 

Ching-hsi 

CHINA 

K v ' /, V"s f 

ciolBang 0 

V 


- 22 , 


DWTGAI 3AU 

„ Jf S' 

S ^T 

AIPHONG 

DAO CAT BA 


Muang Nan' 


AUANG PHITSANuloK 


Ha Tinh 


MUI RON 


Domniation Line 

Dong Ha 


LAOS 


International boundary 
Province boundary 
National capital 
Province capital 
Railroad 
Road 


-Track or trail 


75 100 Miles 5= 


0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers 


CULF OF S/AM 


m- 


Lomphat 

° \ 


Base 52588 10-65 


SECKfT ^classified 


V -26B 


Map 4 













































(TS) YANKEE TEAM (reconnaissance) operations in the same 
area entailed: 

- Control by CINCPAC; 77 

- Prohibition on the use of napalm by escort aircraft; and 

- Prohibition of attacks on trucks sighted by escort aircraft 

78 

(the same trucks could be destroyed by interdiction aircraft). 

(TS) As of mid-1965, the majority of BARREL ROLL and STEEL 
TIGER missions originated at US bases in Thailand. Approval to 
use these aircraft had been sought early in the BARREL ROLL pro¬ 
gram as being essential to the success of interdiction operations. 
However, due mainly to the Thai Government's reluctance to risk 
their status of nonbelligerence by authorizing combat strikes from its 
bases, this approval was withheld. As a result, the first BARREL 

79 

ROLL missions were carried out by RVN - or carrier-based aircraft. 

(TS) On 1 October 1965, in the wake of an unintentional strike in 

a Royal Lao Government (RLG) controlled area, all STEEL TIGER 

missions were discontinued until further notice by the US Ambassador 

80 

(acting through the Air Attache in Vientiane). The suspension was 
lifted on 20 November. Brigadier General George P. Snider, Director 
of Operations, 2d Air Division, told responsible commanders at that 

time: 


V - 27 




Air operations in Laos are extremely sensitive. It is 
absolutely imperative that your aircrews do not expend munitions 
outside of approved areas. There have been six instances since 
20 November that violated rules of engagement. Laos is being 
utilized as a staging base for NVN military personnel and supplies 
into SVN. Continued violations will jeopardize US authority to 
attack enemy forces before they can engage our ground forces. You 
are responsible for the conduct of your strike crews and their com¬ 
pliance with (the) rules of engagement. There is no excuse that is 
acceptable for any attack outside an approved area . . . 81 

(TS) Meanwhile, the southern half of STEEL TIGER was desig¬ 
nated TIGER HOUND and accorded procedural emphasis in an effort 
to speed up the validation of targets sighted therein (Map 5). TIGER 
HOUND aircraft were authorized to perform armed reconnaissance 
along the roads and motorable trails within the operational area. 
However, as specified by the US Ambassador to Laos and reflected 
in implementing guidance from Washington: 

- Only targets of opportunity within 200 yards of a road 
could be struck; 

£ 

- Infiltration trails or way-stations could not be attacked; 


and 


- Villages or built up areas, regardless of military value, 
could not be attacked without target validation by Vientiane or the 
RLAF. 



V-28 














































(TS) With respect to validation, even with the elaborate commu¬ 
nications equipment aboard the Airborne Command and Control 
Center, including single side-band radio, the process was agonizingly 
lengthy. 

(TS) The imposition of political restrictions on the interdiction 

program also must be considered. Armed reconnaissance over 

selected routes in Laos had been severely restricted. Political 

restraints made it impossible to strike the most significant areas in 

84 

the southern Panhandle. Restrictions placed on air operations, 

both reconnaissance and interdiction, degraded the effectiveness of 

8 5 

US air power and diluted any measure of success achieved. 

Interdiction, 1966-67 

(TS) By 1966, the conflict in Laos had become two wars, each 

with different characteristics. The northern war was one of position 

and maneuver. In the panhandle, the US objective was interdiction 

8 6 

of supplies passing from NVN to RVN. 

(TS) The BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER rules of engagement for 
1966 and the first two months of 1967 were relatively simple (Map 6). 
Within seven armed reconnaissance zones, US aircraft could strike 
any targets of opportunity that were outside villages and within 200 






(TS) In March 1967, a major change of zones and rules for the 


STEEL TIGER area resulted from a series of highly publicized bomb 
incidents near the Laotian/RVN/NVN border. In an attempt to 
reduce the number of these incidents, the STEEL TIGER area was 
rezoned (Map 7) in favor of a north-south configuration. 

- Zone I featured minimum restrictions, but 7th Air Force 
insisted on the use therein of a forward air controller (FAC) because 
"to the guy in the air the line on the map means nothing. " This 
decision was illustrative of one of the main drawbacks of the new 
division -- its complexity. 

- Immediately to the west was Zone II. Since it was more 
populous than Zone I, additional restrictions were imposed on the 
employment of air assets in it. 

- The next area to the west. Zone III, was subject to more 
restrictions than Zone II. 

- The remaining area. Zone IV, contained the bulk of the 
native population of southern Laos. Restrictions applicable to it 
were the heaviest of any in SEA. 

(TS) In the northern war, armed reconnaissance zones along 

88 

the Lao/NVN border remained unchanged. 


V - 30 








Thai 

Nguyen 


PHONG 

3A1*Y 


HANOI 


HOUA KHONG 


Muong*-, 
Sai t 


neua 


BARREL ROLL 


.uang 

'rabani 


(Thanh, 
\ Hoa^ 


.Sayaboury 


Xiangkhoang 1 


"Tchiang 

; Khan 


Khammouani 


Sakon 

Nakhon 


'hitsanu 


Savannakhet, 


SOUTH, 


Muong 

Nong 


VIETNAM 


Chavan* 


^TJbon 

Ratchathani 


Attopeu 


Kontum 


Pleiku' 


Hon Gai 


■ Haiphong 

I 

Dinh 


V V Vinh 

A/.. _S \}.nh 

<■' —Vv_ DEMARCATION 

4A LINE 


Trail 




NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 


LAOS 

-■ - International boundary 

--Province boundary 

® National capital 
O Province capital 
— 1 —*- Railroad 
— 1 - Road 


25 50 75 100 Miles 

I-r-H-r 1 —i- 1 - 1 

0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers 


OPERATING AREA: 
BEFORE MAR 

/ <StungTreng 

CAMBODIA 

a \ / _ .C_ 


Base 57740 7-68 

Map 6 


wclascifie. 


V-29A 































































































Thai 

Nguyen 


PHOf 

SAL 


HANOI 


HOUA KHOjNg 


Haiphong 


VIETNAM 


.Sayaboury 


Paksane 


Sakon 

Nakhon 


tPhitsanu 


Savannakhet 


SOUTH, 


SAVAN 


VIETNAM 


^TJbon 

Ratchathani 


EDONE 


Kontum 


Pleiku' 


Vinh 


DEMARCATION 

LINE 


Trail 


OPERATI 


NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 


LAOS 

- International boundary 
* Province boundary 
® National capital 
o Province capital 
~ 1 —<■* Railroad 
—- Road 


0 25 50 75 100 Miles 

I - 1 — L - 1 - r 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 

0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers 


Base 57740 7-68 

Map 7 


V - 30 A 




























































































































































Interdiction, 1968-69 

(TS) In October 1968, the US Ambassador to Laos, through his 
air attache, issued a consolidated list of restrictions pertaining to 
the BARREL ROLL area. The list, reflecting Washington-level 
support of the Ambassador's position as well as administration 
political/military guidance, portrayed with uncommon clarity the 
problems presented to those charged with planning for and optimum 
employment of air power. Indicative of the difficulty were the 
following: 

- No operations within 10 NM of the NVN border, armed 
reconnaissance only on certain designated routes, limitation on hot 
pursuit, no air operations adjacent to the Chinese Communist border 
and 

- US Embassy, Vientiane, control of ordnance, target 
validation, defoliation and FAC operations., 

In addition, 7th Air Force found it necessary to place in effect its 
own highly detailed control procedures governing strikes in Laos. 

(TS) Within this context a major factor inhibiting the truck kill 
ratio, in the opinion of 7th Air Force, was Embassy, Vientiane, 
insistence on FAC verification and clearance for strikes against 
visually acquired targets. The element of surprise, essential when 



V- 31 




dealing with moving targets, was lost due to the overt nature of the 
FAC mission. As seen by 7th Air Force, "The FAC requirement 
for identification of trucks is unnecessary because the only ones 
running around are North Vietnamese." 90 

(TS) Cessation of air attack against NVN on 1 November 1968 
brought about action on the part of the administration to establish a 
positive control" area along the border inside Laos to protect 
against inadvertent penetration of NVN airspace. 91 

(TS) Early in May 1969 the four STEEL TIGER zones were 
reduced to two, appropriately termed STEEL TIGER EAST and WEST 
(Map 8). However, an attempt to modify arrangements relating to 
the BARREL ROLL area was unsuccessful. The latter remained an 
armed reconnaissance zone without change in limitations. 9 ^ 

(TS) The presence of Chinese road construction crews in the 
northern and northwestern regions of Laos led to the creation of yet 
another restricted area. To avoid international incidents, US aircraft 
were prohibited from conducting air strikes or low level photo recon¬ 
naissance missions in this area without specific approval of the 
Embassy. 9 ^ 

(S) With North Vietnam intent on pouring supplies down the Ho Chi 
Minh trail during the dry season, there had been an increased level 


V- 32 



JJNCL 


TV c c 









Base 57740 7-68 


.UNCLAS2IFIE 


Map 8 


V-32A 































































































































































of truck activity in Laos late in 1968, albeit lower than the 


previous 


year preceding the 1968 Tet offensive. Enemy truck activity increased 
sharply in January 1969, was at a record high in March and then 
declined with onset of the southwest monsoon until sensor readings 
in June revealed that traffic had fallen to ten percent of the average 


for the first quarter of 1969. ^ 


(S) To counter the fall 1968-spring 1969 logistic surge, Operation 
COMMANDO HUNT was initiated. COMMANDO HUNT was an inter¬ 
diction campaign in the STEEL TIGER area of operation which was 
targetted against the NVN logistical system in the Lao Panhandle. 
Successive campaigns bore numerical designations that changed with 
the semiannual monsoonal shift — odd numbered campaigns corres¬ 
ponding to the dry seasons. All-source intelligence -- including 
photo, visual, electronic reconnaissance. Igloo White seismic and 

acoustic sensor input and reports of road watch teams -- were used 

95 

to develop targets. 

(S) In COMMANDO HUNT I, the resupply activity of the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) ran at a high level from January through 
April of 1969. Against it, US forces expended about 400 fighter- 
attack sorties and 22 B-52 forties per day. These sorties destroyed 
or damaged 6,000 trucks, and produced over 50,000 fires and secondary 


V- 33 


,1 







< 



explosions. As a result, the NVA was only able to transport about 
8,500 of the more than 45,000 tons of supplies from NVN through 
Laos to RVN, an input-to-throughput ratio of approximately five to 
one. 96 

(S) The next dry-season interdiction campaign, COMMANDO HUNT 

III, covered the period November 1969 through April 1970. The North 

Vietnamese started their resupply effort earlier than in the previous 

year. Road work and material shipments began before the end of the 

wet-season and intensified after the rains slackened. Truck activity 

reached new heights in January and February of 1970, as did the 

efficacy of the truck-killing force. Fighter-attack aircraft flew 

almost 300 strike sorties per day, while 23 daily B-52 sorties struck. 

Damaged or destroyed trucks numbered 10,000; fires and secondary 

explosions, almost 50,000. The estimated input-to-throughput ratio 

was about three to one: with 19,000 tons reaching RVN of 55,000 tons 

moved into Laos. A reduced air effort and an increased NVA logistics 

effort had resulted in a larger supply flow through Laos during 

97 

COMMANDO HUNT III than during COMMANDO HUNT I. 

(S) Throughput did not meet VC/NVA needs, however, for the 
resupply effort continued, although reduced, well into the wet season. 


V - 34 

f I- r 



< 



The cumulative effects of the rain and the bombing brought this 

98 

effort to a virtual halt in August. 

(S) As COMMANDO HUNT III was ending, the North Vietnamese 
resupply operation received a major setback when the Cambodians 
refused them further use of the port of Sihanoukville. This, com¬ 
bined with the successful allied cross border operations in May and 
June 1970, which deprived them of thousands of tons of stockpiled 

supplies along with sanctuaries, greatly increased the enemy's need 

99 

for supplies from NVN. 

(S) During the 1970 wet season, the North Vietnamese departed 
from past practice in the STEEL TIGER area and did not return 
their construction battalions to NVN. These units continued to build 
and improve the road system in Laos. Many NVA antiaircraft 
positions remained active in Laos to protect the route structure 
and the limited truck movement. In addition to road construction, 
the waterway and pipeline portions of the logistic system were also 
being improved. At the same time in NVN, roads and bridges were 
being constructed or improved, and many of the trucks were being 
replaced. In both Laos and NVN, the wet-season activity presaged 
an intensive resupply effort in the coming dry season. 


V- 35 







(S) Whereas the North Vietnamese were projected to mount a 
larger resupply effort, the US air effort in SEA would be smaller. 

The authorized level of Navy and Air Force fighter-attack sorties 
for FY 1971 was 50 percent below the COMMAND HUNT III level, 
although moderate increases in the capabilities of the VNAF and 
RLAF would offset this reduction somewhat. In addition, improve¬ 
ments to and doubling of the AC-130 force were expected to enhance 
the truck-killing program. Moreover, the B-57G force would add 
to the truck-killing capability. ^ 

(S) During COMMANDO HUNT V, the STEEL TIGER area received 
the preponderant weight of the US air effort in SEA. The upward trend 
in overall weight of effort corresponded with increasing enemy acti¬ 
vity in STEEL TIGER. It peaked in March when air support require¬ 
ments for Lam Son 719 and BARREL ROLL were highest. While the 
month of March was the peak month for NVA truck traffic, 42 percent 
of the allied tactical air effort during that month was devoted to support 

of the Lam Son operation; however, much of this support resulted in 

102 

destruction of enemy supplies and materiel. 

(S) In all, 21, 000 trucks were reported destroyed or damaged, 
twice the number reported in COMMANDO HUNT III. Tactical air 
attacks against truck parks and storage areas accounted for 33,000 



V - 36 



fires and secondary explosions. Of the 60,000 tons of supplies the 
NVA brought into STEEL TIGER from NVN, only 7,000 tons, or 
about 11 percent, reached RVN or Cambodia. This input-to-throughput 
ratio of about nine to one underscores the success achieved by 
COMMANDO HUNT V interdiction effort. 

Review 

(TS) The restricted nature of US air operations in Laos kept them 
largely out of the limelight of US public knowledge. Accordingly, 
policies governing employment of air power in that country were 
shaped less by need to achieve prime effectiveness and to create a 
favorable impression at home than by restrictions stemming from 
the Geneva Protocols establishing Laotian neutrality in 1962 and 
the necessity of avoiding damage to the image of Souvanna Phouma 
among his people. Political sensitivity overrode military require¬ 
ments in connection with policy formulation, planning and conduct 
of operations. In the latter regard, the Ambassador to Laos became 
the central figure insofar as application of air power in Laos is 
concerned. 

(TS) Air employment statutes for Laos shifted from relatively 
simple restrictions to highly complex rules which tended to impede 

V- 37 



r . 














operations from 1967 to mid-1969, then back to simpler arrangements 
by the end of 1969. This undoubtedly was due to many factors; however, 
two of the major probable causes were a change in US Ambassadors and 
the rapidly deteriorating position of the RLG. As the communists con¬ 
tinued to make steady advances in Laos, the friendly forces became 
more and more dependent upon US air power. The source of greatest 
difficulty was need to obtain target validation from the Embassy in 

105 

Vientiane or its instrumentalities, and the time required to do so. 

PART III: CAMBODIA 

(S) In June 1964 US Ambassador to RVN, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
advised Washington that "there is no question in our minds here, and 
there should be none in Washington, that the Viet Cong has been using 
with impunity Cambodian territory as sanctuary for purposes of 
grouping, training, and equipping their military units, and for 
receiving these units from South Vietnam (SVN) when they are tired 

, •, j ,,106 

or hard pressed. " 

(C) The importance of Cambodia to the enemy war effort had 
been stated in numerous prisoner of war interrogation reports, agent 
reports and captured documents beginning as early as 1962. The 
communists had taken pains to maintain good relations with the 


V-38 





a 

* 

.1 - 





officials of the Cambodian government. Indeed, some of the intelli¬ 
gence reports indicated that various officials in the national government, 

to include Prince Sihanouk, could be in collusion with the VC, possibly 

10 7 

allowing them to use Cambodian territory for refuge and supply. 


Aerial Reconnaissance 

(TS) As the extent of VC use of Cambodia became clearer, and 
the impact of this use on enemy military activities in RVN came into 
focus, the US military command in Saigon began to consider means to 
take the war to the enemy for the purpose of denying use of the 
sanctuaries. 

(TS) On 26 October 1963, COMUSMACV recommended that the 
US Ambassador support a request for photo reconnaissance flights 
on the Cambodian side of the border. As an outgrowth of this initiative 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) reconnaissance flights (TROJAN HORSE/ 
GIANT SCALE) were initiated several months later. The objective of 
these flights was to determine and document the nature and degree of 
enemy use of Cambodia. 

(S) In July 1966, comprehensive aerial reconnaissance by 7th Air 
Force aircraft of the Cambodian border area began under the MACV 
DORSAL FIN program. The latter provided for all-sensor coverage 

V-39 






of the Cambodian-RVN border from the area directly west of Tay Ninh 
City to the Laotian border and into Cambodia to a depth of 20 kilo¬ 
meters. In order to maintain security of the program, crews were 
under orders to abort the mission in event of hostile fire. There was 
apprehension that the US would be charged, as in 1964, with responsi¬ 
bility for attacks against Cambodia. ^ 

Interdiction 

(TS) US air operations were initiated in Cambodia on 1 May 1970 
in support of allied cross-border ground operations. Along with 
VNAF, 7th Air Force aircraft flew almost 25,000 attack sorties in 
Cambodia between 1 May and 31 December. Additionally, 1,400 B-52 
sorties were flown. Royal Thai Air Force support commenced on 
4 July, with 135 attack sorties flown from that date to the end of 
1970. 111 

(TS) A 19 May JCS outline plan and directive for an air interdic¬ 
tion campaign in eastern Cambodia restricted implementation until 
necessary coordination had been effected with the Cambodian armed 
forces and RVNAF. To accomplish the required coordinations, a 
meeting was held on 28 May 1970 at MACV headquarters with repre¬ 
sentation from MACV, Cambodian forces and the RVN Joint General 


V -40 





Staff. On 29 May, a memorandum of agreement on rules of engage¬ 
ment for Cambodia was signed by the participants and the following 

112 

day witnessed the first strikes under the plan. 

(TS) Rules for conduct of interdiction operations provided 
sufficient latitude for strike aircraft effectiveness. The following 
constraints were imposed to protect noncombatants and to preserve 
areas of cultural value to the Cambodian people: 

- All strikes by tactical fighters were conducted under the 
control of a FAC except for properly validated and cleared radar- 
controlled attacks. Helicopter gunships were considered FAC capable 
aircraft. F-4 and A-6 aircraft utilizing internal radar bombing 
systems could conduct nonvisual attacks against validated targets; 

- Radar-controlled B-52 strikes were to be conducted 
periodically against validated area targets; 

- Aircraft were cleared to return ground fire directed at 
them, except when such fire was from an urban area, town, village 
or hamlet. When ground fire was received from such an area, 

Forces Armee' Nationale Khmer (FANK) validation was to be secured 
prior to return of fire, and fire was limited to that part of the area 
from which the ground fire was observed; 


- Air strikes, other than to return ground fire, were not 


to be conducted against an urban area, town, village or hamlet 
unless: 

. The target was known to contain enemy forces or 

storage areas, 

. The target was validated by FANK, 

. FANK advised the Tactical Air Control Center 
(TACC) at Tan Son Nhut in RVN of the absence of noncombatants. If 
noncombatants were present, the strike would not be conducted until 
inhabitants had been warned to leave the area; 

- Nonlethal incapacitating agents, in addition to normal 
munitions, could be used by search and rescue forces when required 
to insure the recovery of a downed aircrew; and 

- Specifically designated areas of cultural value to the 
Cambodian people would not be struck unless requested and validated 
by FANK. 113 

(TS) FANK established Special Operating Areas (SOA) which 
were geographically defined areas where there were no friendly 
forces or populace. Allied aircraft could strike any target dis¬ 
covered there. FANK reaffirmed these areas every 10 days and 

114 

could revoke them upon prior notification. 


»~ 

I 


V-42 




(TS) FANK also divided existing LOC into two categories, which 
they reaffirmed every 10 days and could revoke upon prior notifica¬ 
tion: 

- Category A LOC were those along which no friendly 
forces or personnel were located. Strikes were authorized on and 
1000 meters to either side of these LOC; 

- Category B LOC were those along which friendly 

personnel were located. Aircraft, including gunships, were permitted 

to strike motor vehicles or moving watercraft at night and motor 

boats or motor vehicles during daylight hours. These strikes were 

115 

limited to a zone 500 meters either side of the LOC. 

(TS) When potential targets were discovered by aircraft or 
reported by intelligence agencies outside the SOA or the designated 
LOC, FANK validation was required before they could be attacked. 
Procedures were developed to establish rapid validation of targets. 

FANK was responsible for providing: 

- English-speaking laison officers with authority to 

validate targets to the TACC; 

- English-speaking officers with authority to validate 

targets while flying with certified FAC's from Pleiku, RVN, 








- Current information to their officers on the disposition of 

friendly forces and location of noncombatants in the interdiction 
116 

areas. 

The provisions of FANK officers with fluent English language capa¬ 
bilities was a problem that hampered effective air operations from 
117 

time to time. Attempts to provide USAF pilots capable of speaking 

French produced only limited results. 

(S) On 6 June 1970, CINCPAC promulgated the basic operations 

order for air interdiction operations in eastern Cambodia. The 

mission as stated therein called for surveillance of enemy activities 

in Cambodia, east of the Mekong River, and interdiction with tactical 

air and B-52's of those enemy activities considered necessary to 

protect US forces in the RVN. The area of operations was designated 

n q 

FREEDOM DEAL. 

(U) In his televised report on the Cambodian operation on 30 June 

1970, President Nixon stated that the US would conduct: 

. . . with the approval of the Cambodian Government - air 
interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to move supplies and 
personnel through Cambodia toward South Vietnam and to re-establish 
base areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to protect our 
forces in South Vietnam. 


V-44 






(TS) Thus, after 30 June 1970, air operations in Cambodia took 

on the aspect of interdiction designed to halt the flow of men and arms 

before their arrival in RVN and thereby reduce the risk to US forces. 

(U) In late June 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird asserted 

. . We will carry on an air interdiction campaign and any airpower 

that is used in Cambodia will be based upon the interdiction of supplies 

or personnel, that threaten the Vietnamization program, that threaten 

Americans, that are engaged in military operations in Vietnam. " 

(Emphasis added. ) The Secretary further stated "... I would be 

less than frank or candid with you if there would not be a side effect 

as far as Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops operating in 

Cambodia, . . . but the primary reason for the air activities will be 

120 

the protection of Americans in South Vietnam. " 

(U) That Cambodian ground forces were receiving ancillary 
benefits from US air operations did not escape the American press 
corps. In August 1970, in response to a query on "explicit reporting" 
of US close air support to Cambodian forces, Secretary Laird 


reaffirmed: 

... I can tell you that we will continue to interdict 
supplies, personnel and logistic routes. There will be certainly 
gmci.21a.ry benefits, too, that will affect Cambodian operations, 
however, our primary mission, as far as the use of our air 
whether it be in the southern part of Cambodia or along the sanc¬ 
tuary areas, or along the river routes--will be interdiction of 
supplies and personnel. 121 


V-45 





DRAFT 


(TS) On 17 July 1970, JCS provided authority to COMUSMACV to 

employ US tactical air power in any situation such as the imminent 

loss of a province capitol or a military position, which would prove 

to be a major military setback or a serious blow to Cambodian 

morale. Further, he was directed to conduct the most aggressive 

122 

air campaign possible using both US and VNAF resources. 

(TS) Based on a 30 July 1970 request of COMUSMACV, operations 

in an extended FREEDOM DEAL area were authorized on 1 August 

1970. On 26 August the area was further extended under the designa- 

123 

tion, FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA (Map 9). Then on 30 April 1971, 
CINCPAC directed all the FREEDOM DEAL areas to be consolidated 
into one operational area. This same message authorized US air 
support of ARVN ground forces operating in Cambodia. 


•Qe^p^r-Church Amendment 

(U) The G^e^er-Church Amendment to the Foreign Military 
Sales Act, and Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (Public Law 
91 - 652) established a prohibition on the conduct of any combat air 
activity in the air above Cambodia in direct support of the Cambodian 
forces effective 1 January 1971. However, the Amendment reaffirmed 
the constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief to 









.UNCUS. 




LAOS . 


T H A I LAND 


v 1 - 


- .1 


BMIAVIB\\(. si I V! 


V 




STATUTE MILES 


SIAM 


«c 

GULF 


CAMBODIA 

FREEDOM DEAL 
FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION 
FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION 


\ 

»u cr phj oooc 


REPUBLIC 
( OF/ s 

V VI ET-'N AM 

■ \ - /•*-* U, * 

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SOUTH 
CHISA SEA 


Map 9 JJNGLAS 


V-46A 



































































( 




















( 




















exercise whatever power might be necessary to protect the lives of 


US armed forces personnel wherever deployed. 


125 


(TS) Thus, despite the restrictions placed on US air operations 

in Cambodia by the Cooper-Church Amendment, US air power has 

provided various types of support to the Cambodian forces within 

126 

the framework of interdiction operations. 


PART IV: REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 



(C) Of all areas in SEA, fewer restrictions were imposed on air 
operations in RVN, after the US build up, than any other. This 
appears to have been an outgrowth of realization that tactical com¬ 
manders required air support -- that the soldier and marine on the 
ground needed all the assistance that could be provided. 

(C) In early 1965, lack of suitable combat aircraft, coupled with 
a relatively loose air request and control system, initially led to 
complaints on the ground force side that: 

- A cohesive air support program did not exist; 

- Air elements were not responsive; 


- Reaction was too slow; 

- The type support required often was not forthcoming; and 

i 127 

- The air request was cumbersome. 


V-47 

DRAFT 




















r— /**■* i 



exercise whatever power might be necessary to protect the lives of 

12 5 

US armed forces personnel wherever deployed. 

(TS) Thus, despite the restrictions placed on US air operations 

in Cambodia by the Cooper-Church Amendment, US air power has 

provided various types of support to the Cambodian forces within 

126 

the framework of interdiction operations. 



PART IV: REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
(C) Of all areas in SEA, fewer restrictions were imposed on air 
operations in RVN, after the US build up, than any other. This 
appears to have been an outgrowth of realization that tactical com¬ 
manders required air support -- that the soldier and marine on the 
ground needed all the assistance that could be provided. 

(C) In early 1965, lack of suitable combat aircraft, coupled with 
a relatively loose air request and control system, initially led to 
complaints on the ground force side that: 

- A cohesive air support program did not exist; 

- Air elements were not responsive; 

- Reaction was too slow; 

- The type support required often was not forthcoming; and 

v 127 

- The air request was cumbersome. 

V-47 

DRAFT 









(C) In spite of these complaints, air support evolved into an 

acceptable although not fully effective program. With build up of US 

forces in Vietnam, beginning in the spring of 1965, the requirement 

for increased use and improved control of air resources came to 

the fore. In September 1964, and again in July 1965, COMUSMACV 

published directives centralizing control and effecting a refinement 

128 

of the allocation and request system for air support. The major 
improvement accomplished by these directives was retention of the 
joint air operations center at MACV, and establishment at Second 
Air Division (subsequently redesignated 7th Air Force), with VNAF 
participation, a tactical air control center and related system for 
command and control of USAF/VNAF air assets and for the coordina¬ 
tion of US Navy and Marine Corps air strikes. With but few later 
modifications, among them an arrangement adopted in 1968 wherein 
Commander, 7th Air Force became COMUSMACV's "single manager" 

for USAF and US Marine Corps tactical air in RVN, this arrangement 

129 

has met planning, allocation and control requirements to date. 

(TS) While CINCPAC would pass control to COMUSMACV of some 
of the air operations in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam, it 
was General Westmoreland's contention that these areas were in 
fact part of the same battle which was being fought in the south. 


V-48 


DRAFT 







General Westmoreland believed that the Lao logistics corridor to 
include the Route 1 area of the North Vietnam panhandle, and the 
sanctuary areas of Cambodia comprised the communications zone 
for the enemy forces and therefore should be in the extended battle¬ 
field with all operations against these areas under the command of 
the tactical (COMUSMACV) commander. His concept was not to 
bear fruition, however. 

Refinements 

(TS) From 1966 on, the policies governing the employment of 
air assets in RVN remained relatively constant. A problem at times 
was the requirement for approval by the RVN province chief or a 
higher authority for strikes by US aircraft other than those engaged 
in close air support of ground operations. In time, however, the 
approval process was simplified and standardized in furtherance of 
fully responsive use of air power. 

(TS) One development worthy of note was addition of measures 
designed to reduce still further the possibility of air delivered ord¬ 
nance falling on friendly forces. To begin with, the requirement for 
FAC control was extended to all tactical air strikes. Friendly forces 
on the ground were made responsible for marking their positions for 

V-49 


DRAFT 







t r*' 


/*' 


each flight of strike aircraft and for remarking them as often as was 
necessary. The FAC was made responsible for marking the target 
and the ground commander for confirming the accuracy of the 
target-mark. If, in the opinion of the ground commander, the FAC 
or the strike pilot, the target was inaccurately or poorly marked, the 
FAC was to remark it before the strike aircraft could be cleared to 
expend ordnance. If the friendly position could not be marked due 
to lack of marking means or for tactical reasons, the FAC was to 
ask the ground commander to accept responsibility in the event of a 
short round. 

(TS) While not preventing such incidents altogether, the new 

procedures helped to reduce them while still providing flexibility to 

insure continued support. This was in marked contrast to the 1962 

era, when inadequacy of FAC resources and lack of proper marking 

frequently prohibited delivery of ordnance no matter how great the 

13 3 

need of the tactical commander. 

(TS) Commencing in FY 1970, reduction of US strategic and 
tactical air sorties was made a feature of the Department of Defense 
portion of the Federal Budget. Early in calendar year 1970, COMUS 
MACV stated that budget reductions had imposed a cut of over twenty 
percent in B-52 and tactical air sorties; this in turn had reduced 


V - 50 


V- ... 


DRAFT 



allied capability to respond to multiple contingencies with the massed 
firepower that had become increasingly important to success of 
the Vietnamization process. He further stated that the proposed 
FY 1971 budget would in effect dismantle the highly visible means of 
executing the US declaration that strong measures would be taken 
against NYN if increased enemy action jeopardized remaining US 
forces in RVN. 


PART V: B-52 (ARC LIGHT) EMPLOYMENT 

(S) As a sequel to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, additional B-52's 

were deployed to Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, in February 1965 

to provide military planners with additional options. B-52 employ- 

135 

ment was to be given the code designation, ARC LIGHT. 

(TS) Because allied tactical air assets available in RVN and 

aboard Seventh Fleet carriers were not sufficient to meet the 

increasing demands for aerial firepower, on 15 June 1965 COMUSMACV 

requested B-52 strikes against a VC base area in Binh Duong Province. 

136 

The JCS approved the request on the following day. When bomb 

damage assessment carried out following the strike revealed no 

evidence of VC casualties, strong criticism was voiced by the 

American press that B-52's were an expensive and ineffective weapon 

, 137 

for use against guerrilla forces. 

r 

V-51 

DRAFT 







(TS) Under the ARC LIGHT program COMUSMACV was required 
to forward strike requests for coordination with the White House and 
Department of State prior to an execution decision by the Secretary 
of Defense. Each request specified that: 

- The area within one kilometer of the target was free of 
noncombatants, noncombatant dwellings, pagodas, shrines, temples 
and other places of worship; and that 

- Concurrence in striking the target had been received 
from the US Embassy and the GVN.^^ 

(TS) A further example of the degree of control exercised over 
B-52 strikes is found in a 20 October 1965 message from the JCS to 
COMUSMACV which disapproved certain targets by virtue of their 
proximity to noncombatants or friendly elements. This had proved 
to be a matter of concern to agencies responsible for target review 
and granting of execution authority. The JCS reminded COMUSMACV 
that targets situated within one nautical mile of noncombatants were 
subject to close scrutiny at the national level. 

(TS) In reply to this message COMUSMACV, on 31 October 1965, 
stated: "The protection of noncombatants is a primary concern to us 
on the scene. " In addition, he stated that control procedures in 


V-52 

DRAFT 


n 






u 


effect within RVN were designed to minimize risk to inhabited areas. 
He added that cancellation of targets meeting the control criteria, to 
include approval by GVN authorities, could jeopardize the success 
of operations as well as disrupt continued progress in exploiting the 
value of B-52 strikes. 

(S) Approval authority for ARC LIGHT strikes within RVN was 
delegated to CINCPAC in April 1966. Under this decentralized 
approach: 


- COMUSMACV was tasked with sending target requests 
and justification therefor to CINCPAC, simultaneously notifying 
Washington agencies that previously had been involved in execution 
approval; and 

- CINCPAC, upon approving requests, was to inform 

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), who then 

would execute the strike. Concurrently, CINCPAC was to notify 

141 

COMUSMACV of the action taken. 

(S) In November 1966, ARC LIGHT approval authority was further 
decentralized to COMUSMACV. Rationale for this action resided 
primarily in the fact that targets were usually in enemy-controlled 
areas and were not "politically sensitive. " CINCPAC was to be 
notified of each planned strike and could apply a veto if desired. 

V-53 


DRAFT 




G VN and US Embassy concurrence remained a requirement; CINCSAC 
exercised execution control. 

(S) Under this streamlined arrangement faster reaction time 
was achieved. Moreover, the ARC LIGHT effort could be blended 
more and more into the maneuver of ground forces as opposed to 
employment only against pre-planned fixed targets. The added fire¬ 
power was necessary to cope with the enemy's ever-increasing 

142 

commitment of troops and materiel. 

(TS) Despite COMUSMACV's expressed concern, sortie rates 
for tactical air fell from about 21, 000 per month to 14, 000 per month, 
and B-52 sortie rates fell from 1, 600 to 1,400 per month at the 
beginning of FY 1971. 143 

(TS) Budget-related reductions in authorized sortie rates conti¬ 
nued throughout the period with sortie levels reduced at the beginning 

of FY 1972 to 11,000 tactical air and 1,000 B-52 sorties per month, 

144 

with still further reductions planned. CINCPAC, meanwhile, 
stressed that progressive reduction of sorties in SEA had resulted 
in easing pressure against the enemy and had increased the level of 
risk to allied forces in RVN when coupled with US ground force 
reductions. ^ 43 


V- 54 

DRAFT 





DRAFT 


u 


PART V: CONCLUSIONS 


(U) Both strategic and tactical air -- the latter in its recon¬ 
naissance, airlift and strike roles -- have contributed in major degree 
to fulfillment of allied objectives in SEA. Employment of air pcwer 
in SEA has been most effective in RVN by virtue of fewer restrictions 
imposed on air operations in that country. 

(TS) Political constraints, notably in the realm of targetting 
policy, have prevented fully effective and sustained application of air 
power against the enemy in NVN and Laos. In company with the US 
administration's doctrine of graduated pressure and its self-imposed 
restrictions against neutralization of Cambodian and Laotian sanc¬ 
tuaries, the constraints take their place among actions exemplifying 
conduct of the war with "one hand tied behind the back. " 

(U) Restrictions notwithstanding, allied operations in SEA have 
manifested the flexibility and adaptability of air power. 

* 

(U) Strategic air as employed in SEA has provided a means of 
bringing massive fire power to bear against enemy base areas and 
troop concentrations inaccessible to friendly ground forces. As such, 
it has been an invaluable asset for use by COMUSMACV in influencing 


f**- 

V-55 

DRAFT 


the situation. 




(TS) Beginning in FY 1970, budgetary decisions have been 
responsible for progressive decline in availability and effect of US 
air power in SEA. These decisions have had only marginal rele¬ 
vance to the enemy threat and to military requirements presented 
by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. 


V-56 

DRAFT 




UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER V 

POLICIES GOVERNING THE USE OF AIR POWER 


1. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1964 (U), pp. 371- 
372 (TS) and Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 042119Z Aug 64. 

2. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Evolution of the Rules 
of Engagement for Southeast Asia, 1960-65 (U), 30 Sep 1966, 
p. 38 (TS-NOFORN). 

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid., pp. 38-39 (TS-NOFORN). 

5. Cooper, Chester L. , The Lost Crusade, New York: Dodd, 
Meade & Company, 1970, pp. 231-232; Newsweek, 28 June 
1971, p. 20; Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 
30 Jun 68), CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, 1969, pp. 3, 84. 

6. Rept (FOUO), Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward 

Southeast Asia, 1943-1968, A Chronological Compendium (U), 
USAF Historical Division, 1968, pp. 289-290. 


7. 

Ibid. 


8. 

Rept on the War in Vietnam (as 

of 30 Jun 68), p. 14. 

9. 

Ibid. , pp. 14-15. 


10. 

Cooper, The LostCrusade, pp. 

259-260. 

11. 

Ibid., p. 250. 


12. 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC 
p. 325 (TS). 

Comd Hist 1965 (U), Vol II, 

13. 

Ibid. , pp. 330-331. 



V-57 



UNCLASSIFIED 








UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

14. Project CHECO, Evolution of the Rules of Engagement for 
Southeast Asia, 1960-65 (U), p. 58 (TS-NOFORN). 

15. Ibid. 

16. Rept, The Effects and Impact of US Air Operations Against NVN, 
1965-68, HQ PACAF, 1969, pp. 3-4 (S). 

17. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Assessment of the Air Effort in Vietnam and 
Laos, Annex A, Rolling Thunder, Strategy and Tactics Analysis 
Group, Dec 1965, p. A-l (TS-NOFORN). 

18. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), p. 17 and Cooper, 
The Lost Crusade , p. 278. 

19. A Chronological Compendium, USAF Historical Division, p. 347 
and Cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 278. 

20. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), p. 17. 

21. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 

22. Ibid. , p. 18. 

23. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Rolling Thunder, Strategy and Analysis 
Group, p. A-4 (TS). 

24. Ibid., pp. A-l, B3-4 (TS). 

25. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), p. 18. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Rept, The Effects and Impact of US Air Operations Against NVN, 
1965-68, pp. 3-4 (S). 

28o Ibid. , p 0 4 (S). 

29. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1966 (U), Vol II, 
p. 496 (TS). 


V - 5 8 



UNCLASSIFIED 





UNCLASSIFIED 

drmt 

30. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), p. 21. 

31. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1965 (U), Vol II, 
p. 377 (TS). 

32. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), pp. 18-19. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Ibid. , p. 23. 

35. Rept, DIA Intelligence Summary, 29 Jan 66, p. F-6 (TS). 

36. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), p. 23 (U). 

37. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement, 

1 January 1966 - 1 November 1969 (U), HQ PACAF, 31 Aug 69, 
pp. 1-5 (TS-NOFORN). 

38. Ibid. 

39. Ibid. 

40. Ibid. 

41. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), p. 25. 

42. Ibid., pp. 26-30. 

43. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1966 (U), Vol II, 
p. 514 (TS). 

44. Ibid. , pp. 510-512 (TS). 

45. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement, 
1966-1969 (U), pp. 6-10 (TS-NOFORN). 

46. Ibid. 

47. Ibid. 

48. Ibid. 

V-59 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 



49. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), pp. 35-40. 

50. Ibid. 

51. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement, 

1966-1969 (U), pp. 11-13 (TS-NOFORN). 

52. Ibid. 

53. Rept on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), p. 44. 

54. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 
1966-1969 (U), p. 13 (TS). 

55. Rept, The Effects and Impact of US Air Operations Against NVN, 

1965- 68, pp. 1-9 (S). 

56. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Historical Summary, Navy Interdiction 
Campaign, NVN (U), CINCPACFLT, 15 Oct 69, pp. 9-15-145 (S). 

57. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 

1966- 1969 (U), pp. 13-14 (TS-NOFORN). 

58. Ibid. 

59. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1964 (U), pp. 275, 

303 (TS). 

60. Rept, History of US Naval Operations, Vietnam, 1964, Vol II, 
February 1970, pp. 8-12-13 (S-NOFORN). 

61. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement, 
1960-1965 (U), p. 23 (TS-NOFORN). 

62. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Escalation of the War, 

July -December 1964 (U), pp. 149-152 (TS-NOFORN). 

63. Rept, History of US Naval Operations, Vietnam, 1964, Vol II, 
pp. 8, 12, 13 (S-NOFORN). 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Escalation of the War, 
July-December 1964 (U), pp. 149-152 (TS-NOFORN). 


V- 60 



UNCLASSIFIED 


64 . 



UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

65. A Chronological Compendium, USAF Historical Division, 
pp. 272-273. 

66. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 
1960-1965 (U), p. 25 (TS-NOFORN). 

67. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Escalation of the War 
July-December 1964 (U), pp. 149-160 (TS-NOFORN). 

68. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 271 (TS). 

69. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 
1960-1965 (U), p. 29 (TS-NOFORN). 

70. Richard M. Nixon, Policy Speech Concerning Laos, 6 Mar 70. 

71. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Escalation of the War, 
July - December 1964 (U), pp. 159-160-165 (TS). 

72. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 
1960-1965 (U), pp. 44-47 (TS). 

73. Ibid. , p. 48 (TS-NOFORN). 

74. Ibid. , pp. 54-56 (TS). 

75. Ibid. , pp. 59-60 (TS). 

76. Ibid. , p. 64 (TS). 

77. Ibid. , p. 62 (TS). 

78. Ibid., pp. 63-64 (TS-NOFORN). 

79. Ibid. , p. 66 (TS). 

80. Ibid. , p. 68 (TS). 

81. Ibid. , p. 69 (TS). 

82. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1965 (U), Vol II, 
pp. 404-405 (TS). 

V-61 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 




UNCLASSIFIED 



83. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 
1960-1965 (U), p. 71 (TS-NOFORN). 

84. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 
1966-1969 (U), pp. 16-17 (TS). 

85. Ibid. , p. 19 (TS). 

86. Ibid. , pp. 20-26 (TS). 

87. Ibid. , pp. 27-33 (TS). 

88. Ibid. 

89. Ibid. 

90. Ibid. 

91. Ibid. 

92. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol I, 
pp. Ill-48 and V-212 (S). 

93. Rept (TS-NOFORN), COMMAND HUNT V, HQ 7th Air Force, 
May 1971, pp. 1, 204 (S). 

94. Ibid. , pp. 1-3 (S). 

95. Ibid. 

96. Ibid. 

97. Ibid. 

98. Ibid. 

99. Ibid. 

100. Ibid. , pp. 126-129 (S). 

101. Ibid. 

V - 62 






102. Rept (TS-NOFORN), Project CHECO, Rules of Engagement 

1966-1969 (U), pp. 35-36 (TS). 

103. Ibid. 

104. Ibid. 

105. Ibid. 

106. Rept (S), DIA Summary, 10 Oct 66, Viet Cong Use of Cambodian 
Territory, AP 1-650-4-1-66. 

107. Study (TS-NOFORN), ACSI, DA, The Role of Cambodia in the 
VC/NVA War Effort , 1964-1970, pp. 13-24 (TS-NOFORN), 
short title: Role of Cambodia . 

108. Ibid. , pp. 89-96 (TS) 

109. Ibid. , pp. 146-147 (TS). 

110. Ibid. , p. 248 (TS). 

111. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol I, 
pp. 179-181 (TS). 

112. Ibid. 

113. Memorandum of Agreement on Rules of Engagement - Cambodia, 
29 May 1970, Saigon, RVN (TS). 

114. Author's Personal Knowledge as Deputy Commander, USMACV, 
Apr 69 - Sep 70. 

115. Ibid. 

116. Ibid. 

117. Ibid. 

118. Ibid. 


V -63 









119. 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

Richard M. Nixon, Report to the Nation on the Cambodian 
Operations, 30 Jun 1970. 

120. Melvin R. Laird, Interview by Newsmen at Andrews AFB, 

26 Jun 70. 

121. Melvin R. Laird, News Conference, 6 Aug 70. 

122. Author's Personal Knowledge as Deputy Commander, USMACV, 
Apr 69 - Sep 70. 

123. Ibid. 

124. Msg (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, subj: 

Freedom Deal Areas of Operation, 300626Z Apr 71. 

125. Msg (U), SECSTATE WASHINGTON D. C. to A ME MB SAIGON, 
State #103937, 302105Z Jun 70, subj: Cooper-Church Amend¬ 
ment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, and Special Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1971, Public Law 91 - 652 (Cooper-Church 
Amendment). 

126. Msg (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 300626Z Apr 71. 

127. Rept (TS), Assessment of the Air Effort in Vietnam and Laos, 
Annex C, Close Air Support, Strategy and Tactics Analysis 
Group, Dec 1965, pp. C1-C3 (TS). 

128. Ibid. 

129. Ibid. 

130. Study, Role of Cambodia, pp. 88-96, 147-148 (TS). 

131. Rept (S), Project Corona Harvest, B-52 Employment in 
Southeast Asia 1965-1968 (U), p. 8 (S). 

132. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1965 (U), Vol II, 
pp. 425-429 (TS). 

133. Ibid. 


V - 64 



UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 



134. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol I, 
pp. VI-27 - VI-34 (S). 


135. Rept (S), Project Corona Harvest, B-52 Employment in 
Southeast Asia 1965-1968 (U), pp. 6-9 (S). 

136. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1965 (U), Vol II, 
p. 424 (TS). 

137. Ibid. 

138. Rept (S), Project Corona Harvest, B-52 Employment in 
Southeast Asia 1965-1968 (U), p. 8 (S). 

139. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 202244Z Oct 65. 

140. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 310137Z Oct 65. 

141. Rept (S), Project Corona Harvest, B-52 Employment in 
Southeast Asia 1965-1968 (U), pp. 10-11 (S). 

142. Ibid. , pp. 12-37 (S). 

143. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol II, 
p. 142 (TS). 

144. Ibidc , pp. Ill, 142 (TS). 

145. Ibid. , pp. 110-111 (TS). 


V - 65 





UNCLASSIFIED 



CHAPTER VI 

PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR AND THE LIMITED 
INCURSION INTO CAMBODIA (U) 

PURPOSE 

(U) The use of Cambodia as a sanctuary and source of supply by 
North Vietnam (NVN) and Viet Cong (VC) forces has had a profound 
effect on the war in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). This chapter 
will analyze the impact on military operations in RVN of United States 
(US) policy on enemy use of Cambodia during the period January 1963 
to and during the US-RVN incursion into Cambodia commencing 1 May 
1970. 


APPROACH 

(U) The major topics identified below will be examined: 

- VC/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) use of Cambodia as a 
sanctuary and source of supply; 

- US political objectives and policy guidance with respect to 
Cambodia; 

- US political restraints placed upon friendly operations into 
Cambodia; 

- Proposals by Commander, United States Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), for authority to use limited air, 



IIMP.I ASSIFIED 




UNCLASSIFIED 

DRftFT 

ground, and naval forces in Cambodia to gain intelligence of enemy- 
activities therein and to destroy enemy base areas; 

- Effects of enemy use of Cambodia on friendly military 
operations in RVN; 

- The intelligence dispute between the field and Washington 
intelligence agencies on extent of enemy use of Cambodia; and 

- Nature and effect of US public pressure resulting from the 
US-RVN incursion into the Cambodian sanctuaries. 

(U) Examination will be undertaken within the framework of the 
following outline: 

- Period prior to major US buildup, 1963-65. 

- US buildup, 1965-67. 

- Tet offensive to incursion, 1968-70. 

- Intelligence dispute. 

- Political crisis in Cambodia, 1969-70. 

- US-RVN incursion, 1970. 

- Assessment 

- Conclusions. 

(U) A chronology of significant events is attached at Appendix. 


VI-2 


UNCLASSIFIED 



PERIOD PRIOR TO MAJOR US BUILDUP, 1963-65 


(S) In 1963,VC use of Cambodia for sanctuary and as a source 
of supply became increasingly apparent. Although the degree of 
complicity on the part of Cambodian officials at the time is unclear, 
there are indicators that some cooperation was forthcoming from 
Phnom Penh. In any case, at a meeting reportedly held in the 
Communist Chinese Embassy, Phnom Penh, in January 1963, repre¬ 
sentative of the VC, NVN, Communist China and the Soviet Union 
agreed on a plan to outfit 12 battalions of troops to protect VC war zones, 
particularly Zone "D" northeast of Saigon. The concept called for the 
■units to rotate from RVN into Cambodia. Control would be exercised 
by a headquarters in Cambodia. At a minimum, the conferees considered 
that as long as the units taking sanctuary in Cambodia gave no offense 
to authorities in Phnom Penh, their activity risked little probability 
of being curtailed by the Cambodians. ^ Terrain and population distri¬ 
bution along the RVN - Cambodian border undoubtedly reinforced this 
point of view. 


(U) Approximately 675 miles in length, the border passes through 
varying terrain, vegetation and population density. From the tri-border 
area where Laos, Cambodia and RVN come together south to Snuol, the 
terrain generally is rolling and covered with light to heavy jungle, although 
there are some extensive grass lands (Map 1). The region is thinly 



VI-3 

sssm 



UNCLASSIhltD 



in RatchathanT 


SisaKet 


Warm Chamrap 


i. Attopeu 


Samroni 


f Phnom Thbeng 
[ Meanchey 
o 

R E A H 
VJTteA R 


Talanh 


Lomphat 


Phum 

Rovfeng 


BATTAMB»N G 

V_^Battambang 


Mounf 


Kompong Thom 


Sandan 


Pursat 


Krakor 


. Kompong 13 
^Chhnang 


I •. N Dl 


Banam 


SAIGON S' 

mr n 


Tmh \ 
Bien \ 

long Xuyen 


Vi 

.Thanh 


Senmonorom I 

i.v /*djc 

f/K Lap 


Trat 


Khemara* ' 

^PhCLiminvilj^/^ ^ i tSbMPONG FjUflpI* ! prey 

f J 

, 'KOH K, ON C, X yKimp 
Kinrom*) 

Sre Umbell 


KO KUT 


KOH 

KONG 


Sre umbell \ yT\ 

■ "■ VMte 

ROSG ■ li[e=l y 

/ / 'v 10! -gam apt / 

Kompong.Som V - 

(Sihanoukville) .Ream ' >"T f 


Xuan 


Ream 

X y -\ Kep 

C V 

\ t'o 

\ PHU 
^ QUOC 


Vung Tau 

SOUTH CHINA 
SEA 


G ULF 
OF _ 

THAILAND 


True Giang 

Phu 


Cvinh 


HON RAi 


CAMBODIA 


OOAN 0*0 
NAU OM 


International 

boundary 


Bac 

Lieu 


— Province boundary 
® National capital 
o Province capital 
-—— Railroad 
- Road 


HON 

PANjANG 


Quan 

Long 


-Trail 


5C Miles 


25 50 Kilometers 


Phnom Penh, Bokor, Kep, Kiri- 
rom and Kompong Som ore 
autonomous municipalities. 


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS 
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 


Base 77970 6-70 


Map 1 


UNCLASSIFIED 


VI-3A 




































.-"v 



populated by Montagnard tribes, various of which have little contact 
with the Cambodian Government. The area from the vicinity of Snuol 
extending southwest for roughly 50 miles features moderate to heavy 
jungle. In this same area, however, extensive rubber plantation and 
some rice cultivation are to be found. 

(U) Population density is shown on Map 2. From Mimot southwest 
to the Bassac River, density increases. The bulk of the populace 
inhabits small villages and cultivates rice. Although the population 
is principally Khmer, ethnic Vietnamese settlements are interspersed 
throughout this area, primarily in the vicinity of Svay Rieng. From the 
Bassac River to the Gulf of Siam, density begins to thin and rice farm¬ 
ing predominates. 

(U) Two significant salients project into South Vietnamese 
territory: the "Parrot’s Beak" and the "Fish Hook. " The "Parrot's 
Beak" is heavily populated; the "Fish Hook" sparsely so. 

(S) Early evidence that the VC were being assisted logistically 

from sources in Cambodia was provided by interception of large 

quantities of explosives on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers near the 

2 

Cambodian border during the period April through June 1963. Prior 
to this time an apparent shift toward the possibility of Cambodian 
governmental sympathy for or accommodation with the communists 


VI-4 











was indicated by the visit of Prince Sihanouk to Peking in February 

1963, followed by the signing of a friendship treaty between Peking 

and Phnom Penh during the visit to Cambodia of Chinese Communist 

3 

President Liu Shao-chi in May. Following a series of accusations by 
both the South Vietnamese and Cambodians concerning border viola¬ 
tions, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed 
on 27 August 1963. In October, during another visit to Peking, 
Sihanouk signed a joint communique which condemned US "actions" 

in Indochina and China, and reiterated support for an international 

5 

conference on Cambodia. On 14 October and again on 29 November, 
Chinese Communist ships were observed unloading arms and trucks 
at Sihanoukville. The unloading took place at night under strict 
security conditions. ^ 

(TS) As early as January 1963, COMUSMACV had reported to 

Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) his belief that Cambodia 

was being used extensively by the VC as a sanctuary and source of 

supply, and that border controls initiated by the South Vietnamese 

7 

were ineffective in stopping this use. In April 1963, CINCPAC in 

turn informed the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of VC use of Cambodia; 

however, he urged that the problem be handled through diplomatic 

8 



channels. 







UNCLASSIFIED 



Samrong 
5 O D 


Cheom 

Ksan 


pKho!ig\^ 


1 Virachei v 


Phnom Thbeng 
Meanchey 


RATANAKIRI 


twHPONG 
Koinpqnn !/] 


HOM 


-'Khemarak 

Phouminville 


KOH KONG 


IJmbell 


Chau 

Phu 


(Vietnam) 


/N 


Ubon 

^A^Ratehathani 

o 

Sisaket 


P 5 k?e 


‘Cbarnpasiati ^ O ^^AUopsfu '“J 


Surin 

T H A I I. 


AND 


®Lomphat 


3 A 


MONDOLKIRI i 

? ] 

Senmonoiom ; 


-IN- 


FISH HOOK 


T v sro u T H 


u- . % . Jt 

-Wttn BEAK 

I. JpH \ Sien Hoa 

SAIGON^ \ i 

VIETNAM 


Ninn 


/ V J N 

j 4 ! 

\ *►,*'■* // f K A M P/Ol i 

CV Btikor 

ihanotfkville A Vfjll h 11 II . . 


GULF 


N A M 

: k. - O' 

Vung Tau 


S.hano^v.ll^ 


Duong Dong w 

SIAM \ 

j I 

/ 


10 


CAMBODIA 

RICE-GROWING AREAS 
AND POPULATION 


mn Major ri 


rice-growing area 


Persons per square mile 

2.6 26 130 320 


I IO 50 200 

Persons per square kilometer 


Province boundary 


® Province capital 


CON SON 


MUI BAI BUNG 


SO Miles 


25 SO Kilometers 


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS 
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 


104 


/ 


Map 2 


UNCLASSIFIED 


VI-4A 



























































































































































# 






I 







(TS) On 20 February 1964, COMUSMACV requested some relaxa¬ 
tion by the JCS on restrictions placed on US forces and on Republic 
of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in regard to the Cambodia border. 
These restrictions are summarized as follows: 

- Overt Operations : Air, ground and naval units were for¬ 
bidden to move beyond or fire across international boundaries; hot 
pursuit was not authorized; operations were prohibited within one 
kilometer of the border except in support of units under attack, unless 
the border was well defined by a river or road. 

- Covert Operations : There was to be no penetration of 

Cambodian airspace, and no US personnel were to accompany RVNAF 

9 

elements into Cambodia. 

(TS) COMUSMACV requested relaxation of the restrictions in the 
following priority: 

Overt Operations 

- Encourage the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to adopt 


the principle of "hot pursuit" when VC forces entered Cambodia after 

committing hostile acts in the RVN; 

- Authorize US advisors to accompany RVNAF units 

engaged in hot pursuit; and 


VI-6 








- Authorize overflight of Cambodia for reconnaissance 
and photography. 

Covert Operations 

- Authorize RVNAF to conduct covert ground operations 
into Cambodia; 

- Authorize air operations in support of such operations 
to include airlift, resupply and cover; and 

- Authorize US personnel to accompany the RVNAF 
ground and air elements. 

(TS) The request came to naught. Rather, the restrictions con¬ 
tinued in force well into 1967, except for high altitude flights by 
U-2 aircraft authorized in February 1964. ^ 

(S) In an effort to operate within the restrictions while maintain¬ 
ing effective surveillance of the borders, US Army Special Forces 
were tasked to organize and train Civilian Irregular Defense Group 
(CIDG) forces and to establish a number of camps along the border. 
By the end of 1964, of 44 CIDG camps established, 29 were assigned 
border control and surveillance missions. Twenty-three of these 
camps were in the vicinity of the Cambodian border, the remainder 


near the Laotian border. 





w 



raised the issue concerning border restrictions and again recommended 
that authority be granted for hot pursuit by Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) units. On 12 May, the JCS stated that "The Depart¬ 
ment of State has been consulted with respect to those recommenda¬ 
tions and is opposed to any relaxation in constraints at this time in 
view of the political situation with Cambodia"^ (even though Cambodia 
had severed diplomatic relations with the US on 3 May). ^ 

US BUILDUP, 1965-67 

(TS) As more US forces moved into RVN, it was inevitable that 
their operations would take them near the Cambodian border. In 
November 1965, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 
engaged sizable VC/NVA units in the la Drang River Valley west of 
Pleiku. During the course of the operations, the enemy forces 
eventually withdrew into base areas in Cambodia. 1 ^ Accordingly, in 
December 1965, COMUSMACV requested the following standby 
authorities with respect to operations near the Cambodian border in 
Pleiku, Kontum and Darlac Provinces: 

- Use of artillery and air strikes to a depth of 10 kilometers 

on enemy weapons firing from Cambodia; and 




- Maneuver of ground troops up to two kilometers into 


Cambodia if such maneuver was necessary for preservation of the 

17 

force or attainment of an objective within RVN. 

Later in the month, this request was approved except for that portion 

pertaining to attainment of an objective within RVN. However, 

Washington required advance notification when friendly forces were 

to be maneuvering adjacent to the border. In emergency situations, 

18 

this notification could be waived. Although this authority was 

granted for a three-province area, it was not until June 1968 that it 

19 

was extended to include the entire Cambodian border. 

(S) In March 1966, the Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division 
requested through I Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV) that the 
Cambodian-RVN border be redefined west of its then current definition. 
The principal rationale offered was that by observing a border further 
west friendly forces could gain the advantage of surprise as well as 
improve their chances of cutting off the enemy's possible escape 
routes. Further reasoning pointed out that the request, if granted, 
would aid the US in proving that NVA troops were being employed in 
RVN. COMUSMACV approved and forwarded the request on 31 March 
1966. ^ In a 1 April reply thereto, the Chairman, Joint Chief of 
Staff (CJCS) stated he was in full agreement with the military 


VI-9 






DRAFT 


v 


justification for the request, but that after serious deliberation he felt 
compelled to deny it. He further stipulated that authority already 
granted to COMUSMACV concerning the Cambodian border would per¬ 
mit tactical commanders to deal with enemy utilizing Cambodian 

/ 

territory. He counseled that this authority could be used if and when 
the need arose. ^ 

(S) On 27 June 1966, the JCS authorized COMUSMACV to develop 
a cross-border ground reconnaissance capability utilizing indigenous 
assets led by US Special Forces. The undertaking was to be identified 
by the code name DANIEL BOONE. u Permission to use the cross- 
border reconnaissance teams developed under the new authority was 
not granted, however, until May 1967, and then only for the tri-border 
area^ (Map 3). 

(S) In a message from the CJCS to CINCPAC concerning initiation 
of aerial reconnaissance over Cambodia, the former stated that the 
JCS had been trying for several weeks to obtain State Department con¬ 
currence, but as of early June 1966 had been unsuccessful in the 
attempt. The problem as seen by the CJCS revolved around State 
Department dialogue via the Australians with Prince Sihanouk on use 
of the International Control Commission within Cambodia, and the 
fear that aerial reconnaissance would jeopardize its success. The 




CJCS felt that a State go-ahead might be obtained through a strong 

message from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC outlining again VC/NVA 

exploitation of Cambodian sanctuary and reiterating need for timely 

and accurate intelligence of enemy activity. Such a message, endorsed 

by CINCPAC, might, he felt, get at least a one-time authorization for 

an aerial reconnaissance mission. ^4 Though the Chairman's lead 

was followed, the requirement for cross-border reconnaissance 

remained unsatisfied as 1966 closed. 

(S) On 19 September 1966 at an Embassy meeting in Saigon, 

General Westmoreland had stated that US forces were deployed to 

Vietnam with two general missions: the first, area security; the 

second, to take the fight to the VC/NVA in their base areas in RVN. 

However, he went on to point out that a third major mission had 

emerged -- the US must program troops to contain large enemy forces 

25 

situated across the RVN border in the areas of sanctuary. 

(TS) In November 1966, after assessing battle actions in Tay 
Ninh Province involving VC utilization of Cambodia as a sanctuary, 
COMUSMACV recommended the following: 

- Low-level reconnaissance flights in the immediate border 


area; 





Ubon Ratchathan, 


Sisaket 


Warin Chamrap 


. Attopeu 


Cheom 

Ksan 


Samroni 


Krtong 


Phnom Thbeng 
Meanchey 
° 

t^REAH S 

Vf’H e a » 


ralanh 


Phum 

Rovieng 


BATTAM BWi N G 

\ -Battambang 

y 

\ j IA J 

/ ■ MounA-A 


NG THOM 


Kompong Thom 


Sandan 


Senmonotom 


Pursal 


Kratie 


Krakor 


Kompong 0 

Ctilinang 


v ' KhemaraK 
'^Phoumlnville 


NG « 
Kirirom' 


Chon Thanh 


Banam 


SAIGON w> 

V I E T N 


ampot 


Vi 

Thanh 


Base 77970 6-70 

Map 3 




VI-10A 


CQ 


_ # Duc 
'S*f\ Lap 


KO KUT 


KOH 

KONG 


m. 

\ Sre Umbell I 


■’V.rxJ 

KON . 

RONG'l \ 

Kompong, Sbm* 
(Sihanoukville) 

GULF 

OF 

THA I LAND 


Xuan 


QUOC 


Tinh 
Bien 

y. 

Long Xuven*\ 

/ 

, Rach / 

,Gia Can Thd» 


—^My ThoV—-•-Go 

^ Cong 

? Vinh *Truc Giang 
Long 

, Phu 
.Vinh 


Vung Tau 

SOUTH CHINA 


QUAN OmO 
NAM O'l 


~ \ I 

Khanh Hung * 
Bac 

.4 Lieu 1 


Quan 

Long 


Phnom Penh, Bokor, Kep, Kiri¬ 
rom and Kompong Som ore 
autonomous municipalities. 


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS 
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 


CAMBODIA 


■ — International 
boundary 

—— — Province boundary 
® National capital 

O Province capital 

• * « Railroad 

- Road 

-Trail 


25 50 Miles 

I, 1 


25 50 Kilometers 


IEI 









































V 



!***■ 


- Limited covert operations into Cambodia; and 

- Limited bombing attacks in the border area. 


This authority was denied. 


26 


(TS) Since Ambassador Lodge frequently associated himself with 
requests by COMUSMACV for widened authority in coping with the 
Cambodian problem. Secretary of State Rusk, in a November 1966 
message to the Ambassador, amplified the reasons for denying them: 


Our desire to avoid an expansion of the war in the Republic of 
Vietnam remains a basic consideration regarding our policy for South¬ 
east Asia. Actions which threaten to bring such an expansion into 
Cambodia would raise misunderstanding as to our intentions and weaken 
the base of national and international support of our effort in Southeast 
Asia. Although recognizing the problems created by the VC/NVA use of 
Cambodia and the need to protect our forces in the Republic of Vietnam, 
we must avoid action which would create greater problems and dangers. 
We continue to believe that the best means of achieving our objectives 
regarding Cambodia is through political and diplomatic means, although 
at this time there seems to be little hope for an improvement in Cam¬ 
bodian attitudes through diplomatic measures. Furthermore, although 
a genuine concern over mounting use of Cambodia by the VC/NVA exists, 
we believe the situation will continue to require considerable forbearance 
on our part as well as cool and objective balancing of costs and benefits 

in terms of our overall interests in considering ways to deal with this 
2 7 

problem. 

(TS) During the same month, November 1966, a Southeast Asia 
Coordinating Committee (SEACOORD) meeting brought together 

Tr - "\ 

vi-liU i. . ... . 




< 



4 


Ambassadors Sullivan (Laos), Martin (Thailand) and Bunker (RVN), 
to which General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp were invited. 

As an outgrowth of this session a sequential, non-belligerent approach 
toward Cambodia which supported Secretary Rusk's message was 
recommended to Washington in the hope that the diplomatic approach 
would move Sihanouk closer toward neutralism. ^ 

(U) Although the diplomatic approach was underway, events in 
RVN were influencing the VC/NVA to place increasing reliance on 
Cambodia. By the fall of 1966, operation MARKET TIME, designed 
to seal the RVN coast against infiltration of enemy troops and supplies, 
had become highly effective. For the period prior to 1966, MACV 
estimated the enemy in RVN had received about 70 percent of his 
supplies by coastal infiltration. As of the end of 1966, best estimates 
indicated that less than 10 percent were received in this way.^ To 
support his forces logistically, the enemy now had either to resupply 
through Laos or through Cambodia. He chose Cambodia to meet his 
requirements in the southern half of the Republic. 

(TS) Continuing use of Cambodia by VC/NVA forces posed an 
increasing threat to US and RVN forces as the war moved into 1967. 

VI-13 




. V 


> 


t 




The demonstrated ability of the VC/NVA to mass large forces in 
Cambodia, and then with little or no warning to strike out against 
targets within RVN was becoming more and more difficult to cope 
with. Again, political and administrative requirements compounded 
the problem and delayed realization of appropriate countermeasures. 

(TS) DANIEL BOONE operations inaugurated in the tri-border 

area commencing in May 1967^*“* were expanded in October 1967 to 

two zones. Alpha and Bravo, which extended to a depth of 20 kilometers 

from the border (Map 4). Missions into Zone Bravo, however, 

31 

required approval in Washington on a case by case basis. In July 
1967, selective tactical air reconnaissance overflights into Cambodia 
were authorized under a program designated DORSAL FIN, and in 
December of that year forward air control aircraft were provided 
limited authorization to overfly Cambodia. J In each instance, how¬ 
ever, COMUSMACV's requests for the requisite authority met with 
calls not only for detailed documentation of VC/NVA use of specific 
areas in Cambodia, but for equally detailed forecasts of intelligence 
to be derived from the undertakings. Response necessarily entailed 
extensive effort which served to impose further delay in obtaining 
needed approvals. 


VI-14 










DRAFT 

(U) Important support for General Westmoreland's position in 

regard to Cambodia was provided by two correspondents who accompanied 

Mrs. John F. Kennedy on her visit to Cambodia, 1-9 November 1967. 

The correspondents had been briefed by Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam (MACV) on where they could expect to find VC/NVA base 

areas in Cambodia. On 19 November, both correspondents released 

publicly a story on and photos of an enemy camp in Cambodia. 

Sihanouk refuted the report but forbade all Western reporters to go 

34 

near border areas. During the visit by Mrs. Kennedy, DORSAL 

35 

FIN flights had been suspended. 

(S) Another SEACOORD meeting held in August 1967 produced 

the following recommendation for Washington's consideration: 

. . . that a carefully documented and verifiable dissemina¬ 
tion of available evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia be made in 
world capitols and to the Cambodian Government. This would show 
increasing US concern that such misuse of Cambodia by VC/NVA was 
reaching an intolerable level and would lay the necessary psychological 
and political ground work for more forceful actions should we reach 
the point where intervention is clearly imperative. ^ 

Such evidence, developed through the Vesuvius Program was subse- 

37 

quently passed to Sihanouk by the Australians. 

(U) During 1966 and 1967, the full weight of US participation in 
RVN was beginning to show its effect. Review of the major operations 
and battles occurring during this two-year period shows that the 
majority were conducted in the provinces adjacent to the Cambodian 


VI-15 






Ubott Ratchatham 


Warin Chamrap 


Attopeu 


Samrong 


/'"Virachei 


Phnom Thbeng 
f Meanchey 


vTfllAKIfij 
* Mbinsiek 


P R E A H 
V\l HEAR 

Phum f 
RovfengJ 


-Sisophon {^ralanh 


mphat 


BATTAMB»N G 

\ -Battambang | 


NGTHOM 


Moung' 


Kompong Thom 


TSandan 


ienmonorom 


Pursat 


Kratie 


Krakor 


Khemarak 

Phouminville 


Kompong Som 
(SihanoukvilleT .Ream 


Thanh 


Due 

lap 


i ' \ ' 0 

V KOMPONG 
M- SPEU 


UOH KONG \{ 1 ^ompofij^ ®T«kflmau^f y < Ve f ) 

Kirirorh*) Spey A J'\ fSanam i 


Sre Umbell 


Gia* 

Nghia a 


KO KUT 


KOH 

RUNG 


G ULF 
OF 

THAILAND 


. p 

DAO 
1 PHU 
QUOC 


oi 

SvavRiens '—,— 

y svIay 

k RIEN <5 

'Hong Ngu 

TA'Kt C V C phu Moc Haa 

\ \ 

Tinh \ -v y 

Bien \ v Ca0 Lanh 

\ i. J__ 

Long XuyenV ' My Tho 

—-m 4 

/V.nh j True Giang 

Rach 


~ saigon)® 

V I £7 NAM 

. v r~ - 

s 

Vung Tau 

/ \ /Vnh 'TrucGiane 

«—./ lon « ) 

Gia Can Thd* . Phu 

V 


SEA 


QUAN 0-0 
NAM PI I 


HON 

PANJANG 


Khann Hung.% 

[ Bac 
--4 Lieu 


Quan 

long 


Phnom Penh , Bokor, Kep, Kiri- 
rom and Kompong Som are 
autonomous municipalities. 


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS 


CAMBODIA 


International 

boundary 

-—— Province boundary 

® National capital 

o Province capital 

-*—Railroad 

- Road 

-Trail 


50 Miles 


25 50 Kilometers 


NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 


«•, J 


Base 77969 6-70 

Map 4 


VI-14A 





































4 



# 




































border. For most of them the pattern generally was the same: A 
gradual enemy supply buildup in RVN from sources in Cambodia; a 
rapid enemy troop buildup from base areas in Cambodia; sharp engage 
ments with US and ARVN troops as the VC/NVA were detected in 
RVN; withdrawal of the VC/NVA forces back into Cambodia and sub¬ 
sequent discovery of large stocks of food, weapons, ammunition and 

38 

other supplies. Location of the more significant operations is 
shown on Map 5. 

TET OFFENSIVE TO INCURSION, 1968-70 
(TS) One of the most significant events of the war was the enemy's 
1968 Tet offensive. Based on indications that the communists were 
planning large-scale operations in this time frame, COMUSMACV 
had deployed US units and influenced the deployment of RVNAF units 
to block any large movement of enemy forces into major population 

39 

areas, especially in III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Nonetheless, 

the enemy was successful in employing the holiday to achieve tactical 

surprise, hloreover, utilizing base areas in Cambodia and Laos, he 

had been able to concentrate forces, buildup supplies and prepare for 

40 

the offensive unmolested. 

(TS) Among pre-Tet intelligence reports reaching COMUSMACV 
confirming a large buildup of VC/NVA forces in the "Fish 

VI-16 



was one 





Hook" area. In response thereto COMUSMACV requested urgent 

authority to enter this and other Cambodian sanctuaries when major 

enemy buildup was detected. Unfortunately, this request was dis- 

41 

patched on 30 January, the day the offensive commenced. No 
authority to enter Cambodia resulted from this effort. ^ 

(TS) As the VC/NVA were making their preparations. Ambassador 
Chester Bowles, after having been briefed by members of the MACV 
Staff on the extent to which the communists were using Cambodia, ^3 
visited Phnom Penh in an effort to influence Sihanouk to take positive 
steps to curtail the use of his territory by the VC/NVA. The visit 
completed, he recommended that the US continue the non-belligerent 
approach, providing Sihanouk with evidence when possessed of the 
VC/NVA activities taking place in Cambodia.^ 

(TS) Subsequent to Tet it was readily apparent to US officials in 
Southeast Asia that use of Cambodia by the communists was extensive 
and that the Cambodians themselves were deeply involved. Accord¬ 
ingly, at the SEACOORD meeting of 7 March 1968, the following out¬ 
line of recommended initial and subsequent military actions were made 
to the Departments of State and Defense: 






UNCLASSIFIED 


TT 


\ 


\ NORTH 
\VIET-NAM 


DEMARCATION LINE 






V 


•/ 




THAILAND 


7 



MUI 0* NANG 

?PA NANG 


••QUANG NAM_, 


> 

(. 1 
s r" 

jume 1966 Operation hawthorne^> a 

^■kontum 


•n.._ 


_JANUARY 196^ OPERATION MATADO 

V V 

\ _ / 

APRIL 1967 FRANCIS MARION 


c 


A M B O D I 

APRIL 1966 OPERATION AUSTIN VI 
OCTOBER 1967 LOC NINH 
JUNE 1966 OPERATION EL PASO 


MUI HAI HUNG 



APRIL 1966 OPERATION BIRMINGHAM 
FEBRUARY 1967 JUNCTION CITY 

OCT 1966 OPERATION ATTLEB 
MAY 1967 OPERATION MANHATTAN 
JANUARY 1967 CEDAR FALLS 

r-t-y 


< / 

^ OAO 

) rnii oui’iC 

/ (Victnjtn) 

/ t KIEM 


55572 12-67 


Map 5 


UNCLASSIFIED 


VI-16A 




































































Initially 


- Relax restrictions on the number, depth and frequency 
of cross-border operations (DANIEL BOONE); 

- Authorize more helicopter support for cross-border 
operations; and 

- Initiate active defensive measures of short duration in 
the border area. 

Subsequently 

- Increase aerial reconnaissance efforts in Cambodia; 

- Authorize B-52 strikes in unpopulated remote areas astride 
the RVN-Cambodian border; 

- Increase active defensive measures of short duration in 
remote unpopulated sections of Cambodia by raids, pursuit and destruc¬ 
tion of enemy forces retreating into Cambodia; and 


- Employ company and battalion-size forces to reinforce 


reconnaissance and raid actions in order to assist in the disengage- 

45 

ment and withdrawal of forces as necessary. 

(U) In May 1968, coincidental with the start of peace talks in Paris, 
the VC/NVA again used staging areas in Cambodia to launch another 
major offensive into RVN. Although considerable combat activity 


VI-18 











"C 


VT\’ 



resulted, no major communist political or propaganda objectives 
were achieved. ^ 

(TS) In July, a US manned LCU (landing craft utility) on the 
Mekong River inadvertently intruded into Cambodian territory and 
the vessel and crew were detained by the Cambodian Government. In 
commenting on JCS recommendations for pressures to obtain release, 
CINCPAC stated that the fundamental US objective should be to compel 
Cambodia to cease its collaboration with the VC/NVA forces. Accord¬ 
ingly, he recommended that the following positive sequential actions 
be undertaken: 

- Economic measures beginning with curtailment of the supply 
of POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants) and other products to Cambodia 
via the Mekong River system; 

- Unrestricted pursuit, raids and air attacks on VC/NVA 
forces in the thinly populated area of Northeast Cambodia and along 
the entire border area; 

- Mining of selected Cambodian harbors and enforcement of 

a quarantine on the importation of war and war-related materials; and 

- Blockade of the port of Sihanoukville. ^ 

These recommendations were not considered favorably due to their 
effect on the diplomatic approach. 


VI-19 

DRAFT 







» 



(TS) In September 1968, MACV requested authority for the use of 
tactical air and artillery in Cambodian border areas against clearly 
identified VC/NVA targets. Also in September, continuing to support 
COMUSMACV's request, the JCS recommended to the Department of 
Defense that authority be granted to pursue VC/NVA forces into base 
areas inside Cambodia to a depth of 20 kilometers. ^ These requests 
were denied. In December, however, restrictions on DANIEL BOONE 
operations were relaxed. COMUSMACV was authorized to conduct 
covert operations in Zone Charlie (see Map 6) without prior Washington 
approval. ^ 

(TS) CINCPAC, in his "YearEnd Review of Vietnam - 1968, " 
indicated to the JCS that the Cambodian sanctuaries posed a serious 
threat to the recently inaugurated program to improve and modernize 
the RVNAF. He went on to state: 

Notwithstanding his current military weakness, there are 
no indications that the enemy has deviated from his goal of both a 
military and political victory in South Vietnam (SVN). The enemy has 
utilized the respite from our air and naval attacks to improve his 
military position in the Laos/Cambodian base areas, and throughout 
North Vietnam. He has rapidly rebuilt key war-supporting installations 
and repaired his industrial base. Additionally, recent large increases 
in the movement of men and supplies toward SVN indicate that the 
enemy intends to increase greatly his forces in SVN, either in prepa¬ 
ration for an anticipated Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) 
withdrawal, or to re-engage in serious ground conflict as occurred in 
the first nine months of 1968. If this trend continues, and there appears 
to be little reason to anticipate otherwise, a direct and continuing 
threat of substantial proportions will be created for FWMAF early in 
1969. 51 


VI-20 




I 




(U) Although the diplomatic approach continued throughout 1969 

and into 1970, it was becoming more and more apparent that VC/NVA 

forces in the southern half of RVN were receiving the bulk of their 

arms and ammunition through Cambodia, and that the enemy was 

expanding his logistic activities there. To offset the loss of sea 

infiltration along the RVN coast and reduction of throughput on the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail system, more and more use was being made of the 

port of Sihanoukville. By early 1970, the threat by VC/NVA forces 

in Cambodia to the Vietnamization policies of the Nixon Administration 

52 

were being felt acutely. 

INTELLIGENCE DISPUTE 

(S) As cited earlier in the chapter, MACV had reported communist 
discharge of military materiel at Sihanoukville as early as 1963. 
Subsequently, the headquarters became convinced that the enemy was 
receiving major logistic support through a system established in 
Cambodia with the acquiescence, possibly participation, of officials 
of that country. Basically, the system was believed to provide for 
receipt of weapons and supplies at Sihanoukville, and for transship¬ 
ment to the communist base areas just inside the Cambodian border. 
MACV held the belief that the communist forces in III and IV CTZ's, 
as well as some troops in the southern half of II CTZ were receiving 





L, Attopeu 


Cheom 

Ksan 


Samrong 


y'^Virachei 


Phnom Thbeng 
Meanchey 


\RAtAlVAT.VtV 

•« • • • • «-1 


\RREAH 

HEAR 

Phum 

Rovieng. 


Siaephon 


Kralanh 


BATTAM B VA N G 

V^Battambang 


Pailin 


M PONG THOM 


Kompong Thom 


Khemarak 

Phouminville 


Bokor 


ettfcri 


r v-r*r; - 


lhanh 


Warin Chamrap i 


'Dak 

Sut 

iak To 


Trat* 


KO K'JT 


KOH 

KONG 


\ / Sx * 

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Pursaf < \ 

V aROr J\ \Ba,ayC 

PURS AT 7 ^En n |\ V 

> KOM^ONQ </ f 
-V. CHHNANq !S 1 

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—' W' 

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KOMPONG fllNpr. : FRE> 

K O H K O N G Up ' SS 

Kmrom OKAVU 


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- -x_ 1 -••••••• e i ••• e . Arv 

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-WAV. 


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^Ve .l Renh . /.V.V.V.v A Ph “ 


SOUTH 

'Bien Hoa * u ™ 


Kompong Som 'Y^r'' 
(Sihanoukville) kReam 

C 


Tinh 
Bien \ 

Long Xuyen* 
Rach / 


SAIGON® 

VIETNAM 


My fho > 


HON RAI 


QUA* 0*0 
NAM m • 


Vi 

Thanh 


Go 
Cong 

'Vmh *TrucGiang 
Long 


* Vung Tau 

SOUTH Ci 


Phu 

_^Vinh_ 


CAMBODIA 


P<SJA\G 


Quan 

Long 




. . - International 

boundary 

-Province boundary 

® National capital 

o Province capital 

• — ■ ■ — Railroad 

- Road 

- Trail 

0 25 50 Miles 


Phnom Penh, Bolcor, Kep, Kiri * 
rom and Kompong Som are 
autonomous municipalities. 


50 Kilometers 


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORIT 


Base 77969 6-70 


Map 6 


















































the major portion of their ordnance support in particular from this 
source.^ ^ 

(S) In contrast to this position, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Intelligence and 
Research Department (INR), Department of State, held the view that 
the major portion of the logistical support for the communist forces 
throughout RVN was being delivered along the overland trail system 
from the north. While they did accept that some arms and ammunition 
were being smuggled from Cambodia, they maintained that these were 
being sold by "local Cambodian officials" from their own stocks. They 
knew that rice and some other foodstuffs were being sold to the VC/NVA 
by the Cambodians. However, it was their consensus in 1968 that 
since Sihanouk had been unable to stop these sales, he was attempting 
to tax them to gain revenue for the state. Finally, they maintained 
through 1968 that Sihanouk was trying to stop or at least limit the 
"smuggling" of illicit arms, and that while there were reports that 

he had made an arrangement with the communists, their validity was 

54 

doubtful at best. 

(S) In late 1968 the United States Intelligence Board established 
a special team composed of representatives from CIA, DIA and INR 
to study and evaluate the divergent views on the involvement of 

VI-22 ... - 

DRAFT 





DRAFT 

Cambodia in logistical support of the Vietnamese communists. Listed 
hereunder are the major conclusions of the team taken from its final 
report, commonly referred to as the Graham Report: 




- There was no significant body of intelligence data in the field 
that had not been disseminated to Washington. Difference in views arose 
from analysis of the commonly shared information. 

- There was no question that Cambodia had been used by the 
communists for base areas and sanctuaries. 

- There was no question that the Cambodian Army had been 
involved in the shipment of non-lethal supplies to the Vietnamese 
communists, such as rice and medical supplies. 

- While there was little doubt that the Cambodian Army was 
engaged on an organized basis in the shipment of some arms, ammuni¬ 
tion and certain other war materials, and that this undertaking involved 
high-ranking Army officers, possibly even General Lon Nol, there was 
inadequate evidence to establish the existence of a high-level agreement 
between Sihanouk and the communists. Sihanouk probably was aware of 
these activities but the extent of his knowledge or complicity in the 


VI-23 

DRAFT 


activity was unknown. 


n> '• * T T 

Bryy i 


- The basic channel for movement of arms and ammunition 


was the overland route from the north. ^ 


(S) Early in the summer of 1969, with publication of several CIA 

intelligence documents, the national level intelligence agencies began 

to acknowledge a higher level of logistical support to the VC/NVA 

56 

through the port of Sihanoukville. A July 1969 CIA memorandum 
reported that Sihanouk was controlling the arms and materiel shipments 
to the communists, and that Lon Nol and other key officials were 
participants. As the year progressed, more of MACV's earlier 
assessments of the Cambodian involvement were accepted. In an 

c 7 

advanced intelligence summary dated 17 December 1969, DLA included 
an extensive account of the transshipment of arms, ammunition and 
other supplies from Sihanoukville to the VC/NVA forces based in Cambodia 
and operating in southern RVN. 

(S) It was not, however, until after the 1970 cross-border operations 

into Cambodia that the full extent of this support was realized. The 

5 8 

CIA finally published studies in September and December 1970 which 
verified and confirmed MACV's estimates and analyses of the degree 
of Cambodian involvement in supplying arms and ammunition to the 
VC/NVA in III and IV CTZ's from 1966-1970. These reports also 

VI-24 

DRAFT 










confirmed Forces Armee 1 Khmer's complicity in the shipment of 

arms and supplies to the VC/NVA both through the port of Sihanoukville 

and in extension of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

(S) Statistics published by the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA in 

December 1970, disclosed that 96 percent of the communist ordnance 

delivered to VC/NVA forces in III and IV CTZ's, as well as in the 

southern half of II CTZ from December 1966 to April 1969 was 

59 

channeled through Sihanoukville. Of the 21, 748 tons of ordnance 
delivered to Cambodia for the communists, border deliveries of 
18,198 tons have been identified: 


- Communist ordnance deliveries to Cambodia 


Via Sihanoukville 20, 921 

Via Laos 827 

Total 21, 748 

- Ordnance deliveries to border areas 

From supplies delivered via Sihanoukville 17,646 

From supplies delivered via Laos 552 

Total 18,198 

- Residual (21,748 minus 18,198) 3, 550 

- Ordnance remaining at Kompong Speu Depot, 

March 1970 2,272 

- Ordnance still unaccounted for 



1, 278 





(S) It is relatively certain that the 1, 278 tons of ordnance still 
unaccounted for in border delivery data were, in fact, shipped to 
final destinations. It is known, for example, that all deliveries via 
Laos moved immediately to the base camps without going through the 
warehouse at Kompong Speu. The inventory of 2, 272 tons at the 
Kompong Speu Depot at the time of the 18 March 1970 coup is not a 
residual, but is shown in documents that detail the number and tonnage 
of each type of ordnance. 

POLITICAL CRISIS IN CAMBODIA, 1969-70 
(S) The mounting proposals for incursions into Cambodia were 
to be influenced significantly by events that were crystalizing in the 
Cambodian Government itself. On 14 March 1969, Sihanouk, after 
years of denial, admitted use of Cambodia by the VC/NVA forces. 

In May, Cambodia instituted an arms embargo against ordnance 
destined for the VC/NVA. However, while attending Ho Chi Minh's 
funeral in September, Sihanouk apparently agreed to relax this embargo 
if no communist support were given to the Cambodian communist 
rebels (Khmer Rouge). 

(S) On 18 September 1969, General Lon Nol, the Cambodian 
Prime Minister, presented to Sihanouk a comprehensive report on 
VC/NVA activities in Cambodia. This report appears to mark the 


VI-26 







start of Lon Nol's attemps to curtail Sihanouk's power. Included 
were data showing communist support of the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, 
Lon Nol pointed out use of the Khmer Rouge by the VC/NVA as cover¬ 
ing forces, and indicated that supply networks existed. ^ 

(S) On 8 March 1970, demonstrations broke out in several 
Cambodian border areas in protest over the presence of NVA troops. 
If not organized by high Cambodian officials who were in disagree¬ 
ment with Sihanouk's policies, they were at least encouraged by them. 
On 11 March, the North Vietnamese and VC Provisional Revolutionary 
Government (PRG) embassies in Phnom Penh were sacked by demon¬ 
strators organized by government officials. On 12 March, Lon Nol, 
in the name of the government, issued an ultimatum demanding that 
the VC/NVA troops leave Cambodia within 72 hours. At the same 

time. First Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak canceled an existing 

6 2 

trade treaty between Cambodia and the PRG. 

(S) On 15 March, Lon Nol's ultimatum expired, its demands 

unmet. Subsequently, on 18 March, Sihanouk, who had been in 

France since January, was removed as Chief of State by a unanimous 

6 3 

vote of the Cambodian Parliament. 


VI-27 


US/RVN INCURSION, 1970 



(S) In January and February 1970, COMUSMACV had initiated 

unilateral US planning for possible cross-border ground operations 

64 

against lucrative targets in Cambodia. Following Lon Nol's 15 March 

ultimatum to the communists and the abrupt change of government in 

Cambodia, VC/NVA forces redisposed themselves both in RVN and 

Cambodia, and actively supported efforts to overthrow the new govern- 
65 

ment. On 26 March, the JCS authorized combined planning for 

66 

incursions into Cambodia. 

(U) On 20 April, President Nixon, announcing future US troop 

withdrawals from Vietnam, referred to "the enemy's escalation in 

Laos and Cambodia" and stated that the enemy would be taking "grave 

risks" if they attempted to use American withdrawals to jeopardize 

remaining US forces in Vietnam by "increased military action in 

Vietnam, in Cambodia, or in Laos." Additionally, he stated that if 

the enemy were to do so, he would "not hesitate to take strong and 

G1 

effective measures to deal with that situation. " 

(U) As stated by a White House spokesman on 24 April 1970, the 
North Vietnamese and VC offensive in Cambodia was "a foreign 

invasion of a neutral country which cannot be considered in any way 

lq 

a pretense of a civil war. " Secretary Rogers, testifying before the 









Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 April 1970, was reported 
to have emphasized that a communist takeover in Cambodia would 
increase the peril to the US policy of withdrawing troops from the 
RVN. Further, he mentioned several ARVN incursions into Cambodia 
against enemy troops and bases that had been "fairly successful. " 

On the same day, a White House press statement indicated that the 
US had "an overriding interest" in Cambodia in relation to "how a 
possible communist take-over of Cambodia would affect the security 
of our forces in Vietnam and the Vietnamization Program. "^ Q Two 
days later, RVNAF, with the help of US advisors and some US 
tactical air support, air coordination and logistical assistance, 

70 

launched a large-scale operation into the "Parrot's Beak" area. 

(S) As regards Secretary Rogers' reference to "fairly successful" 
ARVN incursions into Cambodia, it is significant that during the latter 
part of March and the month of April 1970, liaison between local 
Cambodian and RVN authorities was established on several occasions 
along the border in III and IV CTZ's. Cambodian officials reported 
active efforts by VC/NVA forces in Cambodia to eliminate Cambodian 
units within a terrain belt of undetermined depth paralleling the border 
inside Cambodia. Several officials, claiming they were empowered 
to do so by the government in Phnom Penh, 

VI-29 

AFT 



requested RVNAF 



assistance in engaging enemy forces within Cambodia. This led in 
turn to modest unilateral cross-border forays by RVNAF units sup¬ 
ported by mortars, artillery and Vietnamese Air Force strikes. The 
Vietnamese Navy provided support on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers 
and related channels. Results achieved by these limited operations 
were noteworthy in terms not only of casualties inflicted on the enemy 
and destruction of small bases and supply caches, but in terms of 

rapproachment between Cambodia and RVN and increased confidence 

71 

on the part of RVNAF forces. 

(S) US advisors, with but few exceptions, were informed by their 
South Vietnamese counterparts of the cross-border operations and in 
turn reported them through channels to MACV Headquarters. In 
coordination with the Embassy, MACV instructed its advisors and 
field commands that advisors were not to accompany RVNAF units 
into Cambodia, but that they could inform their counterparts that 
normal US support would continue within RVN. At a later stage dur¬ 
ing this several week period, US advisors and the senior field com¬ 
mander in IH CTZ (Commanding General, U FFORCEV) were authorized 
to assist RVNAF in concentrating forces on the friendly side of the 
border and to redispose US ground elements to cover gaps within RVN 


VI-30 





tions. Generally speaking, the US posture was one of encouraging the 

72 

GVN and its forces while avoiding direct participation. 

(TS) As GVN cross-border activity stepped up in cooperation with 
the Cambodians, Washington issued instructions to the US Ambassador 
and COMUSMACV to intercede with the GVN to terminate such activity. 
Rationale supporting this guidance cited the danger of generating con¬ 
cern within the US public that the US was party to widening the war 
and violating Cambodian neutrality. The guidance emphasized need 
to impress upon the GVN that hostile US public reaction could jeopardize 
support of programs for RVN and undermine Vietnamization. Represent¬ 
ations made by the Embassy to President Thieu and by MACV to the 
Chief, RVN Joint General Staff, succeeded in halting the cross-border 
effort, although not without some dismay on the part of various RVNAF 
leaders who were tasting the fruits of anti-sanctuary success for the 

first time. Appropriate instructions were issued to US advisors and 

7 3 

senior field commanders to uphold the new guidance. 

(TS) Within a matter of days following the developments just cited, 
Washington instructions that reflected a reevaluation of the situation 
authorized the Embassy and MACV to inform the GVN of US agreement 


VI-31 


DRAFT 




« 





to resumption of cross-border activity. This having been done, selec¬ 
tive operations were resumed under the previously stipulated ground 
rules governing US participation. ^ 

(U) President Nixon announced on 30 April that US forces, "in 
cooperation with the armed forces of the RVN, " would launch attacks 
"to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnamese 
border." He said that "the enemy, in the past two weeks, has stepped 
up his guerrilla actions, and he is concentrating his main forces in 
the sanctuaries where they are building up to launch massive attacks 
on our forces and those of South Vietnam. " He stated that these 
[US/RVN] operations were "not an invasion of Cambodia" because 
"the areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely 
occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. " He further 
stated that cleaning out of the sanctuaries was "indispensable for the 
continuing success" of the program of withdrawing US forces from 
Vietnam, was "essential" to keeping US casualties at an absolute 

minimum, and would serve the purpose "of ending the war in Vietnam 

75 

and winning the just peace we all desire. " 

(S) As President Nixon was making his announcement (1 May in 
Vietnam), US forces began operations against enemy base areas in 
Cambodia. Although these forces were limited to penetrations of not 


VI-32 







■* _ 2 -' 





7 L 

more than 30 kilometers, most base areas were within that distance 

of the border. Eleven major operations with US participation were 

conducted. By 30 June 1970, all US forces, to include advisors, had 

77 

been withdrawn to the RVN side of the border. Results indicated 

that the enemy losses were heavy: Over 10,000 were killed; over 

22, 600 weapons, 1, 765 tons of ammunition and 6,880 tons of rice were 
78 

captured. Another result of prime significance was the administra¬ 
tion's decision, influenced by public and congressional pressure, in 
the latter instance the Cooper-Church Amendment, not to permit 
reentry of US ground forces into Cambodia subsequent to 30 June 1970. 

(U) Indicative of the effect of pressure generated against administra¬ 
tion decisions and policy by anti-war and "dove" elements within the 
US public, was the emotionally charged reaction to the President's 
announcement of incursion into the Cambodian border base areas by 
US forces. The widespread incidence of campus disorder and violence, 
demonstrations, opposition pronouncements by prominent public 
figures and congressional reaction are seen as having influenced the 
decision to restrict US operations within Cambodia to a 60-day 
period and to limit the depth to which US forces could penetrate. In 
the latter regard, while it is true that the bulk of the enemy's supplies 
were cached within the 30 kilometer limit, the enemy was known to 
have moved appreciable stores beyond the 30 kilometer line into 


VI-33 



DRAFT 



what became deeper sanctuary beyond the self-imposed limit on US 
probing. Insofar as duration of the operations is concerned, they 
could not have been prolonged for an appreciable period beyond 
30 June because of the onset of southwest monsoonal rains. 


(TS) In extension of the foregoing, three examples of political guidance 
that have exerted governing influence on military planning and operations 
as they affect Cambodia are pertinent. 

- The first is a TOP SECRET State Department message of 
9 May 1970 addressed to Embassy Phnom Penh, Embassy Saigon, 

CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. Selective passages are quoted; 


. . . The purpose of this message is to give you in somewhat 
more detail the thinking here with respect to our objectives and role in 
Cambodia. As stated in our first message on this general subject, we 
have seen our problem as essentially One of navigating between providing 
enough support and reassurance to the Government of Cambodia (GOC) 
so that it will have the morale and determination, as well as enhance its 
capability, to cope with the enemy; while at the same time not leaving 
the GOC with any misleading or false expectations as to the amounts and 
types of assistance that we are likely to provide. . . 

We continue to draw the distinction set forth in the President's 
April 30 address between expanding the war into Cambodia and the actions 
we are taking to clean out the major VC/NVA sanctuaries in the Cambodian- 
Vietnamese border in defense of Americans in Viet-Nam and the Viet- 
namization program in SVN, even though it continues to be our hope that 
actions will help relieve VC/NVA pressures on the Cambodian forces and 
thus indirectly support the GOC. The President has announced his intention 
to withdraw American forces as quickly as the operations against the 
sanctuary areas have achieved their objectives, which is primarily the 
destruction of supplies and facilities. As you know, the congress has 
been assured that these operations will not extend deeper into Cambodia 
than sanctuary areas or up to about 21 miles and that it is expected that 









all of the forces will have been withdrawn to SVN in about six to eight 
weeks, or roughly by July 1. While these limits apply to a lesser degr 
to GVN forces, we would not like to see the GVN in a deep, substantial 
or prolonged extension of hostilities into Cambodia and would find it 
difficult to support if it did. . . 

- The second example relates to a 21 May 1970 TOP SECRET 
State Department message to the same addressees as for the first, 
with Embassy Bangkok added for information. Again selected 
passages are quoted: 

Operations of ARVN forces must be consistent with 
the objectives of Vietnamization. In Cambodia, therefore, they 
should be limited to North Vietnamese occupied territory where 
enemy military activities threaten Vietnamization. ARVN forces 
must strengthen their capacity to fight the NVA/VC in South Vietnam. 
We should accordingly urge GVN to keep eyes on NVA/VC forces in 
South Vietnam and to focus effort on exploitation of opportunities to 
seriously damage those forces which destruction of supplies in 
sanctuaries now affords. 

We want to encourage South Vietnamese to maintain 
a flexible posture concerning future operations in Cambodia, which 
would have principal objectives of (a) deterring enemy from reestab¬ 
lishing his previous posture in sanctuary areas threatening allied 
forces in South Vietnam and (b) deterring enemy from moving 
aggressively against Phnom Penh and the port areas of southern 
Cambodia by creating uncertainty about GVN reaction. 

We want to make clear that restrictions which apply to 
U. S. forces after June 30 do not repeat not apply to SVN forces. We 
would favor short duration ARVN operations in sanctuary areas where 
required to protect ARVN/US forces and promote progress of Viet¬ 
namization. Fact that ARVN forces free to conduct such operations 
will serve as deterrent to enemy efforts to reoccupy and rebuild bases 
and sanctuaries and, should he attempt to do so, should permit their 
quick neutralization. • • » 


VI-35 

DRAFT 






4 



- The third and last example is the unclassified 30 June 
1970 Cooper-Church Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, which in essence stated: 

... it is hereby provided that unless specifically 
authorized by law hereafter enacted, no funds authorized or 
appropriated pursuant to this act or any other law may be expended 
after July 1, 1970, for the purposes of; 

- Retaining United States forces in Cambodia, 

- Paying the compensation or allowances of, or 
otherwise supporting, directly or indirectly, any United States per¬ 
sonnel in Cambodia who furnish military instruction to Cambodian 
forces or engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces, 

- Entering into or carrying out any contract or 
agreement to provide military instruction in Cambodia, or to provide 
persons to engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian 
forces, or 

- Conducting any combat activity in the air above 
Cambodia in direct support of Cambodian forces. 

Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the 
constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief, includ¬ 
ing the exercise of that constitutional power which may be necessary 
to protect the lives of United States armed forces wherever 
deployed. . . 

(S) Concurrently with Senate passage of the Cooper-Church 
Amendment, the previous restrictions on US, RVN, and FW forces 
were relaxed: 

- US commanders could take necessary counteractions 
into Cambodia in self-defense against VC/NVA attacks from within 
Cambodia; 


VI-36 

DRAFT 





* 


HfflET 

g — 

._s^aM 1 

- While barred from attacking villages or populated areas, 
the US commander could fire artillery or employ air strikes against 
confirmed enemy positions firing against him, and even maneuver 
US troops into Cambodia to preserve his forces. 

- US and FWMAF were authorized to provide artillery fire 
support to RVNAF/FWMAF cross-border operations from gun 
positions in South Vietnam, clearance for such artillery fire had to 
be obtained through RVNAF/FANK channels. 

- Artillery fire was authorized on targets developed by 

cross-border operations or acquired by other means, e.g. , air 

80 

reconnaissance, sensors, side-looking aerial radar. 




VI-37 


DRAFT 





DRAFT 


ASSESSMENT 


(C) Problems created by the VC/NVA use of Cambodia for supply 
and sanctuary brought US political objectives and military considera¬ 
tions into sharp contrast. On the one hand was the political objective 
to avoid expanding the war and to keep Cambodia neutral. On the 
other was the ever increasing threat to the security of RVN by VC/ 
NVA forces which could use remote, well-supplied base areas in 
Cambodia to support their aggression into RVN. Throughout the 
period 1963-1970, an ultimate objective both politically and militarily 
was to remove the threat of these sanctuaries. 


(TS) It became apparent to COMUSMACV that the VC and 
subsequently the NVA were using Cambodia as a sanctuary and 
source of supply. Unfortunately, friendly intelligence was unable to 
produce conclusive and irrefutable evidence that such was the case. 
Aerial photography was not permitted nor were covert cross-border 
operations authorized. Effort^to achieve this evidence initially was 
not permitted because of diplomatic endeavor to move the Cambodian 
Government toward a neutral position. As the danger presented by 
the Cambodian base areas to US and GVN forces increased, intelligenc 
efforts were focused on Cambodia, and covert air and ground recon¬ 
naissance were authorized, first in the tri-border area, and by 1968 
encompassing the entire border region. 


VI-38 







(S) As the war progressed, the VC/NVA, with increasing 
cooperation of high Cambodian officials, were required to establish 
a complex logistical support system in Cambodia in order to maintain 
the large forces being infiltrated into RVN. Until 1966, when US air 
interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, together with effective coastal 
surveillance, began to reduce enemy logistic throughput significantly, 
major use of Cambodia as a supply source was not imperative. How¬ 
ever, once it became evident that the increased forces in IV, III and 
southern II CTZ's could not be supported adequately through Laos and 
by sea, Cambodia became essential as a supply base. 

(U) Political developments within Cambodia during this entire 
period were confused. Desiring to remain completely neutral, the 
influential leaders in Cambodia, to include Sihanouk, did not wish to 
offend the communists. At the same time they had no desire to 
surrender control of their country to the communists. When use of 
Cambodian territory by the enemy became so pronounced that national 
sovereignty was threatened, a coup resulted and the new leadership 
initiated action designed to defend the nation. Active cooperation in 
connection with US-RVN incursions into the border base areas was 


VI-39 



one such action. 


(U) Prior to the incursions the political goal of attempting to keep 
Cambodia neutral imposed serious handicaps on attainment of allied 
objectives in Vietnam. Moreover, the several year ban on decisive 
friendly operations to neutralize the enemy's base and supply structure 
inside Cambodia, and to disrupt his use of Cambodian territory for 
sanctuary, translated into high casualties on the allied side. In a word, 
prolonged adherence to the diplomatic approach provides a classic 
example of fighting a war with "one hand tied behind the back. " 

CONCLUSIONS 

(U) US political restrictions on conduct of operations against the 
Cambodian sanctuaries during the 1965 - May 1970 period enhanced the 
enemy's combat and logistic posture, placed allied forces in RVN at 
decided intelligence and operational disadvantage, and produced 
unnecessarily heavy friendly casualties, military and civilian, over an 
extended period. 

(S) Divergence of professional judgment on the nature and extent of 
VC/NVA supply activity in Cambodia as between COMUSMACV and 
Washington level intelligence agencies served to delay decisions in sup¬ 
port of the military's quest for authority to counter enemy exploitation 


VI-40 



of Cambodia. 







UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

(U) Opposition by segments of the US public and the Congress to 
the US-RVN incursions into the enemy's Cambodian base areas 
affected decisions on the depth of penetration by US forces of the 
sanctuary complex, duration of operations by US forces and prohibi¬ 
tion against reentry of US ground units into Cambodia following 
termination of the incursion. 

(U) Apart from their military value, US-RVN operations to clean 
out the enemy's base areas in Cambodia reaped rich rewards in terms 
of raising RVNAF morale and confidence, stimulating "offensive 
mindedness" on the part of RVN military leadership and providing 
an intangible but nonetheless invaluable boost to Vietnamization. 


VI-41 



UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 



CHAPTER VI 

PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR AND THE LIMITED 
INCURSION INTO CAMBODIA (U) 

1. Rept (S), PACOM Wkly Intel Digest (U), No. 10-63, 15 Mar 63, p. 7(S). 

2. Rept (S), PACOM Intel Digest, 7 Feb 64, p. 13 (S). 

3. Chronology of Developments Affecting Cambodia, American 
Embassy Bangkok, July 1969 (U). 

4. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1963 (U), p. 279 (S). 

5. Chronology of Developments Affecting Cambodia, American 
Embassy Bangkok, July 1969 (U). 

6. Rept (S), PACOM Intel Digest (U), 10 Jan 64 and 14 Feb 64, pp. 11-12 (S). 

7. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1963 (U), p. 277 (S). 

8. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS 302026Z Apr 63. 

9. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC and JCS 200101Z Feb 64. 

10. Trojan Horse Operation Order 60-6507, HQ SAC, revised 20 Dec 
64 (TS). 

11. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1964 (U), p. 90 (S). 

12. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CJCS, Subj: Constraints Affecting 
MACV Operation (U), 21 Jan 65. 

13. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to JCS 040257Z May 65. 

14. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC 121904Z May 65. 

Chronology of Developments Affecting Cambodia, American 
Embassy Bangkok, July 1969 (U). 


VI-42 



UNCLASSIFIED 


15 . 









UNCLASSIFIED 



16 . Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, pp. 110, 123 (U). 

17. Msg (TS), CO MUSMAC V 091149Z Dec 65. 

18 . Msg (TS), CINCPAC 170438Z Dec 65. 

19. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV 010152Z Jan 68. 

20. Msg (S), CG IFFORCEV to COMUSMACV 210040Z Mar 66. 

21. Msg (S), CJCS to COMUSMACV 010037Z Apr 66. 

22. Msg (S), JCS 271912Z Jun 66. 

23. Msg (S), CINCPAC 262246Z May 67. 

24. Msg (S), CJCS to CINCPAC 021535Z Jun 66. 

25. Memo (S), Mission Council Action Memorandum No. 123, 22 Sep 
1966 , subj: Minutes of 19 September 1966 Meeting (U). 

26. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV 220604Z Nov 66, Msg (TS), CINCPAC 
240450Z Nov 66. 

27. Msg (S), SEC STATE 89498 Nov 66. 

28. Msg (S), AMEMBASSY SAIGON 150909Z Nov 66. 

29. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, p. 128. 

30. Msg (TS), CINCPAC 262246Z May 67. 

31. Msg (TS), JCS 202247Z Oct 67. 

32. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), p. 444 (S). 

33. Msg (TS), JCS 231725Z Oct 67. 


VI-43 



UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 



34. News Item Associated Press, 19 Nov 67, subj: Camp in Cambodia 
Linked to Viet Cong, 21 Nov 67, Cambodia Disputes Reports of 
Base (U). 

35. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), p. 445 (TS). 

36. Msg (S), AMEMB SAIGON 011022Z Aug 67. 

37. Memo (C), Dept of State, 11 Sept 1968, subj: Vesuvius Program (U). 

38. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, pp. 117, 125, 129, 133, 135. 

39. Ibid. , pp. 157-58. 

40. Ibid. 

41. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV 300937Z Jan 68. 

42. Msg (TS), JCS 192348Z Feb 68. 

43. Msg (TS), BANGKOK 101515Z Jan 68. 

44. Msg (S), NEW DELHI 8395 and Msg (S), STATE 170532Z Jan 68. 

45. Msg (TS), AMEMB SAIGON 191220Z Mar 68. 

46. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, p. 166. 

47. Msg (TS), CINCPAC 282024Z Jul 68. 

48. Msg (TS), MACV 252300Z Sep 68. 

49. Msg (TS), JCS 2366/16. 

50. Msg (TS), JCS 141806Z Dec 68. 

51. Rept (TS-NOFORN), CINCPAC Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol III, p. 299 (S). 
Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol III, p. C-7 (S). 

VI-44 



UNCLASSIFIED 


52. 






53. VC/NVA Use of Cambodia as a Source for Arms and Ammunition 
15 May 68, SRA Branch CICV (S-NOFORN). 

54. NIE 57-66, 6 Oct 66, Sihanouk's Cambodia (S); NIE 57-67, 26 Jan 
67, Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese War Effort (S): and 
CIA Intelligence Memorandum ER IM 68-84 Jul 68, Cambodia's 
Role in the Movement of Arms and Ammunition to the Vietnamese 
Communists (S). 

55. Memorandum from the USIB Special Study Team (Graham Report), 
subj: Cambodian Movement in the Supply of Arms and Ammunition 
to Communist Forces in South Vietnam, 31 Dec 68 (S-NOFORN). 

56. CIA Weekly Summary, 3 Jul 69, Cambodia Seeks to Limit 
Vietnamese Communist Activity (S-NOFORN). 

57. DIA Advanced INTSUM 293-69, 17 Dec 69 (S-NOFORN). 

58. CIA Intelligence Memo ER IM 70-188 Sep 70, Communist Delivieries 
to Cambodia for the VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam, Dec 66-Apr 
69 (S-NOFORN). 

59. Ibid. 

60. Rept (S-NOFORN),’ MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol III, p. C-3 (S). 

61. Rept (C-NOFORN), DIA Incl of Uk Defense Attache Report from 
Phnom Penh, 18 Nov 69, subj: Report by GEN Lon Nol to 
Prince Sihanouk on VC and Rebel Activities in Cambodia (S). 

62. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol III, p. C-7 (S). 

63. Ibid. 

64. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol III, p. C-32 (S). 

65. Ibid. 

66. Ibid. 


VI-45 


DRAFT 


Special Handling Required 
not releasable to foreign 
nationals 


67. 


UNCLASSIFIED 



Staff Report Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate, 7 Jun 70 
45-766 0 (GPO), p. 3 (U). 

68. Ibid. , p. 4. 

69. Ibid. 

70. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol III, p. C-35 (C). 

71. Author's Personal Knowledge Based on Service as Deputy Commander, 
USMACV, Apr 69 - Sep 70. 

72. Ibid. 

73. Ibid. 

74. Ibid. 

75. 91st Congressional 2d Session, subj: Cambodia 1970, A Staff 
Report Before the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate 
GPO 1970, pp. 1-14 (U). 

76. Ibid. 

; 

77. Msg (C), CG IFFORCEV 110732Z May 70, subj: Rules of Engage¬ 
ment for Cambodian Operations (U). 

78. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), p. C-45 (C). 

79. Msg (U), SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC to AMEMB SAIGON, 

State #103937, 302105Z Jun 70, subj: Cooper-Church Amendment 
to the Foreign Military Sales Act, and Special Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1971, Public Law 91-652 (Cooper-Church Amendment). 

80. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Top Secret 
Supplement, p. TSS-22. 


VI-46 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 







UNCLASSIFIED 



ST* ■ 

' 1 

: ' 1 

a U i * b 

CHAPTER VI 


PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR AND THE LIMITED INCURSION INTO CAMBODIA 


CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 


1963 


Feb - (U) 
May - (U) 
Jun - (U) 
Aug - (U) 
Nov - (U) 
Nov - (U) 


Prince Sihanouk visits Peking. 

Friendship treaty between Peking and Phnom Penh signed. 

Henry Cabot Lodge appointed US Ambassador. 

Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with RVN. 

President Diem overthrown and slain in coup. 

Cambodia requests US to cease providing economic 
assistance. 


1964 


Jun - (U) General Westmoreland assumes command of MACV. 

Jun - (U) General Maxwell D. Taylor named to replace Ambassador 
Lodge 

Oct - (U) Prince Sihanouk signs joint communique in Peking con¬ 
demning US actions in Indochina and China. 


Dec - (U) 


US/Cambodian talks aimed at resolving difference held in 
New Delhi, Broken off and not reconvened. 


1965 


Mar - (U) 


First US ground combat troops (US Marine Corps) arrive 
in RVN. 


May - (U) Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with US. 



if*. 


VI-47 


UNCLASSIFIED 


Appendix 






May - (U) 
Aug - (U) 





173rd Airborne Brigade arrives in RVN. 


Ambassador Lodge replaces Ambassador Taylor. 


Nov - (U) la Drang Valley Battle. 



1966 


May - (TS) Planning and training for covert cross-border operations 
authorized. 


Aug - (U) 


President deGaulle pays state visit to Cambodia. France 
declares respect for Cambodia's territorial integrity. 


Sep - (U) Contemplated visit to Cambodia by US special envoy Governor 
Harriman canceled due to alleged border incident. 


Oct - (S) 


Nov - (TS) 


Chinese ship unloads munitions at Sihanoukville. 

SEACOORD meeting recommends sequential non-belligerent 
approach toward Cambodia. 


Nov - (S) Second Chinese ship unloads munitions at Sihanoukville. 





1967 


Apr - (U) 
May - (TS) 

Jun - (U) 

Jul - (TS) 
Aug - (U) 
Sep - (U) 
Sep - (U) 


■ Ellsworth P. Bunker replaces Lodge as Ambassador. 
Lon Nol resigns as Prime Minister of Cambodia. 

US covert cross-border operations authorized in tri¬ 
border area. 

Cambodia establishes relations with National Liberation 
F ront. 

Overflights of Cambodia authorized. 

NVN Embassy opens in Phnom Penh. 

Thieu elected President of RVN. 

Sihanouk publicly attacks Peking for interfering in 
Cambodian affairs. 












Nov - (U) 
Nov - (U) 


Mrs. Kennedy visits Cambodia. 

Three American correspondents discover VC base in 
Cambodia. 




1968 

Jan - (U) 
Jan - (U) 
Mar - (TS) 

May - (U) 

Jill - (U) 
Jul - (U) 
Jul - (U) 
Jul - (U) 
Sep - (U) 

Oct - (U) 

Dec - (U) 
Dec - (C) 


Ambassador Bowles visits Phnom Penh. 

Tet Offensive begins in RVN. 

Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACOORD) 
meeting recommends military actions against Cambodia. 

Talks between US, NVN, RVN start in Paris. Second 
VC/NVA offensive begins. 

General Creighton W. Abrams assumes command of MACV. 

Admiral McCain assumes duties as CINCPAC. 

Lon Nol becomes Prime Minister of Cambodia. 

LCU strays across border and is captured by Cambodians. 

Special US Envoy Eugene Black visits Cambodia to dis¬ 
cuss Mekong River development. 

1st Cavalry Division relocates from I Corps to Tay Ninh 
Province III Corps. 

LCU crewmen released. 

Graham report issued by Washington level intelligence 
agencies. States bulk of VC/NVA supplies coming through 
Laos. 


1969 


Jul - (U) Diplomatic relations re-established between US and 
Cambodia. 


Jul - (S) CIA acknowledges large shipments of arms and ammuni¬ 

tion to VC/NVA through Sihanoukville. 


VI-49 



Appendix 


DRAFT 







Nov - (S) 



Lon Nol presents Sihanouk with comprehensive picture 
of VC/NVA activity and of their support to Khmer Rouge. 


Jan - (U) 
Mar - (U) 

Mar - (U) 

Mar - (U) 
Mar - (U) 

Apr - (U) 
May - (U) 
Jun - (U) 


Sihanouk leaves for France. 

Demonstrations in Phnom Penh against NVN and PRG 
Embassies. 

Lon Nol issues ultimatum to VC/NVA to leave Cambodian 
territory. 

ARVN task force makes shallow penetration of Cambodia. 

Sihanouk removed as Chief of State by unanimous vote of 
Parliament. 

ARVN conducts large operation into Cambodia. 

US forces enter Cambodia. 

US forces withdrawn from Cambodia. 


a ft 


VI-50 


Appendix 












UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER VII 

THE PRISONER OF WAR ISSUE (U) 

PURPOSE 

(U) The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which 
prisoner of war (PW) considerations influenced the conduct of United 
States (US) military operations in Southeast Asia (SEA). 

APPROACH 

(U) The emphasis in this chapter will be on five main aspects of 
the many-sided prisoner of war issue. 

- Policies of the Administration concerning release of US 
prisoners of war; 

- Efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to induce all parties to the war to abide by the rules of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949; 

- Attitude of North Vietnam (NVN) and the Viet Cong (VC) 
toward the status and treatment of PW; 

- Release and repatriation of PW by the adversaries; and, 

- Heightened emphasis on development of intelligence on 
location of PW and a viable capability for effecting their recovery. 



UNCLASSIRFD 




OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 



(U) There are several other considerations affecting or related 
to the prisoner of war issue which deserve brief mention. The policy 
wherein responsibility for the internment of all North Vietnamese 
Army (NVA) and VC prisoners resided with the Government of Vietnam 
(GVN) was a sound one. The potential problems of US custody of these 
prisoners -- such as those experienced by US forces guarding North 
Korean prisoners during the Korean conflict -- were precluded. The 
policy also kept down the requirement for military police in the force 
structure. 

(U) Inadequacy of data precluded efforts to determine accurately 
the influence exerted by North Vietnamese and VC treatment of 
prisoners on the morale and effectiveness of US forces in Southeast 
Asia. Based on his Vietnam experience, however, the author considers 
that publicity on enemy treatment of US prisoners, such as that provided 
by Major James N. Rowe after his escape and Navy Lieutenant (JG) 
Robert Frishman after his release, strengthened the US serviceman's 
natural resolve not to be taken prisoner. 

(U) In the same vein, it is considered that troop morale in 
Southeast Asia was enhanced by certain events, such as: 


- The Son Tay raid; 

- Private efforts, such as those of H. Ross Perot, to bring 


relief to US prisoners of war; 



VII-2 







tarian treatment of PW and to secure their early release; and. 


- The release of approximately 60 prisoners by North Vietnam 


and the VC from February 1967 to date. 

(U) At the same time, the author has concluded that troop morale 
has been degraded on a minor, uneven and ill-defined basis, but not to 
a degree resulting in known cases of inability or failure to fulfill mission 
requirements. Principal factors are: 


Lack of encouraging progress in obtaining release of US 


prisoners of war; 

- Domestic political exploitation of the PW issue. 

IMPACT OF PW CONSIDERATIONS ON US MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(U) The overriding conclusion insofar as the PW problem is con¬ 
cerned is that at most it exerted only minor influence on the conduct of 
military operations in SEA. While the history of the war is replete with 
specific instances in which localized and time-limited military activities 
were influenced by PW considerations, evidence is lacking to support a 
finding that the latter impacted importantly on overall conduct of the 
war by US and allied forces. Examples of influence at local level 
include: 



VII -3 






- PW releases and truces associated therewith; 


- Operations designed to liberate prisoners from known or 
suspected enemy PW camps; 


- Modification of operational plans to preclude casualties 
among prisoners believed to be in such camps; 

- Need to strengthen the security of PW camps during periods 
of heightened enemy threat; and 

- Diversion of military construction capabilities to improve 
and expand PW facilities. 


ADMINISTRATION POLICY CONCERNING US PW'S 


(U) Simply stated, US policy throughout the war in regard to 
prisoners of war has been that all of the adversaries should abide by 
the conditions of the 1949 Geneva Convention. In February 1970, 
President Nixon restated this policy: 


This is not a political or military issue, but a matter of basic 
humanity. There may be disagreement about other aspects of this 
conflict, but there can be no disagreement in humane treatment for 
prisoners of war. I state again our readiness to proceed at once for 
the release of prisoners of war on both sides. ^ 


VII-4 




J 


L: 


L. /' • 




(U) A year later, on 




[ary 1971, President Nixon, apparently 


trying to prod the North Vietnamese into action on the question of 
repatriation, linked US troop withdrawal to the release of US prisoners. 
He stated that US troops would remain in Vietnam as long as US prisoners 


are held by NVN. Additionally, he stipulated that: 


We and the South Vietnamese have made intensive efforts this 
past year to secure better treatment and release of Allied prisoners -- 
through global diplomacy, through proposals in Paris, and through the 
courageous raid at Son Tay. Congressional expressions have been 
valuable in underlining American public concern. The world increasingly 
condemned the other side's practices, and the UN General Assembly 
passed a resolution this fall which underscored the international obliga¬ 
tion to treat prisoners humanely. 

I repeat my October 7, [1970] proposal for the immediate and 
unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides. All 
prisoners, journalists, and other civilian captives should be released 
now to return to the place of their choice. Such action would not only 
meet humanitarian concerns, it might also lead to progress on other 
aspects of a peace settlement. ^ 


(U) On 16 April 1971, the President extended the foregoing by stating 
that while ". . . our goal is total withdrawal ... as long as the 
prisoner issue remains unresolved and the South Vietnamese still are 
unable to defend themselves against the Communists . . . we will have 
forces there. " 


(U) When analyzed within the context of the administration's overall 
Vietnamization objectives, it would appear that the PW/withdrawal 
linkage is aimed more at generating political/psychological pressure 
and leverage than at maintaining a major military threat. This 


UI 


i'lCLASSIfc 


A5.I-5 

r t' 



r 





i 


i 



consideration notwith 



:ifig,*it is evident that the US has made 


release of its prisoners a condition precedent for any settlement, 
negotiated or de facto , involving complete withdrawal of its military 
forces from the RVN. Nor can one fail to discern the possibility of 
repetition of the negotiations which ended the Korean conflict, wherein 
the fate of prisoners of war exerted dramatic influence on the settle¬ 
ment as a whole. 


ICRC EFFORTS 


(U) On 11 June 1965, as a result of increasing force levels and 
combat operations in South Vietnam, the ICRC addressed a letter to 
the governments of the United States, South Vietnam and North Vietnam 
The letter pointed out that each of the three governments had ratified 
or adhered to the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Victims 
of War and reminded them of their specific obligations under the con¬ 
vention. The ICRC also asked to be informed of the measures being 
taken by each addressee to carry out its obligations. 4 In part, the 
latter entail: 


- Prompt release of names of all PW; 

- Inspection of prison camps by neutral delegates of the ICRC; 

- Regular flow of correspondence between PW and their 


families; 


- Humane treatment of prisoners; 





VII -6 


I 

1 









- Collection and treatment of sick and wounded; and 

- Release of all seriously sick and wounded prisoners. 

(U) The ICRC also delivered a copy of the letter to the National 
Liberation Front (NLF). ^ 

(C) The United States in its reply stated that it "has always abided 
by the humanitarian principles enunciated in the Geneva Conventions 
and will continue to do so. It has been US policy throughout that the 
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention applies to the Vietnam conflict 
and should be adhered to by the US, the RVN and other allied forces. 

For example, the US consistently has urged the South Vietnamese to 
comply with ICRC standards in connection with prison camp standards, 
visits by neutral observers and the publication of prisoner of war lists. 

(S) The Republic of Vietnam stated it was "fully prepared to respect 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention and to contribute actively to 
the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to ensure 

g 

their application. " Although there have been instances of South Vietnamese 
failure to live up to the Geneva Conventions, observation by reliable US 
and allied officials manifests that, in the main, NVN and VC prisoners 
have been accorded better food and shelter than major segments of the 
South Vietnamese who have challenged the ICRC to show definitive prog¬ 
ress in getting NVN and the VC to comply with the Convention. The 


VII-7 




-- 


nNCLivs-- 

x * — 





LfJvpr r 

!j: v r « ■ ' » T^s* 


2 *« \ •> 


North Vietnamese Red Cross, however, has opposed the ICRC position 


and has parroted Hanoi's attitude, summarized below, concerning its 
obligations under the Convention. 9 


NVN AND VC ATTITUDES 


(U) North Vietnam's reply, while difficult to evaluate otherwise, 
made it clear that it would regard "pilots who have carried out pirate- 
raids" over its territory as "major criminals . . . liable for judgement 
in accordance with the laws of [North Vietnam] although captured pilots 
are well treated. ^ On later occasions, the North Vietnamese have 
repeated these claims and have stated that prisoners are not entitled 
to protection under the Convention because a declaration of war has 
been made by neither the United States nor North Vietnam. This con¬ 
tention being entirely invalid under the terms thereof, it can be asserted 
unequivocally that North Vietnam has refused to comply with the provisions 
of the 1949 Convention. 11 " At the same time, the North Vietnamese 
continue to assert that they treat all prisoners humanely, even though 
not obligated to do so. 

(U) The NLF replied that it was not bound by the Convention in that 
as insurgents they were not subject to previous actions taken by the 

# Common Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 states: ... the 

present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by any 

of them. 



VI I - 8 












•ri ■’ i 


u ; C* 

4 '<* ' £ 

^ 


_ siJ . 

government they were attempting to overthrow. Nonetheless, the NLF 

maintained that the prisoners it held were humanely treated, especially 

12 

the sick and wounded. 


(S) In spite of claims on the part of Hanoi and the NLF, evidence 
that US prisoners of war have been mistreated is accumulating. 
Physical and mental abuse, including solitary confinement, have been 
commonplace. Prisoners have been paraded in public and forced to 
make statements designed to convey the impression that all prisoners 
are well treated. In addition, the North Vietnamese have refused to 
allow the ICRC or any other impartial body to visit its prison camps. 
Mail privileges have been withheld or at best curtailed. Complete 
prisoner lists have not been provided. 


(S) Meanwhile, however, the North Vietnamese appear to be 
interested in keeping their prisoners alive. Primary reasons for this 
policy, rather than being humanitarian in character, appear to be rooted 
in desire to: 


- Avoid adverse world opinion and judgment; 

- Generate leverage for use in connection with negotiations; 

and 


- Attain psychological warfare objectives exemplified by use 
of "confessions of war crimes" in efforts to convince world opinion 
that the US is the aggressor. 13 


VII- 9 







(C) Similarly, captured documents reveal that official VC policy 
toward PW's is one of leniency and humanitarianism for political 
expediency. Prisoners generally are fed and provided medical care 
within the VC ability to provide them. On the other hand, caging and 
shackling are commonly used to prevent escape, and there have been 
occasions wherein the fundamental policy has been violated. 

(C) On 24 December 1969, for example, the bodies of two US 
servicemen who had been executed in 1966 were recovered.^ On 
another occasion, on 20 May 1967, two US prisoners of war were 
tortured, then murdered at a church at Ngo Xa Dang, three miles 
from Quang Tri City. ^ 

(S) A VC directive captured in 1967 provided guidelines for 
treatment of US and allied prisoners. Among its statements was the 
following: 

There are also some cadre who do not want to escort the 
prisoners due to fear of hardships. They willingly create occasions 
for the prisoners to escape in order to kill them. As mentioned 
before, if many US soldiers are captured, our political struggle will 
have greater influence. Therefore, we should try to capture US 
prisoners and evacuate them to our base. 

(U) Over the years, the ICRC repeatedly has called upon the North 
Vietnamese to live up to its obligations under the Geneva Convention. 

To date, with one major exception, despite much talk and many promises 



VII- 10 








on Hanoi's part, the status and lot of US prisoners of war remain 
unchanged from that prevailing at the time of their reply to the ICRC 
letter of 11 June 1965, A major exception is the NVN position on war 
crimes trials for captured pilots. Two central points affect the trial 
issue: 

- Whether the pilots are entitled to prisoner of war status; 

and 

- Whether the North Vietnamese have the right to try them 

17 

for alleged war crimes. 

(U) In relation to the foregoing, it is to be stressed that the pilots 

are members of the US Armed Forces, were captured while flying 

combat missions over North Vietnam, wore US flight uniforms and 

made no attempt to hide their identity. On this basis, they clearly 

18 

are entitled to prisoner of war status. 

(U) While not contesting these facts, Hanoi goes beyond them 
by asserting -- without benefit of trial -- that since the pilots are 

1 < 

"war criminals" they are no longer entitled to prisoner of war status. 
Such a position is, in itself, a violation of the Convention. 

(U) Reaction to the North Vietnamese threat in 1966 to try captured 
pilots as war criminals was immediate and highly vocal. A cross- 
section of world opinion condemned or opposed the threat, "including 


VII-11 



* i >. n 

H ‘ > ‘ 

b N 


* .r: *; «•: ' l. ••♦- 


fej.-atu4J ■ 


those who sided with the United States position in Vietnam, those who 

20 

opposed it, and those who were neutral. " 

- United Nations Secretary General U Thant warned North 

Vietnam that "the possible trial of American prisoners is certain 

21 

to generate still more intense escalation of the war. " 

- Pope Paul cautioned that mistreatment of prisoners by 

22 

North Vietnam would result in "grave consequences. " 

- President Lyndon B. Johnson, while not stating what the 
US would do were our pilots to be put on trial, announced that the US 


would react accordingly. 


23 


- A group of US Senate "doves, " headed by Senator Frank 
Church of Idaho, appealed to the North Vietnamese not to try the 

•i * 24 

pilots. 


(U) The worldwide reaction apparently did not go unheeded by 

Hanoi. On 23 July 1966, Ho Chi Minh declared that no trials were 

25 

"in view” for the captured American pilots. 

(U) As it developed, Ho's pronouncement proved to be more in the 
nature of a tactical adjustment than a reversal of policy. A later 
statement held that the "main criminals" were not captured pilots, 

"but the persons who sent them there [to NVN] - Johnson, Rusk, 

2 6 

McNamara -- these are the ones who should be brought to trial. " 


V11-12 

p-y' F\ : " 



1 


* V * 


1 





Nonetheless, the fact that no known trials have taken place nor appear 
to be in the offing suggests that North Vietnam is at times responsive 
to the weight of world opinion and is not unmindful of the absence of 
precedent for such action under international law. 


RELEASE OF PRISONERS BY THE ADVERSARIES 


(S) The propaganda value to the enemy of publicity on captured 
American pilots has been paralleled by the propaganda value to all of 
the adversaries of selective release of prisoners. 

(S) Focussing first on the friendly side, it is significant that the 
South Vietnamese have released NVA prisoners to demonstrate their 
humanitarianism and to demonstrate that North Vietnam, contrary to 
its public claims, has troops in the South. The United States has 
supported this program in the hope that US prisoners would, in turn, 
be released. 

(C) During Tet of 1967 (annual celebration of the Lunar New Year), 

28 sick and wounded NVN prisoners were repatriated by the RVN across 

the Ben Hai River in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). They were met 

27 

and accepted by officials from NVN. Another illustration of friendly 
initiatives of this type is found in release on 12 June 1967 at the same 
site of forty additional NVN prisoners who qualified medically in accord¬ 
ance with articles 109 and 110 of the 1949 Convention. 



(S) On 18 August 1967, General Westmoreland recommended to 
Ambassador Bunker that repatriation be stepped up. His rationale 
included the view that repatriations rejected Hanoi's assertions that 
no NVA troops were in South Vietnam, put pressure on North Vietnam 
to repatriate US seriously wounded and sick, and promised to induce 
other NVA troops to surrender. Based on subsequent coordination 
with the GVN: 

- On 21 October 1968, fourteen prisoners who had been members 
of a NVN Navy patrol boat crew were released twelve miles off the 
southern coast of NVN. A 36-hour stand down of military operations 

in the area of release was agreed upon and observed by the US, GVN 
and NVN. 30 

- On 30 November 1968, in simultaneous ceremonies in Saigon, 

Da Nang, and Pleiku, 140 prisoners of all ages who had been drafted 

into the service of the VC were released. They had been afforded the 

31 

option of going to North Vietnam, but all chose to stay in the South. 

- July of 1970 signaled another special truce featuring the 

return of 62 sick and wounded prisoners and 24 fishermen by junk near 
32 

the DMZ. 

- On 24 January 1971, thirty-seven NVN prisoners were 
returned to NVN across the Ben Hai River in the DMZ. The Republic 
of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) had declared a 15-hour ceasefire 

to coincide with this action. Once the release was effected, the RVNAF 


VII_14 


UNCLASS 


.V «k « 





escort which had accompanied the prisoners was taken under small-arms 
and mortar fire from within NVN and suffered one casualty, wounded in 
action. ^ 

(U) For their part the NVA and VC have released a small number of 

US servicemen in an apparent effort: 

- To demonstrate that US prisoners are in fact treated "humanely"; 

and 

- To exploit attempts at "brainwashing" certain of those released. 
(C) In connection with the first general election in NVN in 1967, one 

US prisoner was released; two others received similar treatment during 

the Tet holiday period; and three others later were turned over to a 

member of a US anti-war organization. ^ 

(C) During Tet 1968, in Vientiane, Laos, three US pilots were released 

into the custody of representatives from an American peace group. 

(C) In December 1968, the VC, via a radio broadcast, proposed a 
release of US prisoners to be negotiated by US/VC representatives near 
Tay Ninh City, RVN. The demand by the VC for a 72-hour truce during 
this proposal was rejected by the US and GVN in favor of safe conduct in 
a specified zone for eight hours. Three enlisted personnel were released 

on 1 January 1969, one suffering from a head wound which resulted in 

3 6 

his death after his return to the US. 

(S) Three prisoners, to include Lieutenant (JG) Frishman, USN, 

were released in Vientiane in August 1969. Frishman later talked quite 


VII -15 



u 




:> •• v 

t a** R 
* -1 


frankly about the inhumane treatment accorded US^prisoner s in NVN, 


although he did give credit to the North Vietnamese doctors for saving 


his arm. 


37 


(C) Six other US prisoners were released in Vietnam - four 
near Tam Ky and two near Bu Prang, by the VC during October-December 
1969. All were released in proximity to friendly units and were left to 


make contact on their own. 


38 


(U) While these individual releases generally were hailed with 
understandable hope, there was no consistent pattern nor clearly 
discernible motive on which to judge and react to the enemy's actions. 
Other than for the isolated truces, these events had negligible effect 


on normal operations, much less the overall war effort. 


PW RECOVERY EFFORTS 

(TS) In June 1965, the US Ambassador in Saigon established a 
Committee on Prisoners and Detainees with membership composed 
of representatives from each element of the Country Team. Later 
a Joint Recovery Center was established under Commander, United 
States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). 

(TS-LD) The number of US detained or missing personnel in SEA 
having risen during 1965 and 1966, COMUSMACV activated a Joint 
Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) in September 1966. The principal 



VII-16 









U 


T* 




: * O F , . 

objective of this organization was defined as return of missinf; ***•£..£* l: ^ 

captured, detained and evading US personnel to US control. In time 
its major functions have grown to include: 

- Collation, evaluation, and dissemination of all data con¬ 
cerning missing and detained FWMAF personnel and post search and 
rescue (SAR) recovery operations; 

- Establishment of evasion and escape procedures; 

- Establishment of a capability within MACV for personnel 
recovery operations subsequent to SAR efforts; and 

- Monitorship and coordination of recovery operations with 

3 9 

agencies external to MACV during execution of approved plans. 

(S) JPRC has no forces under its operational control. It recom¬ 
mends to MACV the unit to be tasked to plan and carry out a recovery 
operation. 

(TS) Recovery operations beyond the borders of RVN require 

coordination at the highest military, government, and diplomatic 

levels. No JPRC sponsored operations have been authorized or 

40 

attempted in NVN since the bombing halt of 1968. 

(C) The cumulative results through 1970 for JPRC sponsored pro- 
41 

grams are: 


VII-17 



Free World PW's Recovered 




I. '-k* L^J 5 


- 9 


Ui« 


__ r 7 

v W W : V" i * 



Vietnamese PW's Recovered 


483 


- Free World Escapees Recovered 


- 10 


- Remains Recovered 


- 88 


Rewards Paid 


- $12,149. 00 


- Leaflets Dropped 


- 224 Million 


(TS-LD) An example of a successful PW recovery operation coordi¬ 
nated by the JPRC is one conducted on 22 August 1970 near Vi Thanh 
in the lower Mekong Delta. In brief: 


I 


. . . Information concerning a VC PW camp was received 
by the [US Navy] SEALs at approximately 1800H 21 August 1970 from 
an escapee. Coordination was immediately effected with the Province 
Headquarters for support to include: gunfire support from a US 
destroyer; bombing support from the Australian Air Force B-57's; 
gunships and RF/PF forces. The ground units were inserted along a 
beach line to the east of the reported camp at 0910H 22 August 1970. 

The B-57's bombed to the south. Rocket and minigun fire was applied 
north and west of camp. Naval gunfire and gunships were directed to 
the south of the camp when it was discovered that the VC camp personnel 
and PW's were being evacuated to the south. The intent was to apply 
sufficient pressure so that the VC guards would abandon the PW's. The 
operation was successful and resulted in the recovery of 28 ARVN. There 
were no friendly casualties and three VC were KLA. No US PWs had 
been in this camp. The success of the operation is attributable pri¬ 
marily to the quick reaction and coordination effected between all 
commands. 42 

(TS) Planning currently is underway at Pacific Command Head¬ 
quarters to provide a continuing theatre-wide recovery capability for 

. , 43 

the post-Vietnam period. 


VII-18 

[7^ H FF R 


V iif i ' \ 

K ; 3 


; ..u 


i: 


Ik 



CONCLUSION 



J 


(U) Although the status of prisoners of war, particularly that 
of the captured US pilots has generated intense public concern, 
motivated official and private initiatives designed to improve the 
situation, and prompted development of a sophisticated PW recovery 
mechanism, it has exerted only minor influence on the conduct of 
military operations in SEA. 


- -*'<7 T 




VII-19 


f- 


t 


r 



u 


» c 


CHAPTER VII 


THE PRISONER OF WAR ISSUE 


1. President Nixon's Message to Congress on U. S. Foreign Policy 
for the 1970's, 18 Feb 70. 

2. President Richard M. Nixon's Address on U. S. Foreign Policy for 
the 1970's, 25 Feb 71. 

3. Karnow, Stanley. Washington Post , "Vietnam Pullout Date Urged, " 
Honolulu Advertiser , 29 Apr 71. 

4. Levie, Howard S. The Viet Nam War and International Law, edited 
by Richard A. Falk, 2 Volumes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1969, Vol II, p. 361. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid. , p. 362. 

7. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1966 (U), pp. 683-84 (TS). 

8. Levie, p. 362. 

9. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol II, p. x-11 (S). 

10. Levie, p. 362. 

11. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
of 12 Aug 49. 

12. Levie, p. 362. 

13. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol II, p.x-15 (C). 

14. Ibid. , p. x-35 (C). 

15. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol II, p. 979 (C). 


16. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol II, p. x-34 (S). 


VII-20 



r 

i 

L 






.X 


* / V. 

I■ 'S 


'U 



17. Levie, p. 383. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Ibid., p. 384. 

20. Ibid. , pp. 382-83. 

21. Rept (FOUO) Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward South¬ 
east Asia, 1943-1968, A Chronological Compendium (U), USAF 
Historical Division, 1968, p. 442 (U). 

22. Ibid. 

23. Ibid. , p. 443 (U). 

24. Levie, p. 383. 

25. Rept (FOUO) Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward South¬ 
east Asia, 1943-1968, A Chronological Compendium (U), USAF 
Historical Division, 1968, p. 442 (U). 

« 

26. Levie, p. 383. 

27. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol II, p. 985 (C). 

28. Ibid. , pp. 985-86 (C). 

29. Ibid. , p. 986 (C). 

30. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol II, p. 856 (S). 

31. Ibid. 

32. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol II, p. x-53 (U). 

33. Ltr (U) MACPM to CS, MACV, 27 Jan 71, subj: Repatriation of 
NVA PW, 24 Jan 71. 

34. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol II, p. 978 (C). 


VII-21 

C 



„ i 

w 




» ‘ 


« 









35. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol II, pp. 841-43 (C). 

36. Ibid. , pp. 845-47 (C). 

37. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol II, pp. x30-34 (S). 

38. Ibid. , pp. x55-56 (C). 

39. Rept (TS-NOFORN-LIMDIS), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Annex B, 
pp. Bl-97 (TS-LD). 

40. Ibid. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Msg (TS-SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 9675) from JCS for Admiral 
McCain, subj: PW Rescue Force and Crash Teams (U), 101715Z 
Apr 71. 


VII-22 




- -TJ 


K 


i- ; 

W 


17. 


Levie, p. 383. 



18. Ibid. 

19. Ibid., p. 384. 

20. Ibid., pp. 382-83. 

21. Rept (FOUO) Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward South¬ 
east Asia, 1943-1968, A Chronological Compendium (U), USAF 
Historical Division, 1968, p. 442 (U). 

22. Ibid. 

23. Ibid. , p. 443 (U). 

24. Levie, p. 383. 

25. Rept (FOUO) Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward South¬ 
east Asia, 1943-1968, A Chronological Compendium (U), USAF 
Historical Division, 1968, p. 442 (U). 

26. Levie, p. 383. 

27. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol II, p. 985 (C). 

28. Ibid. , pp. 985-86 (C). 

29. Ibid. , p. 986 (C). 

30. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol II, p. 856 (S). 

31. Ibid. 

32. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Vol II, p. x-53 (U). 

33. Ltr (U) MACPM to CS, MACV, 27 Jan 71, subj: Repatriation of 
NVA PW, 24 Jan 71. 

Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1967 (U), Vol II, p. 978 (C). 

VII-21 



34. 








35. 



Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1968 (U), Vol II, pp. 841-43 (C). 

36. Ibid., pp. 845-47 (C). 

37. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist 1969 (U), Vol H, pp. x30-34 (S). 

38. Ibid. , pp. x55-56 (C). 

39. Rept (TS-NOFORN-LIMDIS), MACV Comd Hist 1970 (U), Annex B, 
pp. Bl-97 (TS-LD). 

40. Ibid. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Msg (TS-SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 9675) from JCS for Admiral 
McCain, subj: PW Rescue Force and Crash Teams (U), 101715Z 
Apr 71. 


VII-22 





t 

u- 



i 


'• -TJ 


K 





UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER VIII 

REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES (U) 

PURPOSE 

(U) To this chapter is entrusted the mission of examining the 
impact of reduction of United States (US) forces from the Republic 
of Vietnam (RVN) on US military activity in Southeast Asia (SEA). 

APPROACH 

(U) Examination focuses on the following major areas: 

- Pre-1969 US consideration of disengagement from Vietnam; 

- Early efforts to strengthen the Republic of Vietnam Armed 
Forces (RVNAF); 

- Concept of Vietnamization; 

- President Nixon's decision to begin significant US troop 
redeployments based on criteria designed to govern the pattern and 
pace of such redeployments; 

- Salient features of each redeployment increment from the 
summer of 1969 to the present; 

- Influence of US political and economic considerations; and 

- Illustrative methods devised by US commanders to minimize 
problems generated by troop redeployments. 



UNCLASSIRFD 





PRE-1969 US CONSIDERATION OF DISENGAGEMENT 


(U) Commencing with the Kennedy administration, withdrawal 
of US forces from Vietnam became a topic of interest in various 
quarters. Reacting strongly to withdrawal sentiment, President 
Kennedy invoked the domino theory when he stated: "For us to with¬ 
draw from the effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam 
but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there. " Later, however, 
the President modified his position somewhat and stressed ultimate 
Vietnamese responsibility by stating: "It is their war. They are the 
ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give 
them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they 
have to win it, the people of Vietnam. 

(U) At the United Nations on 27 September 1966, Ambassador 
Arthur J. Goldberg commented as follows concerning withdrawal of 
US forces from Vietnam: "The United States stands ready to withdraw 
its forces as others withdraw theirs so that peace can be restored in 

South Vietnam, and favors international machinery ... to ensure 

2 

effective supervision of the withdrawal. " 

(U) Continuing this theme on 4 November 1966, President Johnson 
set forth the US position regarding removal of Allied troops from the 


RVN: 


VIII-2 



UNCLASSIFIED 




UNCLASSIFIED 

Our position is quite clear. We don't want to occupy that 
country . . . the seven participants in that conference [the Manila 
Summit Conference, 24 October 1966] felt that they wanted the entire 
world to know that if infiltration would cease, if the aggression would 
cease, if the violence would cease . . . the Allies would gladly 
reciprocate by withdrawing their troops, and that they would withdraw 
them in a period of not to exceed six months. ^ 

(U) As time passed, dissatisfaction over the course of the war 
arose within various segments of the US public, and the Johnson 
administration came under growing pressure to end US participation 
in the conflict. Many Americans seemed not to know exactly what 
aims their government was pursuing, while others, professing total 
understanding of Vietnam policy, expressed varying shades of disagree¬ 
ment concerning its wisdom. Among the factors involved were: 

- The tremendous financial burden caused by the war. Annual 
costs of US participation had increased steadily to almost $22 billion 

4 

in Fiscal Year 1969 (the peak year). These enormous costs had 
caused taxes to be raised and key domestic programs to be diluted 
or postponed. 

- The length of the war and the number of US casualties. 

These areas perturbed not only those of "dovish" persuasion but 
many "hawks" who were beginning to feel that results attained were 
not commensurate with the amount of American blood spilled. 


VIII-3 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 



- A growing feeling among many thoughtful Americans that, 
because of then existing draft deferment policies, the disadvantaged 
element of US youth, including those in racial minority status, was 
being forced to bear the brunt of the war while those young men of 
higher social and financial classes were able to avoid it. 

- Anti-administration and anti-war influence exerted by 
various of the news media. 

(U) Onto this scene burst the enemy's 1968 TET offensive whose 
shock effect, fanned by the "anti" media, caused many Americans 
to regard the war effort as futile. From within his own administration 
and from various of his closest advisors President Johnson was 
dissuaded from further major troop build up. Indeed, he announced 
on 31 March 1968 that he would not seek reelection and offered a 
partial halt to the bombing of North Vietnam (NVN) as an inducement 
to negotiations leading to peace and US unity. It was apparent that 
the US had taken a positive step toward winding down the war. A 
further step came on 1 November 1968 with total cessation of bombing. 

PRE-1969 EFFORTS TO UPGRADE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 

ARMED FORCES 

(S) Although the US had been concerned indirectly with strengthen¬ 
ing and upgrading the RVNAF during its support of the French - Viet 


VIII-4 

DRAFT 





DRAFT 

Minh war, through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 
Indochina, its first direct efforts came during the latter part of 1954 
in the wake of the Geneva Accords that signalled French military 
redeployment from Vietnam. To facilitate shifting of responsibility 
from French to US auspices, a combined organization entitled "Train¬ 
ing Relations and Instruction Mission" (TRIM), composed of French 
and US personnel under Major General John W. O'Daniel, Chief MAAG, 
Indochina, was created early in 1955. With phase-out of French 
representation by the fall of that year, the US role from then until 
1965 was limited to advising, training, and logistically supporting 

the RVNAF with the objective of guiding and assisting them until 

5 

they were able to protect their nation without outside help. 

(S) By early 1963, progress in the development of RVNAF was 
evident, but the overthrow of President Diem and the subsequent 
period of political uncertainty and lack of direction in the government 
triggered a process of military deterioration. As coup followed coup, 
military commanders at various levels changed frequently, troop 
morale dropped, desertions increased and RVNAF effectiveness 
declined sharply. Several demoralizing defeats by the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces in I and III Corps Tactical Zones 


VIII-5 

DRAFT 




(CTZ) compounded the situation. By early 1965 the situation was becom- 



combat forces to forestall what was considered to be the imminent 
probability of Communist victory. 

(S) With build up of its forces in RVN, the US concentrated its 
attention on military operations against the foe. The advisory pro¬ 
gram continued, but without benefit of equal emphasis and vigor. 

"The advisory effort . . . had become in reality US prosecution of 
7 

the war. " 

(U) Among programs stressed by General Westmoreland as 
Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
(COMUSMACV), to upgrade RVNAF during the years 1966-1968 were: 


- Developing leadership, both officer and NCO; 

- Streamlining RVNAF administrative procedures; 

- Raising troop morale by improving standards of living; 

- Enhancing training to increase combat proficiency; 

- Expanding the RVNAF force structure, to include imple¬ 


mentation of an effective and enforced mobilization program; 

- Equipping RVNAF with better weapons, especially the M16 




UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

- Stressing need to keep combat units up to strength, even at 
sacrifice of expansion goals. 

(U) Although progress was uneven and in some cases disappoint¬ 
ing in terms of accomplishment, by late 1967 General Westmoreland 
was able to conclude that "the trend of development of the Vietnamese 
Armed Forces was such that, given additional modern equipment, they 
could progressively take over a larger part of the war. One notes 
in this statement the keystone of what later was to be termed 
"Vietnamization. " 

(U) Despite progress in improving and modernizing the RVNAF 
prior to 1969, there was yet no suggestion that the balance of opposing 
forces would enable the US to begin reducing its forces in RVN. How¬ 
ever, in announcing a limited mobilization of reserves on 11 April 1968, 
Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford stated that the US troop ceil¬ 
ing in RVN would be 549,500 and that the Vietnamese forces eventually 
would begin to supplant some American troops in combat areas. 

Mr. Clifford added: "It might be that the American troops could be 
used elsewhere, that they could be drawn back into reserve. " 10 He 

did not say that American forces could be redeployed. Similarly, 
almost one year later, on 19 March 1969, Mr. Clifford's successor. 
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, stated after a trip to Vietnam: 


VIII-7 



UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

... I see no indication that we presently have a program 
adequate to bring about a significant reduction in the US military con¬ 
tribution to South Vietnam. The current operating assumption as 
stated to me is that even the currently funded modernization program 
for the South Vietnamese forces will equip them only to withstand the 
VC insurgents that would remain after all North Vietnam forces had 
been withdrawn to North Vietnam. Also, the presentation given to 
me by the MACV staff was based on the premise that no reduction 
in US personnel would be possible in the absence of total withdrawal 
of North Vietnamese troops. Our orientation seems to have been 
more on operations than on assisting the South Vietnamese to acquire 
the means to defend themselves. ^ 

PRESIDENTIAL REDEPLOYMENT DECISION 


(U) On 20 January 1969, as the Nixon administration assumed 
office, the situation as seen through its eyes could be summarized 
in these terms (as recapitulated by the President): 

- The war had been going on for four years; 

- 31, 000 Americans had been killed in action; 

- The training program for the South Vietnamese Armed 
Forces was behind schedule; 

- 540, 000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to 

reduce the number; 

- No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris; 

- The US had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal; 


VIII-8 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 


and 





- The war was causing deep division at home and criticism 

12 

from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad. 

(U) The announced aims of the Nixon administration were succinct: 

to stop the war in Vietnam and to terminate American involvement 
13 

there. Three possible means by which the US aims could be obtained 
suggested themselves to President Nixon: 

- The enemy might reduce his forces and/or the level of 
fighting in RVN; 

- The Paris negotiations could lead to a ceasefire agreement; 


or 

- The RVN could be strengthened so that it could defend 
itself against the present Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA) threats without major outside assistance. 

With the third possibility appearing to offer worthwhile possibilities, 

late in February 1969 the President dispatched Secretary Laird to 

RVN to reexamine the South Vietnamese war effort and the training 

14 

program for RVNAF. 

(S) At about the same time. General Abrams, by now having 
replaced General Westmoreland as COMUSMACV, announced in 
Saigon a three-faceted goal for 1969: 



I*_3 







. . . combat operations to defeat the enemy and promote 
security, increased effort to improve and modernize the RVN's armed 
forces, and a further emphasis on pacification and building the inchoate 
republic into a viable state. Each facet of this "one war" was to, and 
in fact did, receive equal attention. ^ 



Although the three major goals of the "one war" concept were 
to be given equal attention and priority, the most important objective, 
the one with the highest payoff, was the pacification program. The 
success of pacification would dictate the degree of improvement 
necessary in the RVNAF to transfer to them functions and responsibility. 
It would indirectly determine the speed with which US forces would be 
withdrawn. ^ 


(U) After the return of Secretary Laird, President Nixon stated 

that a new approach to our efforts to strengthen the Republic of Vietnam, 

termed "Vietnamization, " provided the key to an honorable solution to 

17 

the war and an end to US participation therein. If Vietnamization 
succeeded: 

- The RVN would be able to defend itself against both NVA and 
VC forces; 

- It would not matter if the Paris negotiations failed to pro¬ 
duce a ceasefire; and 

- The US could reduce its forces in RVN because they no 
longer would be needed. 

(U) Secretary Laird later defined Vietnamization as follows: 


VIII-10 




■- 






f - 




Vietnamization means a lot more than modernization of the 
South Vietnamese armed forces to permit their continuing assumption 
of more military responsibility. Vietnamization means the progressive 
transfer to the South Vietnamese of responsibility for all aspects of the 
war and management of their affairs; stronger government, stronger 
economy, stronger military forces, stronger police for internal 
security. 

(U) On 8 June 1969, at Midway Island, after discussion with 
President Thieu and General Abrams, President Nixon announced 
that training and equipping of RVNAF had been so successful that they 
could begin to replace US combat forces. Accordingly, he declared 
not only that he had decided on immediate redeployment of 25, 000 US 
troops, but that three criteria would determine the pace of future 
redeployments: 

- Progress in Vietnamization; 

- Progress in the Paris negotiations; and 

19 

- Decrease in the level of enemy activity. 

US TROOP REDUCTIONS, 1969-1971 
(S) When US redeployments began in the summer of 1969, Allied 
forces possessed a clear margin of superiority over the enemy in 
firepower, mobility and number of troops. In order to maintain the 
momentum of ongoing efforts and to insure maintenance of a prudent 
posture vis-a-vis the enemy during the period required to attain 


VIII-11 



i 




DRAFT 

RVNAF improvement and modernization objectives, it was decided 
at Washington level to predicate future redeployment on periodic 
assessments prepared by COMUSMACV and studied at each higher 
echelon (a process later to be termed the "cut and try approach"). 
Although all three of the Presidential criteria were to be considered 
in the assessment process, absence of negotiating progress in Paris 
led to concentration on the enemy threat, status and performance of 
RVNAF and progress of pacification: 

- Analysis of the NVA and VC threat included consideration 
of enemy infiltration rates, logistic activity, intensity and frequency 
of attacks, personnel gains and losses, reaction to US redeployments 
and use of sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam (NVN). 

- Appraisal of RVNAF included leadership, manpower 
availability versus requirements for activation of additional troop 
units, shift in the mission of ARVN units from support of pacifica¬ 
tion to operations against enemy main forces, development of 
territorial forces, combat performance of RVNAF in terms of 
activity and effectiveness, personnel management and morale support 
ing activities, intelligence, logistics, training and communications- 


VIII-12 

DRAFT 


electronics. 



- Assessment of pacification addressed progress achieved 
in strengthening territorial security, combatting terrorism (includ¬ 
ing neutralization of the VC infrastructure), expanding Peoples Self 
Defense Forces, improving local administrations, inducing enemy 
personnel to "rally" to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) (Chieu Hoi 
program), caring for and resettling refugees, expanding public 
information and advancing rural well-being, urban improvement and 
social development. ^ 

(C) Conclusions and recommendations associated with the periodic 
assessments were the product of judgment based on interplay of all 
factors, and were designed to facilitate redeployment decisions at the 
Washington level. In addition, they took cognizance of the political, 
economic and psychological climate within RVN. In time, as will be 
brought out later in the chapter, they required consideration of and 
were influenced by US political and economic developments. 

(U) Redeployment Increment I, applicable to the period between 

1 July 1969 and 31 August 1969, reduced the authorized US troop 

strength, or ceiling, in RVN by 25,000, from 549,500 to 524, 500. 

Major units redeployed were the 9th Infantry Division (-) and the 9th 

21 

Regimental Landing Team of the 3d Marine Division. 


VIII-13 





DRAFJ UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Increment II, between 15 September 1969 and 15 December 

1969, saw the ceiling lowered another 40, 500 spaces, to 484, 000, 

Major units redeployed were the remainder of the 3d Marine Division 

22 

and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. 

(U) Increment III, between 16 December 1969 and 15 April 1970, 

reduced authorized US troop strength by 50, 000, to a new figure of 

434, 000. The bulk of the troops departed after the Tet holiday in the 

interest of maintaining existing Allied strength during that potentially 

dangerous period. Major units redeployed were the 1st Infantry Division, 

3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and the 26th Marine Regimental 

23 

Landing Team. 

(U) On 20 April 1970, President Nixon announced that since progress 

in the Vietnamization program substantially had exceeded his original 

expectations, he was able to offer a longer-range withdrawal plan. 

Accordingly, he specified that 150, 000 US troops would be redeployed 

24 

through the spring of 1971 (subsequently defined as completion by 1 
May 1971). 

(U) Under Redeployment Increment IV, 50, 000 of the 150, 000 spaces 

cited by the President were redeployed between 16 April 1970 and 15 

October 1970, dropping the authorized level to 384, 000. Major units 

redeployed were the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, 199th Light 

25 

Infantry Brigade, and the 7th Marine Regimental Landing Team. 

nniirT vm-14 

DRAM unclassified 



(U) With Increment V, 16 October 1970 through 31 December 1970, 

the US troop ceiling was lowered by another 40,000 spaces to 344,000. 

Major units redeployed were the remainder of the 4th Infantry Division 

? A 

and the 25th Infantry Division (-). 

(U) During the period 1 January 1971 through 30 April 1971, Incre¬ 
ment VI featured a further reduction of 60, 000, to a new level of 
284,000. This fulfilled President Nixon's program announced on 
20 April 1970. Major units redeployed were the 1st Cavalry Division (-), 

2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-), 

27 

and the 5th Marine Regiment. 

(U) On 8 April 1971, the President announced a further withdrawal 
of 100, 000 between 1 May and 1 December 1971, thus establishing the 
ceiling at 184,000.^ 

(C) In connection with planning for and decisions concerning each 
redeployment increment, it is to be noted that appropriate coordination 
was effected between the US Government and the GVN, and between 
the US Government and Free World troop contributing countries. At 
both ambassadorial and military levels in Saigon, care was exercised 
to assure the GVN that the US was neither abandoning the Republic 
nor redeploying at a rate incommensurate with the planned pace of 
Vietnamization or insensitive to the time required by RVNAF to accept 


transfer of responsibility from US forces on an orderly basis. 

DRAFT 


29 






\ ■. 



iktft.ttfncf of tts political and economic considerations 


30 


(S) Returning to the process of periodic assessments designed to 
facilitate redeployment decisions, it became evident at US Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) level in mid-1970 that US 
political and economic considerations had, for all intents and purposes, 
supplanted the three Presidential criteria as the basis for redeployment 
decisions. As observed from MACV, this change exerted important 
influence on US and GVN military planning and on Vietnamization. 

(TS) Underlying the change referred to above were decisions taken 
by the US administration with respect to the Fiscal Year (FY) 1971 
budget and to the magnitude of draft calls for the latter portion of 
Calendar Year (CY) 1970 and early 1971. In each instance the decisions 
reflected pressure on the administration generated by increasing anti¬ 
war sentiment, mounting opposition to the draft and need to reduce the 
defense sector of the federal budget - -in part to permit funding of 
other programs; in part to reduce expenditures in connection with efforts 
to balance the budget. Congressional influence was manifest in con¬ 
nection with pressure to reduce defense expenditures. 

(TS) Against this backdrop the FY 1971 budget provided, among 
other things, for reduction in the US troop ceiling in Vietnam from 


VIII-16 






< 


DRAFT 

434, 000 as of 15 April 1970, to 260, 000 by the end of FY 1971 (30 June 
1971) -- a more extensive draw-down than understood by those in 
Saigon, and, very significantly, a reduction of greater magnitude 
than discussed with and utilized in planning with the GVN at the highest 
levels. Additionally, it called for reduction in tactical air strike 
effort of 20, 000 sorties per month at the beginning of FY 1971 to an 
average of approximately 14, 000 during the ensuing year. B-52 
sorties were to be reduced from 1,400 per month at the beginning of 
the fiscal year to 1,200 during the year. 



(TS) Although the foregoing did not make its way through joint 
channels to MACV as guidance during the first half of CY 1970, various 
indications of a tightened defense budget for FY 1971 did surface in 
service channels. Secretary of the Army Resor, for example, during 
the course of a visit to Vietnam early in July 1970, placed heavy 
stress on need for optimum resource management during FY 1971. 

This same theme received strong emphasis from General Westmoreland 
when he visited Vietnam several days later. The Secretary also called 
attention to the fact that MACV's assessments and redeployment 
recommendations called for a slower rate of Army troop reduction 
than the Army itself was planning under the FY 1971 budget. He noted 
that this had the effect of requiring the Army to fund for more forces 
for a longer period than countenanced under the FY 1971 budget. 


VIII-17 



(TS) Secretary Resor went on to underscore the Army's inability 
to overcome substantial manpower shortages within US Army, 

Vietnam, particularly those in infantry units wherein effectiveness 
had been reduced below desired standards and vulnerability to 
increased casualties had been heightened. It had been recognized 
by MACV in this case that action by the administration to reduce 
draft levies during the latter part of CY 1970 and the early part of 
CY 1971, coupled with failure of the Selective Service System to meet 
January, February and March 1970 draft calls, had imposed serious 
problems on the Army in connection with its efforts to erase the 
manpower deficit in Vietnam. Nonetheless, COMUSMACV had adhered 
to the position that the mission demanded full-strength maneuver units 
and that Army deficits should be eliminated. It was not, however, 
until early in August 1970 that MACV became aware of the acute nature 
and full ramifications of the Army's problem. In this instance, the 
facts were presented at Headquarters, United States Pacific Command 
and in Saigon by Lieutenant General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Personnel, DA Staff, who journeyed to Vietnam with 
approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

(TS^ In brief. General Kerwin explained that the Army would 
face continuing trained manpower shortages through the summer of 
1970 to January 1971, and that despite priority efforts to do so it could 


DRAHi 


VIII-18 



not restore deficits in Vietnam barring acceleration in the rate of 



redeployment of Army forces so as to narrow the gap between Army 
strength requirements in Vietnam and the Army's ability to meet those 
requirements. Although MACV wished to retain a higher level of 
Army forces in Vietnam for a longer period than would be possible 
under the Army formula, ultimately it accepted modification of the 
redeployment schedule for Army forces and altered the timing of 
Marine Corps redeployments to assist in meeting the Army's man¬ 
power problem. 


(TS) May and June of 1970 witnessed US-GVN incursion into the 
enemy s Cambodian sanctuaries. As these highly important operations 
came to a close, planning guidance reaching MACV through the joint 
channel reflected strong accent by the administration on need to portray 
successes attained by the operations and to exploit the demonstrated 
increase in RVNAF confidence, experience and morale stemming from 
the operations as a basis for efforts aimed at accelerating Vietnamiza- 
tion. Results of this approach were seen to be a speed-up in troop 
redeployment, reduction in US casualties and progressive lowering of 
the heavy burden of war costs. Planning guidance increasingly reflected 
the theme that Vietnamization not only is linked to the Nixon Doctrine, 
but inevitably will be used to measure the latter's validity and success. 


VIII-19 

DRAFT 





r r k 



t-.' 


erf- * 



EFFECTS'DF US REDEPLOYMENTS 


(C) As US troop strength declined, the RVNAF assumed 

increasingly greater responsibilities. Although there was continuing 

risk that the RVNAF could become overextended or overcommitted 

in the process, care was exercised to guard against this possibility. 

Moreover, it became apparent that US redeployments were having 

a beneficial effect on both the GVN and the RVNAF who realized they 

had to produce and who discovered that they were able to do so. As 

early as February 1970, even skeptical American newsmen found 

clear evidence of improvement in the combat efficiency, leadership 

and aggressiveness of RVNAF, although admittedly there remained 

31 

areas wherein significant progress was lacking. 

(C) Reference has been made earlier to demonstrated increase 
in RVNAF confidence, experience and morale stemming from the 
US-GVN operations into the enemy's Cambodian sanctuaries in May 
and June of 1970. To expand on this point, it became clear as the 
GVN forces continued their campagning in Cambodia following 
withdrawal of US units by the 30 June deadline established by President 
Nixon, that the operations had provided a dramatic boost to Viet- 
namization through their positive contribution to increased pride, 
know-how and overall effectiveness of the participating forces. Of 
equal importance, however, is the fact that the strong feeling of 

DRAFT 


VIII-20 




DRAFT jmaT'- . ' 

competence, strength and accomplishment on the part of the participat¬ 
ing forces (who were continuing to tie down major enemy forces, thereby 
reducing pressure that otherwise would be felt within the Republic it¬ 
self) carried over to non-participating forces countrywide. In his 
address to the nation on 3 June 1970, President Nixon forecast these 
developments by noting the contribution being made by the operations 

in buying time for RVNAF improvement and in strengthening the 

32 

morale of GVN forces. 

(C) A further outgrowth of the Cambodian operations is found in 
the strong degree to which both leaders and men became imbued with 
belief in their ability to meet the test of combat. Increasingly they 
manifested greater willingness and competence to undertake difficult 
operations, and proved themselves progressively more effective in 
battle. Of vital importance in this connection was their increasing 
capability to undertake operations on a unilateral basis and with 
reduced levels of US combat support and advisory assistance. 

Beyond RVN's borders they operated,and continue to operate, without 
US advisors. 

(S) By the end of 1970, performance of the expanding Vietnamese 
Air Force (VNAF) compared favorably with corresponding US air 
Force units. The competence and professionalism of the VNAF were 





J 


) 



evident particularly during operations in Cambodia. Also by year's 

end, the Vietnamese Navy (VNN), having become one of the ten largest 

in the world, had assumed responsibility for the bulk of the coastal 

surveillance and inland waterway operations formerly carried out by 

34 

US Navy forces alone or working in conjunction with VNN elements. 

(S) As the number of US maneuver battalions decreased, US 
ground operations declined in number and scope. Furthermore, with 
significantly fewer maneuver forces, the US command found itself 
less capable of influencing the action on the ground. To compensate 
for this anticipated development, it relied increasingly upon fire¬ 
power--artillery, gunships and tactical air--for this purpose. Inso¬ 
far as redeployments are concerned, this produced need to reduce 
ground, and to a lesser degree, carrier based tactical air at a slower 
pace than for ground forces. In relation to optimum use of US and 
RVNAF resources, the redeployment pattern witnessed retention of 
substantial US Army combat support assets, particularly lift heli¬ 
copters, gunships, air cavalry and artillery, to support ARVN. 

(U) In keeping with directive guidance from the Secretary of 
Defense that US ground combat forces would be withdrawn from com¬ 
bat by 1 May 1971 (subsequently changed to 1 July 1971), it became 
evident that US Army combat units could expect to assume the primary 


VIII-2 2 



) 


DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED 

35 

mission of security of US bases. With attainment of this posture, 
remaining effort on the part of all US forces could be foreseen as 
support of RVNAF on a decreasing scale during the final phase of its 
growth and development, plus what could be described as ’’dynamic 
base defense." For planning purposes, the US troop reduction pro¬ 
gram is visualized as culminating in a residual military assistance 
advisory group charged with facilitating continued RVNAF progress 
in Vietnamization. 

(U) With reduction in US troop strength and corresponding 

decrease in US ground operations, US battle casualties declined 

steadily. As Secretary Resor stated on 12 October 1970, "In the 

first nine months of 1970, US casualties have been reduced to less 

3 6 

than one-half of what they were during the same period in 1969. " 

(U) Decline in American troop morale incident to force reduction 

3 7 

became a principal concern to the US command. It was an unfortunate 
paradox that this problem stemmed, at least in part, from the success 
of the Vietnamization program. As US forces turned over the burden 
of active fighting to the RVNAF and accelerated redeployments, a 
predictable ebb in morale could be discerned. 

- Racial clashes, combat refusals and both attempted and 
successful attacks on officers and noncommissioned officers by 
disgruntled personnel increased. 

DRAFT vui - 23 

UNCLASSIFIED 


DKAFT unclassified 

- Apprehensions for drug abuse rose sharply in 1970, with 
heroin addicts accounting for five to ten percent of those apprehended. 

(U) Part of the problem could be traced to relative inactivity and 
boredom; troops were being challenged by considerably less fighting 
and support of fighting than before. As one soldier, comparing his 
previous tour with his present one, put it: "It was different last 
time. There was a war on then, and Charlie was kicking up some 

hell. There wasn't time to be hassling us about keeping boots shined 

39 

and laying off 'grass'. " Another source of irritation was the fact 

that as redeployments proceeded, many housing and recreational 

facilities were consolidated or closed, making living conditions more 

40 

difficult for troops staying behind. Still another exacerbating factor 
was loss of a sense of mission among elements of US troops remain¬ 
ing in RVN.^ Newsweek magazine saw fit to aggrandize this factor 

into a general finding by stating on 11 January 1971: "Few soldiers 

42 

still believe in the war. " Certainly some soldiers just arriving 
manifested lack of understanding of why they were needed under 
circumstances in which forces were being redeployed. Others 
evidently misunderstood official US Government pronouncements. 

On 31 May 1971, for example, Iver Peterson reported in The New 
York Times that many soldiers "believed that they would not have to 

VIII-24 

AFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 








UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

go into the field after May 1st when they read reports that Defense 

Secretary Melvin R. Laird had set that date for the end of American 

43 

combat operations. " As one rifleman put it, according to US News 

World Report : "We're getting out anyway. So why should I be the 

44 

last man killed in this no-good war?" This since has gained prom¬ 
inence as the "last man" syndrome. 

(U) With decrease in combat activity, amounting in many cases to 
a complete lull, along with a corresponding decline in US casualties, 
carelessness and loss of alertness made their appearance. Two 
events in the spring of 1971 illustrate the consequences. 

- The first occurred on 28 March, when enemy sappers 

successfully penetrated the perimeter of Fire Support Base Mary 

45 

Anne under cover of a mortar attack and killed 33 Americans. 

- The second occurred on 23 May at Cam Ranh Bay--long 

considered one of the least vulnerable US installations in RVN--when 

enemy sappers slipped through the perimeter defenses and blew up 

46 

some 1. 5 million gallons of aviation fuel. 

(U) Commenting on these incidents, General Abrams is reported 
to have stated: "There is a climate now which is the same as when we 
were approaching V-E Day in World War II. An atmosphere begins 
to prevail, and with it comes a certain amount of laxity. It takes a 
herculean effort to keep alertness up; it just requires a lot of attention. 

D 

UNCLASSIFIED 


;AFT 


VIII-25 





UNCLASSIFIED 


DRRFT 

COPING WITH THE PROBLEM 

(U) In extension of COMUSMACV's accent on command emphasis 
in dealing with morale and disciplinary problems generated by 
redeployment, a number of remedial programs were adopted. 

- On 28 October 1970, General Abrams, supported by higher 

authority, approved a new leave policy which granted US military 

personnel one 14-day leave during a normal RVN tour and permitted 

travel to Continental United States (CONUS) if desired. The 14-day 

leave was additive to the normal six-day "R&R" (rest and recreation) 

for which all personnel were eligible. US airlines were quick to 

support the new program, offering round-trip charter flights to the 

4-8 

CONUS during that month. Subsequent assessment supports the 
conclusion that the policy has been beneficial in its relevance to 
morale and discipline. 

- Through command channels and information media, per¬ 
sonnel were encouraged to take advantage of both the normal six-day 
out-of-country R&R program and the three-day in-country R&R pro¬ 
gram. 

- A religious retreat center was opened at Cam Ranh Bay to 
fulfill the needs of soldiers desiring spiritual reflection, rededication 


VIII-2 6 



UNCLASSIFIED 


and strengthening. 



DRAFIf UNCLASSIFIED 

- US Army, Vietnam, instituted a command-wide sports pro¬ 
gram exploiting the challenge of small unit competition at installation 
level as well as country-wide championships. Illustrative of this 
undertaking was action on the part of an infantry battalion commander 
in the 1st Cavalry Division who devised a series of competitions in 

military arts plus a "winter Olympics" in which companies competed 

49 

in softball, volleyball, riflery and comparable activities. 

- In August 1970, a drug abuse task force was formed at 

Headquarters, MACV in an attempt to identify key factors and to 

establish corrective measures. Conclusions of the task force were 

embodied in MACV Directive 190-4, published in December 1970. 

Among other things, the directive established an expanded drug 

50 

suppression program to be coordinated by MACV. All command 
information media were enlisted in support of the program. Pacific 
Stars and Stripes , for example, was utilized to inform troops of the 
dangers of narcotics addiction. This campaign, called "Cold Turkey, " 
evoked a favorable response as evidenced by requests for copies of 
materials made available by the newspaper. Under Department of 
Army auspices an amnesty program was instituted to afford the drug 
user freedom to seek treatment and rehabilitation without incurring 
penalties established by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

In May 1971 formal representations were made by the US 
Government to the GVN on need for meaningful GVN "crack-down" 

VIII-2 7 

UNCLASSIFIED 







UNCLASSIFIED 



on widespread narcotics trade--more particularly, on smuggling of 

51 

narcotics into RVN. This initiative resulted in positive action on 
the part of President Thieu who, in addition to manifesting under¬ 
standing of the drug problems confronting US forces, was impressed 
by the magnitude of financial loss occasioned by corruption within 
his customs service. Results of the GVN offensive necessarily 
await future assessment. 

- In addition to educational and rehabilitative measures, the 
drug suppression program included an intensified enforcement cam¬ 
paign. Dogs trained to detect marihuana were employed to good 
effect, as was screening of packages introduced into the postal 
system. "Pushers" became the object of concerted effort aimed at 
their apprehension and prosecution. . 

- Control of weapons and ammunition, especially in rear 
areas where the danger of enemy ground attack was relatively slight, 
was tightened in furtherance of efforts to reduce "fraggings" and 
comparable attacks against officers and noncommissioned officers. 

- To combat general relaxation and loss of alertness. 
General Abrams directed his commanders to re-emphasize combat 
fundamentals in their units and to devote their attention to insuring 


that personnel were alert and wary at all times. 


52 


VIII-28 



UNCLASSIFIED 



(U) Reduction of US forces from RVN stems from a deliberate 
political decision by the US administration to achieve an honorable 
solution to the war and to terminate US participation therein. 

(TS) Political, economic and psychological pressures have 
affected both US-GVN military planning and US troop redeployments. 
Prominent among the influencing factors have been desire on the 
part of the US administration to reduce casualties and to lower the 
cost of the war, in the latter case as reflected by budgetary cuts 
based on decisions largely divorced from the enemy threat and 
military recommendations. 

(U) Within the framework of Vietnamization, US troop redeploy¬ 
ments have had a salutary effect on the RVNAF which came to realize 
it had to produce. 

(U) With winding down of the war and reduction of US forces from 
Vietnam, various problems relating to decline in morale, alertness 
and discipline have tested the US command. Major emphasis has been 
accorded development of programs to cope with this situation and to 
overcome the problems involved. 




UNCLASSIFIED 



CHAPTER VIH 

REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES (U) 

1. Schlesinger, Arthur M. , Vietnam and American Foreign Policy , 

ed. John R. Boettiger, Lexington, Mass: D. C. Health and Company, 
1968, pp. 24-25. 

2. Rept (FOUO) Corona Harvest, United States Policy Toward South¬ 
east Asia , 1943-1968 , A Chronological Compendium (U), USAF 
Historical Division, 1968, p. 448 (U). 

3. Ibid. , p. 455 (U). 

4. Stanley R. Resor, Address to World Affairs Council, Dallas, 

Texas, 5 Nov 70. 

5. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, pp. 212-17. 

6. Ibid. , p. 211. 

7. Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist, 1969 (U), Vol I, p. 1 (S). 

8. Rept (U), Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 68), CINCPAC 
and COMUSMACV, 1969, pp. 212-17. 

9. Ibid. , p. 219. 

10. Bob Horton, Associated Press Dispatches A024 and A025, 
Washington, D. C. , 11 Apr 68. 

11. Melvin R. Laird, Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, 19 Mar 69. 

12. Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation, 3 Nov 69. 

13. Melvin R. Laird, Interview, US News and World Report , 7 Apr 69. 

14. Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, 4 Mar 69. 


VIII-30 



UNCLASSIFIED 











15. 


UNCLASSIFIED 



Rept (TS-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist, 1969 (U), Vol I, p. 1 (S). 

16. Ibid. , p. 2 (S). 

17. Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation, 3 Nov 69. 

18. Melvin R. Laird, Address to National Press Club, Washington, 

D. C. , 25 Sep 69. 

19. Richard M. Nixon, Statement at Midway Island, 8 Jun 69. 

20. Author's Personal Files. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Ibid. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation, 20 Apr 70. 

25. Author's Personal Files. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Ibid. 

28. Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation, 8 Apr 71. 

29. Author's Personal Files. 

30. Author's Personal Knowledge, while MACV Chief of Staff, June 
1965 -April 1967. 

31. "Vietnamization: Will it Work? ," Newsweek, 9 Feb 70, pp. 15-18. 

32. Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation, 3 Jun 70. 

33. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist, 1970 (U), Vol II, p. VII-109 (S). 

34. Ibid., p. VII-105 (C). ■ 




/ 


VIII-31 



UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

35. Melvin R. Laird, as quoted in The Philadelphia Inquirer (UPI 
Dispatch), 8 Jan 71, p. 2. 

36. Stanley Resor, Address to Annual Meeting of the Association of 
the US Army, Washington, D. C. , 12 Oct 70. 

37. Peter A. Jay and Peter Osnos, "Morale, War Ebb Together, " 
Washington Post, 27 Dec 70, p. 28. 

38. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist, 1970 (U), Vol I, p. 1-6 (S). 

39. Jay and Osnos, p. 28. 

40. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist, 1970 (U), Vol II, p. XII-1 (U). 

41. Ibid. 

42. "The Troubled U.S. Army in Vietnam," Newsweek, 11 Jan 71, p. 30. 

43. Iver Peterson, "Pullout is Not Seen as Threat," The New York 
Times , 1 Jun 71, p. 5. 

44. "As Fighting Slows in Vietnam: Breakdown in GI Discipline," 

US News and World Report , 7 Jun 71, p. 16. 

45. "Reds Kill 33 GIs in Fire Base Attack, " Pacific Stars and Stripes, 

31 Mar 71, p. 24. 

46. "Withdrawal Pains," Newsweek , 7 Jun 71, p. 41. 

47. Ibid. 

48. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist, 1970 (U), Vol II, pp. XII-25-27 
(FOUO). 

49. Jay and Osnos, p. 28. 

50. Rept (S-NOFORN), MACV Comd Hist, 1970(U), Vol II, pp. XII-4-6 (U). 

51. Keyes Beech, "Premier's Kin Tied to Drugs, " Chicago Daily News , 

3 Jun 71, p. 4. 

52. "Withdrawal Pains," Newsweek , 7 Jun 71, p. 41. 

VIII-32 

DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 






















UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

CHAPTER IX 

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 


"This war is the most difficult war any army 
has ever fought. Certainly, it is the most diffi¬ 
cult war any Army of the United States of America 
has fought. Because this is the first time in our 
history when we have had a lack of understanding 
of why we are here, what the war is all about, 
where we have had real division at home. " 

President Richard M. Nixon, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, 

Di An, RVN, 30 July 1969. 

(U) Salient conclusions developed by each chapter are summarized 
below. 


Chapter I - Rules of Engagement 

(U) Nonmilitary considerations have exerted strong, continuing 
and generally restrictive influence on ROE governing conduct of 
ground, sea and air operations in SEA. Broadly speaking, ROE have 
affected military operations in SEA by: 

- Frustrating the application of air power against NVN, 

- Preventing adequate ground engagement of enemy base 
areas and LOC in sanctuaries, including the DMZ, 

- Reducing the effectiveness of air interdiction of the 
enemy's base areas and LOC, and 


DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 




UNCLASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

- Increasing the vulnerability of friendly forces. 

(U) During the 1965-71 period, ROE as utilized in SEA moved in 
the direction of improving the effectiveness of US military forces, 
while at the same time insuring maximum protection for noncombatants 
and civilian property. 

(U) ROE pertaining to the DMZ have continued to place US-GVN 
forces at a disadvantage by restricting them primarily to defensive 
reaction to enemy offensive initiatives. 

Chapter II - Free World Military Assistance Forces 

(U) The "more flags" concept produced additional forces to 
confront aggression in the Republic of Vietnam, thereby strengthen¬ 
ing the anti-communist front of the Free World. However, unilateral 
political and economic factors, plus constraints imposed by the 
principal Free World troop contributing countries on the employment 
of their forces, has diminished their effectiveness. Allied command 
and control arrangements that have evolved in RVN have provided a 
reasonable, though not wholly satisfactory, basis for coordination 
and cooperation among all Free World elements within the limits 
established by political facts of life. 


IX-2 


DRAFT 

UNCLASSIFIED 




Chapter III - The Buddhist Uprising in 1966 

(C) Although the GVN emerged from the Buddhist crisis of 1966 
considerably strengthened politically and psychologically, the crisis 
had a temporarily detrimental effect on the war effort, particularly 
in the I Corps Tactical Zone. During the crisis, both United States 
and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces were forced to turn their 
attention from exerting maximum pressure on the enemy. 


Chapter IV - Effect of Truces on United States and Allied Operations 

(U) The enemy has yet to honor in full a truce in Vietnam. Con¬ 
versely, he consistently has used truce periods to enhance attainment 
of political and military objectives. US and allied forces have been 
placed at a military disadvantage during these periods. Over the 
years, however, the pattern of enemy violations has produced 
heightened vigilance and pre-planned countermeasures on the part 
of friendly forces with resultant lessening of disadvantage. 

(U) The enemy's truce violation at the outset of Tet 1968 was a 
major strategic error on his part -- one that constituted precisely 
the "Pearl Harbor" needed to rally the South Vietnamese people. 

(U) With the exception of their use in prisoner of war exchanges, 
truces have been politically motivated and militarily unjustifiable. 


IX-3 


UNCL 




it • , • » » 

.ri..a£ir 


DRAFT 



t 




Chapter V - Policies Governing the Use of Air Power 

(U) Both strategic and tactical air -- the latter in its reconnais¬ 
sance, airlift and strike roles -- have contributed in major degree to 
of allied objectives in SEA. Employment of air power in 
SEA has been most effective in RVN by virtue of fewer restrictions 
imposed on air operations in that country. 

(TS) Political constraints, notably in the realm of targetting 
policy, have prevented fully effective and sustained application of 
air power against the enemy in NVN and Laos. 

(TS) Beginning in FY 1970, budgetary decisions have been 
responsible for progressive decline in availability and effectiveness 
of US air power in SEA. These decisions have had only marginal 
relevance to the enemy threat and to military requirements presented 
by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. 



Chapter VI - Prior Proposals for and the Limited Incursion into Cambodia 

(U) US political restrictions on conduct of operations against the 
Cambodian sanctuaries during the 1964 - May 1970 period enhanced 
the enemy's combat and logistic posture, placed allied forces in RVN 
at decided intelligence and operational disadvantage, and produced 
unnecessarily heavy friendly casualties, military and civilian, over 


IX-4 

DRAFT 


an extended period. 


T . 


$ ■* 





T "F- Cr C V i ' j 


(S) Divergence of professional judgment on the nature and extent 
of VC/NVA supply activity in Cambodia as between COMUSMACV and 
Washington level intelligence agencies served to delay decisions in 
support of the military's quest for authority to counter enemy exploi¬ 
tation of Cambodia. 

(U) Opposition by segments of the US public and the Congress 
to the US-RVN incursions into the enemy's Cambodian base areas 
affected decisions on the depth of penetration by US forces of the 
sanctuary complex, duration of operations by US forces and prohibi¬ 
tion against reentry of US ground units into Cambodia following 
termination of the incursion. 


Chapter VII - Prisoner of War Issue 

(U) Although the status of prisoners of war, particularly that of 
captured US pilots, has generated intense public concern, motivated 
official and private initiatives designed to improve the situation, and 
prompted development of a sophisticated PW recovery mechanism, it 
has exerted only minor influence on the conduct of military operations 
in SEA. 


Chapter VIII - Reduction of United States Forces 

(U) Reduction of US forces from RVN stems from a deliberate 
political decision by the US administration to achieve an honorable 


DC-5 


DRAFT 






solution to the war and to terminate US participation therein. 

(TS) Political, economic and psychological pressures have affected 
both US-GVN military planning and US troop redeployments. Promi¬ 
nent among the influencing factors has been desire on the part of the 
US administration to reduce casualties and to lower the cost of the 
war, in the latter case as reflected by budgetary cuts based on 
decisions largely divorced from the enemy threat and military recom¬ 
mendations. 

(U) Within the framework of Vietnamization, US troop redeploy¬ 
ments have had a salutary effect on the RVNAF which came to realize 
it had to produce. 

(U) With winding down of the war and reduction of US forces from 
Vietnam, various problems relating to decline in morale, alertness 
and discipline have tested the US command. Major emphasis has 
been accorded development of programs to cope with this situation 
and to overcome the problems involved. 





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